Humanitarian Governance in Colonial New Zealand (1833 - 1872) by Woodbury, Matthew
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Humanitarian Governance in Colonial New Zealand (1833 - 1872) 
 
by 
 
Matthew Marshall Woodbury 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(History) 
in The University of Michigan 
2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
  
 Associate Professor Kali A. K. Israel, Co-Chair 
 Professor Mrinalini Sinha, Co-Chair 
 Professor Pamela Ballinger 
 Professor Emeritus Richard P Tucker 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthew Marshall Woodbury 
 
mwoodbur@umich.edu 
 
ORCID id: 0000-0003-3792-8155 
 
 
 
© Matthew Marshall Woodbury 2018 
 
 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Dr. Marsha Cook Woodbury,  
with gratitude for her support and encouragement. 
  
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 Historical inquiry can sometimes be an isolating task. Though compensated by moments 
of quiet but elated archival discovery and the joys of putting the finishing touch on a piece of 
writing, my happiest moments have been spent with the people and communities that made this 
work possible. Two unflappable co-chairs, Mrinalini Sinha and Kali Israel, provided a wealth of 
guidance and perspective at all stages of the project. Their astute commentary, insightful 
questions, and deep reservoirs of knowledge were crucial to the dissertation’s success. Pamela 
Ballinger’s introduction to the field of humanitarian history opened my eyes afresh to a topic I 
thought I knew. Her suggestions and feedback were central to how this project engages 
humanitarian action. Richard Tucker’s perspectives on the connection between environment and 
warfare proved especially valuable and his graciousness throughout is a model I aspire to 
emulate. The failings of this dissertation are, of course, mine alone. 
 Arriving at the University of Michigan, I had no real concept of what rich academic 
opportunities awaited. Coursework and seminars with Brandi Hughes, Damon Salesa, Douglas 
Northrop, Howard Brick, Kathleen Canning, Marty Pernick, and Sueann Caulfield sharpened my 
thinking about political economy, global history, intersectionality, and ways of teaching it. A 
public history course with Michelle McClellan not only opened up a world of thinking about 
how broader publics engage the past, but also introduced me to a community of scholars – 
among them Adam Johnson, Jacki Antonovich, and Joe Cialdella – who are also interested in 
history’s role beyond the university. 
My Michigan education would have been impossible without the resources of the 
University of Michigan Libraries. To all the librarians and staff who helped find books, make 
maps, and scan obscure articles, thank you. The History Department and Eisenberg Institute staff 
of Dawn Kapalla, Diana Denny, Greg Parker, Kathleen King, Kimberly Smith, Lorna Altstetter, 
Sue Douglas, and Terre Fischer made my slow progress through the various stages of the 
doctorate an administrative dream. I’m also deeply appreciative of financial support from the 
University of Michigan’s Department of History; Rackham Graduate School; Center for 
European Studies; the Law School’s Race, Law, and History Program; the Alumni Association; 
and the International Institute. 
 During my years in the program I have been the fortunate beneficiary of the friendship, 
counsel, and support of a remarkable cohort. While the potlucks, happy hours, and road trips to 
iv 
 
places near and far from Ann Arbor are most salient in my mind, the intellectual work of 
dissertation would also not have been possible without Aaron Seamen, Brady G’sell, Kate 
Silbert, Nora Krinitsky, Sophie Hunt, and Tapsi Mathur. My gratitude to this crew is exceeded 
only by collective consumption of wine and cheese. Nick Rinehart arrived in my life halfway 
through this process and has been of invaluable personal and emotional support during the final 
years of the doctoral journey. His patience and understanding eased the burden of long days of 
research and writing. 
Colleagues and friends in the History Department were also crucial interlocutors in 
conceptualizing and framing the dissertation. The European History Workshop provided early 
experience in reading and talking about ideas. I am particularly thankful for feedback about 
chapters, conference papers, and job talks provided by Alyssa Reiman, Andres Pletch, Andrew 
Rutledge, Chelsea Del Rio, David Spreen, Emma Thomas, Jaqueline Larios, Joseph Ho, Kate 
Wroblewski, Leslie Hempson, Marie Stango, Marvin Chochotte, Noah Blan, Sara Katz, Sarah 
Mass, Tiggy McLaughlin, Trevor Kilgore, and Yanay Israeli. 
 For five years the Michigan Branch of the Telluride Association was my home. Over 
long dinners, longer house meetings, and debates about community service, intellectual inquiry, 
and democratic self-governance I could rely on Arden Finn, Lisa Lau, Madeline Huberth, 
Melinda Kothbauer, Michele Wogaman, Nils Stannik, and Yourui Yeo to remind me that a world 
existed outside of history. The amount of patience and determination it takes to write a 
dissertation is only matched by the forbearance of those who have to witness somebody go 
through it. My friends Jan Machielsen, Kristin Emilsson, Laurel Gabler, Meredith Fahrner, 
Michaela Oldfield, and Ryoko Oono bore the burden of my successes and failures with aplomb 
and good humor. As shown by the dedication, I am grateful to my mother Marsha Woodbury for 
supporting my academic choices, even when they are years in the making, and encouraging me 
to keep a healthy perspective about the world and the people in it.  
  
v 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
DEDICATION ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS vi 
 
MAP OF NEW ZEALAND  vii 
  
ABSTRACT viii 
 
PROLOGUE 1 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the New Zealand Company 
 
INTRODUCTION 13 
Humanitarian Governance in New Zealand (1830 - 1872) 
 
CHAPTER 1 43 
A Theatre of Dangers 
Theories of Humanitarian Governance and Maori Protection (1833 - 1840) 
   
CHAPTER 2 85 
An Uneasy Submission 
The New Zealand Company and the Protectorate of Aborigines (1840 - 1846) 
  
CHAPTER 3 129 
To Gain Their Confidence and Attachment 
Humanitarian Governance in Health, Education, Economy and the Law (1845 – 1856) 
 
CHAPTER 4 176 
English in Spirit if not Absolutely in their Form  
Trusteeship, Humanitarian Institutions, and Individualizing Native Space (1854 - 1865) 
 
CHAPTER 5 226 
A Shadow of Responsibility 
Humanitarian Governance at War (1860 - 1872) 
 
CONCLUSION 282 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 287 
  
vi 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVATIONS 
 
 
AJHR  Appendix to the Journal of the New Zealand House of Representatives 
 
ANZ  Archives New Zealand 
 
APS  Aborigines’ Protection Society 
 
CMS  Church Missionary Society 
 
GBPP  Parliamentary Papers of Great Britain 
 
NZC  New Zealand Company 
 
TNA  The National Archives [UK] 
vii 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
“Humanitarian Governance in Colonial New Zealand” focuses on a landmark 
intervention, Britain’s 1840 annexation of New Zealand, to show how officials, settlers, and 
indigenous Māori implemented a transnational discourse of humanitarian care within the colony. 
Invoking favorable impressions of Māori capacity for “civilization,” British proponents of 
colonization in the 1830s and 1840s advocated planned settlement and an intentional approach to 
managing indigenous peoples. New Zealand constituted an early experiment in humanitarian 
governance – defined as the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral 
principle – as a solution to the grim consequences European settlement entailed for aboriginal 
populations. 
Uncertainly surrounding the terms of annexation, competition between a private company 
and the British government, and the colonial state’s lack of military power relative to Māori 
slowed early efforts at implementing policies of humanitarian governance. The dissertation 
examines several areas of government action – land reserved for Māori, the administration of 
health and education, and programs promoting legal assimilation – to show how colonial 
officials initially deployed humanitarian governance as the only viable means of assimilating 
Māori into the colonial state. With the arrival of more colonists in the 1850s and London’s 
devolution of authority over Māori affairs to New Zealand, humanitarian governance became 
more assertive. Instead of seeking Māori participation, settlers prioritized the individualization of 
communal lands and accelerated the legal assimilation of Māori communities. 
A hardening of racial attitudes toward indigenous peoples throughout the British Empire, 
and a decade of intermittent warfare in the 1860s, reframed practices of governance. If in the 
1840s agents of empire implemented ideas of humanitarian governance as an experiment in 
colonization and a way of encouraging Māori engagement with the colonial state, by the 1870s 
the government conceptualized humanitarian governance as a way to limit Māori autonomy and 
justify interventions in the name of progress. 
 
Prologue: Edward Gibbon Wakefield and the New Zealand Company 
In June 1836, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, a noted advocate of British colonization, spent 
four days testifying before the British Parliament’s Select Committee on Colonial Lands. At 
forty-years-old with “fair complexion, fine skin, and fine intellectual forehead,” Wakefield’s 
notability derived from a scandalous personal life, a campaign against capital punishment, and 
from writings regarding Britain’s overseas settlements.1 His Letter from Sydney, published in 
1829 as he finished a prison sentence for abducting the fifteen-year-old heiress Ellen Turner, 
adopted the voice of an Australian settler arguing for colonial emigration as a solution to 
Britain’s overpopulation and Australia’s demand for labor.2 Four years later, the two volumes of 
England and America compared the sources of wealth and civilization in each country.3 Instead 
of the chaos of unregulated migration, Wakefield promoted reproducing British social, political, 
and economic models as the key to colonial success. Contrasting what he characterized as the 
prevailing view of colonies as “fit only for the residence of convicts, labourers, mechanics, and 
desperate or needy men,” Wakefield instead argued colonies could extend British influence 
through organized settlement while simultaneously resolving demographic pressures at home.4   
1 David Moss, “Wakefield, Edward Gibbon (1796–1862),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28415. 
2 Edward Gibbon Wakefield, A Letter From Sydney, The Principal Town of Australasia, ed. Robert Gourger 
(London: Joseph Cross, 1829). 
3 Edward Gibbon Wakefield, England and America: A Comparison of the Social and Political State of Both Nations 
(London: Richard Bentley, 1833). In this text Wakefield examines the impact of the frontier and the connections 
between economic production, development, and civilization. The resultant political economy would be a feature of 
Wakefield’s plans. 
4 Edward Gibbon Wakefield, The New British Province of South Australia, 2nd ed. (London: C. Knight, 1835), 128. 
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An intentional approach at the moment of a colony’s establishment, according to 
Wakefield, was necessary for future success. Income generated from the sale of land would 
subsidize the passage of landless and poor laborers from Britain. His proposals, developed in 
conversation with the National Colonisation Society – a group that included Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill among its membership – were well-received and influenced Britain’s 
annexation of South Australia in 1834.5 Wakefield’s ruminations about structuring the 
relationship between land and people in colonial spaces remained influential throughout the 
1830s as Britain considered new ways to manage its North American colonies.6 Given his 
expertise in colonial land management he was an especially valuable witness for the Select 
Committee on Colonial Lands. Charged with investigating land ownership in Britain’s far-flung 
empire, the British Parliament asked the committee to determine best practices of land ownership 
in colonies to which emigrants were heading. 
Wakefield’s testimony before the Select Committee on Colonial Lands reiterated the 
importance of balancing land, labor, and capital. Referring to South Australia, he underscored 
regulating the supply of land as crucial to the success of any colonial venture hoping to attract 
British settlement. The disposal of “waste land” – that is land considered vacant and unowned – 
formed the “very basis of the fabric, the foundation, upon which all is to be raised” of 
settlement.7 Controlling who could own what land was the central mechanism allowing the 
reproduction of British society overseas. Instead of an itinerant and spatially diffused population 
5 South Australia Colonisation Act 1834 (4 & 5 Will. IV c. 95) 
6 Wakefield served as a private secretary to John Lambton, Earl of Durham, during the latter’s trip to Canada and 
publication of a Report on the Affairs of North America that recommended the unification of Upper and Lower 
Canada with an elected representative body empowered with a wide range of perogatives. Lord Durham was also a 
director of the New Zealand Company. 
7 GBPP, 1836 (512) Select Committee on Colonial Lands, Minutes of Evidence: E. G. Wakefield, 22 June 1836, 48. 
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of shepherds that characterized the older Australian colonies of Victoria and New South Wales, 
Wakefield’s plan promised a careful balance of capitalist and laborer, land owner and tenant. 
Wakefield’s efforts constituted a set of “experiments designed to ensure the evils of 
English society would not be reproduced and to prevent the evils of frontier societies from taking 
root.”8 The key was establishing a “sufficient price” for land set high enough to preclude the 
easy acquisition of land by laborers and consequent dispersal of population but not so high as to 
discourage capitalists form investing. At the end of his testimony, when asked about Britain’s 
future as a colonizing power, Wakefield mentioned that “[v]ery near to Australia there is a 
country, which all testimony concur[ed] in describing as the fittest country in the World for 
colonization; as the most beautiful country, with the finest climate, and the most productive 
soil[.]”9 His pivotal role in promoting the colonization of that country, New Zealand, occupied 
much of his energy in the late 1830s and in the summer of 1840 it was New Zealand that again 
brought him before a Parliamentary Select Committee. 
In February 1840 British representatives signed the Treaty of Waitangi with several 
dozen Māori leaders and brought New Zealand under the protection of the British Crown. 
Though the treaty itself was rushed in its execution, the possibility of annexing New Zealand had 
a longer history. Following an 1838 investigation by the House of Lords, by 1840 the British 
Parliament acknowledged New Zealand’s suitability for colonization with potential derived from 
its “geographical position, the fertility of its soil, the salubrity of its climate, its rivers, its 
harbours, [and] its natural productions.”10 The treaty constituted a milestone in the establishment 
8 Erik Olssen, “Mr Wakefield and New Zealand as an Experiment in Post-Enlightenment Experimental Practice,” 
New Zealand Journal of History 31, no. 2 (1997): 198. 
9 GBPP, 1836 (512) Select Committee on Colonial Lands, Minutes of Evidence: E. G. Wakefield, 27 June 1836, 
108. 
10 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Report of the Committee, 30 July 1840, vi. 
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of British authority and influence in the islands that had begun with the appointment of a consul 
in 1833 and had slowly intensified during the early 19th century. 
One of the reasons for the Treaty’s rushed implementation was pressure put on the British 
government by Wakefield’s New Zealand Company. Organized in 1838 with the purpose of 
establishing a colony in New Zealand, the Company had begun purchasing land in New Zealand 
in 1839. Unsettled by this unsanctioned venture, troubled by reports of growing chaos in New 
Zealand, lobbied by the missionaries, and threatened by rumors of French interest in the region, 
the British government under the Whig administration of Viscount Melbourne authorized 
annexation. Charged with this task and appointed Lieutenant Governor of New Zealand for this 
purpose was William Hobson. Along with his secretary James Freeman and the British Resident 
James Busby Hobson had drafted the document at Busby’s house at Waitangi. The Anglican 
missionary Henry Williams translated the treaty into Māori and it was signed on the February 6 
1840. 
The establishment of British administration in New Zealand was not universally praised. 
Influential missionary movements and non-signatory Māori expressed their displeasure with the 
proceedings at Waitangi.11 Unlike other examples of colonial expansion based largely on 
military conquest or assumptions of terra nullius, however, advocates of annexation pointed to 
the contractual and joint nature of the document as marking a qualitative shift in the history of 
empire. Instead of relying on force, New Zealand’s annexation via a treaty recognizing the rights 
of Māori established New Zealand as an experiment in colonial governance. Given the rushed 
11 Richard Boast and Richard Hill, Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land (Wellington: Victoria University 
Press, 2009); Richard Boast, “The Waitangi Tribunal in the Context of New Zealand’s Political Culture and 
Historiography,” Journal of the History of International Law 18 (2016): 339–61. At the time of its signing the treaty 
was an ambiguous document and source of regret for some colonial officials, but increasingly the Treaty of 
Waitangi has moved to a central position in New Zealand jurisprudence as foundational legislation. 
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timetable for creating New Zealand as a colony, however, it was only three months after the 
signing of the treaty that Parliament could consider how to proceed with establishing authority in 
the newest part of its empire. The question before the Select Committee on New Zealand, 
therefore, was not if to colonize New Zealand but rather what form that colonization could take 
and how the formation of British government in the islands would impact Māori. 
As a central figure behind the formation of the New Zealand Company, Wakefield was a 
key witness for the 1840 Select Committee on New Zealand.12 Five days of testimony in July of 
that year probed the limits of his expertise and experience as an entrepreneur, economic theorist, 
and political lobbyist. Questions from the committee ranged widely over the relationship 
between land and labor, delved into cross-examination about the type of paper and ink used in 
official correspondence, and canvassed what entities he thought could be appropriate agents of 
colonial expansion.  
In light of previous instances of European settlement that had destroyed indigenous 
American populations, the NZC proposed a new strategy of colonial administration it thought 
would protect Māori from a similar fate. Central to Wakefield’s testimony before the committee 
was the Company’s plan for Māori living within the Company’s purchases. Having bought 
twenty million acres around Cook Strait in September of 1839, the Company proposed a 
framework that would allow Māori to live within its borders rather than be pushed away from 
European settlements. Intending to leave villages, burial grounds, and agricultural plots 
undisturbed, Wakefield’s plan prioritized leaving areas of active Māori use in indigenous hands. 
The Company’s Board of Directors also argued that their corporate beneficence would be an 
12 The New Zealand Company succeeded the New Zealand Association which in 1838 had failed to get a bill 
through Parliament that would have allowed the settlement of New Zealand. The New Zealand Company was 
organized that same year as a successor to the Association   
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enduring one. Meaningful payment was not the dozen umbrellas, hundred blankets and other 
assorted goods Colonel William Wakefield (brother of Edward Gibbon Wakefield) had paid to 
sixteen Māori signatories in exchange for the lands around Port Nicholson.13 Rather, the real 
benefit would derive from land set aside for the benefit of those Māori. Reserves of land would 
establish security of tenure for indigenous peoples inhabiting the Company’s settlements. The 
New Zealand Company’s colonization plan proposed what they saw as a novel policy that would 
be humane in its organization and not follow the same arc as other encounters between European 
settlers and indigenous peoples.  
Wakefield’s plan applied a foundational belief in the social consequences of land 
ownership in colonial spaces to methods and structures of indigenous administration. Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield was a monogenist, thought that Māori and European were of common 
descent, and that the two populations shared a universal human nature and potential.14 He told 
the committee “that if the inferior race of New Zealand can be preserved at all in contact with 
civilized men, it can only be by creating in civilized society a class of natives who would retain 
the same relative superiority of position which they had enjoyed in savage life.”15 That 
superiority would be maintained through setting aside money for elite families to enjoy “an equal 
position with the richer class of English settlers.”16 These funds were to derive from placing a 
tenth of the Company’s twenty-million-acre purchase into a trust. Income from the rental or 
produce of that land, the Company’s plan stated, would promote the financial security and social 
status of its beneficiaries. 
13 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Appendix 15: Deed of Conveyance, September 27 1839, 
159-160.
14 Olssen, “Mr Wakefield and New Zealand as an Experiment in Post-Enlightenment Experimental Practice,” 215.
15 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: E. G. Wakefield, 13 July 1840, 25.
16 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: E. G. Wakefield, 13 July 1840, 25.
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The Reverend Samuel Hinds, author of a book about the colonization of New Zealand 
and future promoter of Anglican settlement on the South Island, testified that the New Zealand 
Company’s plans formed a “wise and very humane regulation.”17 By making “natives a 
constituent part of the society of every colony” Hinds thought New Zealand could be exception 
in what was otherwise the failure of indigenous populations to be “bettered” through contact with 
Europeans.18 Since Hind considered Māori, like other indigenous peoples, as vulnerable to losing 
their land through deception or fraud, land ownership designed for the long-term viability of its 
beneficiaries was best structured through a trust that precluded alienation. Predicated on an 
understanding of Māori as vulnerable and of New Zealand as a blank slate for colonization, 
annexation provided an opportunity to experiment with new models of how colonization – in this 
case undertaken by a private company – could both develop an imperial project while aspiring to 
a humanitarian concern of “bettering” indigenous peoples in colonial setting. 
Reserves of land, central to the Company’s vision of social and economic elevation of 
Māori, comprised a valuable asset. Totaling 11,110 acres with an estimated value, at least on 
paper, of £33,390, reserves formed a significant estate. Though set aside for their benefit, the 
Company assessed the land as being too valuable to be trusted to Māori directly. Wakefield saw 
land as liable to be “parted with in grog-shops and other places … for merely nominal sums.”19 
Instead of Māori beneficiaries owning and managing the land directly, the Company’s plan 
included sending a European agent to oversee the reserves as a trustee in consultation with 
Māori. To this end, Sir William Hutt, a director of the New Zealand Company and MP for the 
English city of Hull, gave evidence that this representative would work “in a manner as to be 
17 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: Samuel Hinds, 24 July 1840, 120; 
Samuel Hinds, The Latest Official Documents Relating to New Zealand (London: John W. Parker, 1839). 
18 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: Rev. S. Hinds, 24 July 1840, 120. 
19 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: E. G. Wakefield, 16 July 1840, 25. 
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made most beneficial to the natives for whom it was reserved.”20 The task of implementation fell 
to Edmund Storr Halswell, a magistrate of Middlesex and Fellow of the Royal Society, who in 
addition to his role as a land commissioner received the extra duties of being a protector of 
aborigines tasked with, in the first instance, ensuring settlers did not occupy land reserved for 
Māori. 
The contradictions and possible conflicts of interest stemming from Halswell’s position 
as both an employee of the New Zealand Company and responsible for safeguarding Māori 
claims concerned the committee chair and Liberal MP Robert Vernon-Smith. Though intrigued 
by the powers and authority of the protector, the MPs questioned what they saw conflict of 
interest between Halswell’s loyalties to the Company or to Māori welfare. William Hutt testified 
that he was optimistic about Māori agreeing to the Company’s proposals and expressed “no 
doubt that the natives would acquiesce without ceremony in a proposition which carried on the 
face of it an intention obviously beneficial to themselves.”21 The difficulties of officials charged 
with acquiring and populating land while simultaneously being mindful of the circumstances of 
indigenous peoples occupying the land was remarked upon at the time and would continue to vex 
others occupying similar roles in the following decades. Debate about how to proceed with New 
Zealand’s colonization serves as a reminder that the colonial state and colonizing institutions 
were not “automatically unified by coherent vision of their own power and the nature of the 
communities they ruled over.”22 
William Hutt further allayed the committee’s concerns by presenting Halswell’s 
responsibilities as akin to those held by protectors in the Australian colonies. Those officers were 
20 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: W. Hutt, 24 July 1840, 128. 
21 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: W. Hutt, 24 July 1840, 128. 
22 Tony Ballantyne, “The Changing Shape of the Modern British Empire and Its Historiography,” Historical Journal 
53, no. 2 (2010): 439. 
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tasked with preventing encroachment on indigenous property, facilitating education and 
conversion to Christianity, and acting as a channel of communication between the government 
and Aborigines.23 The New Zealand Company anticipated aboriginal protection would be an 
internal affair and operate without any special legal powers derived from the state.24 Even as it 
couched justifications for its success in the larger history of British overseas expansion, the 
Company was also protective of its prerogatives and vision for the colonial future. Planned 
settlement, the Company argued, would benefit Britain, individual settlers, and mark a new 
chapter in the relationship between colonizers and colonized. 
Critical of the British government for failing to establish a government in New Zealand, 
thereby delaying the rule of law and the necessary infrastructure with which to establish a trust 
for Māori, in July 1840 the Company’s own plans for Māori protection remained far from fully 
established.25 Wakefield’s testimony mentioned that the Company would work with the 
leadership of the Aborigines’ Protection Society “for the purpose of devising some proper 
trusts.”26 Once established, however, the New Zealand Company saw its role as a trustee and 
protector ensuring the success and assimilation of Māori into a new, planned, and stable society. 
The Company wanted the rule of law to validate and secure title to its purchases but within the 
larger guarantee of rights the NZC saw limited potential for direct interference in the 
administration of Māori. The extent and intensity of British among agents of humanitarian 
governance – the imperial parliament, the New Zealand Company, and the local government – 
23 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: W. Hutt, 24 July 1840, 128. 
Protectors were assigned to South Australia in 1836, Port Phillip (Victoria) in 1837, and Western Australia in 1839. 
Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 107. 
24 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: W. Hutt, 24 July 1840, 128. 
25 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: E. G. Wakefield, 16 July 1840, 25. 
26 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minutes of Evidence: E. G. Wakefield, 16 July 1840, 33. 
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would also become a recurring problem in the development and implementation of the 
administration of Māori. 
Wakefield’s Parliamentary interlocutors were of mixed opinion about growing British 
involvement in New Zealand. Some joined representatives from the Wesleyan Missionary 
Society and Church Missionary Society in objecting to sovereignty being invested in the British 
Crown.27 Other concerns stemmed from the form and cost of colonization and skepticism 
regarding the capacity of the New Zealand Company to pursue its advertised goals. Among these 
points of divergence, however, the Select Committee shared Wakefield’s anxiety about the 
unplanned, chaotic, and violent state of affairs he perceived in the South Pacific. Any colonial 
project, the committee wrote in its report, would be difficult amidst a “state of lawlessness and 
wrecklessness [sic], boundary disputes, overlapping claims, absence of survey, paucity of 
property and inheritance laws” that they saw in New Zealand.28 
A perceived lack of order in New Zealand, in the eyes of some British observers, largely 
derived from the absence of any government with enough authority to compel adherence to the 
law. Compounding the lack of any legal apparatus were, the committee reported, more serious 
“evils … caused by the profligate and reckless conduct of some of the whites, who have sown 
among the aborigines the seeds of vice and misery.”29 In particular, the haphazard and 
unregulated sale of Māori land to Europeans “materially increased … the difficulty of civilizing 
and preserving that interesting race.”30 New Zealand, therefore, was both an emerging crisis of 
unregulated space and an opportunity to establish administrative mechanisms to mitigate what 
27 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Appendix 21: Statement of the Committee of the Church 
Missionary Society, 29 November 1839, 165-173; Appendix 24: Extract of Instructions of the Wesleyan Missionary 
Committee, September 1839, 182-183. 
28 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Report of the Committee, 30 July 1840, vii. 
29 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Report of the Committee, 30 July 1840, vii. 
30 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Report of the Committee, 30 July 1840, viii. 
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parliamentarians saw as the grim consequences European contact had for the islands’ indigenous 
inhabitants. New Zealand, therefore, constituted a humanitarian crisis that required 
intervention.31 The conceptualization of imperialism as an emancipatory project based on the 
establishment of law and order nevertheless resulted in the widespread dispossession of 
indigenous tangata whenua as new European arrivals sought to transform the islands of 
Polynesian Aotearoa into European New Zealand.32  
Arguments that intervention was justified by British colonization stemming the 
consequences of “evil” behavior by Europeans had to be weighed against a reluctance to trespass 
on Māori sovereignty. A key concern of the committee was the larger mechanism of colonial 
government in New Zealand with attention paid to the creation of suitable laws, the integration 
of Māori into and under British laws, and concern about whether those laws would be beneficial 
for Māori. Significantly, however, the question was not if Māori wanted to adopt the proposed 
institutions but rather how to mitigate the introduction of British legal traditions. Humanitarian 
governance, therefore, retained an imposing quality that likened it to other forms of colonial 
administration. Balancing the maintenance of existing social hierarchies while implementing 
systems of administration, like a legal code and legible patterns of land ownership, allowed for 
the creation of a liberal economic order in New Zealand. The project of bringing order to New 
Zealand was deeply imbued with both emancipatory and coercive potential. 
After weighing the banes of abrogating Māori sovereignty against the boons of 
establishing European order and spreading Christianity, the committee decided to endorse the 
New Zealand Company’s plan for a system of reserves as one of “high importance to the 
31 Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830-1847 (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 1977), 87–89, 106–9. 
32 Tangata whenua: people of the land; Aotearoa: land of the long white cloud 
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interests of humanity, and one well deserving of the sanction of Parliament.”33 The incorporation 
of new administrative frameworks for engaging indigenous peoples, in the eyes of the directors 
of the New Zealand Company and British parliamentarians, marked a shift in the history of 
empire. Not simply mercantile, evangelist, or based on conquest, Wakefield and his 
contemporaries considered might be possible to incorporate indigenous peoples in a manner that 
would not result in their destruction or dispossession.  
Māori input into the Company’s plan, however, was neither solicited nor encouraged. 
The NZC’s proposal contained interwoven strands of “emancipation, amelioration, conciliation, 
protection and development” that nevertheless resulted in dispossession and was based on a 
premise that anticipated the sublimation of that population to introduced social, political, and 
economic systems. 34 While the form of administration proposed by the New Zealand Company 
eschewed overt violence of military conquest, by virtue of their aspiration to integrate and direct 
an indigenous future these spaces nevertheless worked to direct and control the terms on which 
Māori interacted with Europeans. Efforts to administer an empire humanely and debates about 
how to implement “humanitarian governance” in a colonial space formed a pressing issue for 
colonial administrators who sought out ways of reforming administrative practices throughout 
the empire. 
33 GBPP, 1840 (582) Select Committee on New Zealand, Report of the Committee, 30 July 1840, x. 
34 Lester and Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance, 17. 
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Introduction: Humanitarian Governance in New Zealand (1830 - 1872) 
 
In broad terms, humanitarian governance describes how local, national, and international 
organizations translate moral imperative into administrative action. The concept is currently 
salient in analyses of Euro-American interventions aimed at promoting the quality of human life 
and appears frequently in development-related periodicals.1 To render the wide range of actions 
undertaken by NGOs, national governments, and global entities like the UN more wieldy, 
scholarship on humanitarianism divides humanitarian actions into two categories.2 
The first, termed “emergency” or relief humanitarianism, describes short-term efforts 
focused on alleviating individual suffering during a period of crisis. An example of this type is 
the work of the ICRC in delivering aid following a natural disaster. The second category 
encompasses sustained activity geared toward ameliorating underlying causes of suffering. With 
a long-term perspective focused on creating or enhancing institutional or social capacities, such 
interventions are referred to as developmental, progressive, or “alchemical” humanitarianism. 
Undertakings like the peace-building efforts in the Balkans following the breakup of Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990s characterize this category of intervention which feature systemic and long-
term approaches to social ills. Despite differences in organization, strategy, and temporal scope, 
1 For example, Polly Pallister-Wilkins, “Personal Protective Equipment in the Humanitarian Governance of Ebola,” 
Third World Quarterly 37, no. 3 (2016): 507–23. 
2 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
2011), 37–41. Michael Barnett, “Humanitarian Governance,” Annual Review of Political Science 16, no. 1 (2013): 
379–98. 
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both emergency and developmental humanitarianism engage questions of humanitarian 
governance. Governance, even when practiced by non-state actors, requires identifying a 
population as being in a precarious position, making a decision to intervene that is based on a set 
of priorities, and evaluating success against a rubric designed by the organization undertaking the 
action. 
An ethical commitment directed toward those perceived as “in need” is foundational to 
ethical frameworks found around the globe. Humanitarian governance forms one manifestation 
of a universal social impulse to help or assist. The anthropologist and sociologist Didier Fassin 
uses the term “humanitarian reason” to describe how a vocabulary of suffering, compassion, and 
assistance can instill a sense of responsibility to protect.3 This responsibility, in turn, motivates 
organized efforts to ameliorate the suffering of communities deemed precarious by virtue of 
displacement, disease, environmental catastrophe, or other hardship. Humanitarian governance, 
therefore, is one way of addressing social precarity. 
Inseparable from the act of relieving suffering, however, ameliorative efforts that follow 
a donor–practitioner–recipient model also create a power imbalance. Donors who inform 
humanitarian practitioners of what aid to provide recipients, for example, establish an 
authoritative relationship and set of priorities that can, at times, be a literal question of life and 
death. The provision of assistance as being simultaneously an acknowledgement of inequality, 
since relief is made without the expectation of reciprocity, and an act that recognizes of 
solidarity, because humanitarianism derives its moral power from compassion and a sense of a 
common experience, makes for an uneasy balancing act at the core of humanitarian activity.4 
3 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, trans. Rachel Gomme (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2012), 1–17. 
4 Simon Reid-Henry, “Humanitarianism as Liberal Diagnostic: Humanitarian Reason and the Political Rationalities 
of the Liberal Will-to-Care,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 39, no. 3 (2014): 420. 
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Reflecting on these contradictions built into humanitarian practice, Fassin characterizes 
humanitarianism’s conventional donor–practitioner–recipient structure as a “relation of 
domination and a relation of assistance” that is “constitutive of all humanitarian government.”5 
Recipients, by virtue of experiencing crisis or being poorly-situated to participate in defining 
parameters of actions taken on their behalf, are frequently excluded from defining the stakes of 
intervention even as practitioners and donors are conventionally depicted as apolitical and 
independent. Describing the process by why practitioners and donors conceptualize those in need 
as “sentimental humanity,” Lynn Festa argues that the structural narrative of suffering often 
leaves little room for those experiencing suffering articulate their own perspectives. The unequal 
relationship between donor and recipient also creates the risk that the recipients of assistance are 
stripped of any agency once in receipt of any aid.6 
Humanitarian governance derives its potency for enacting social change from the 
intersection of authority, power, and legitimacy. Governments, whether through their ability to 
regulate, coerce, or invoke the public good, have a strong capacity to carry out humanitarian 
programs. The authority wielded by the state or state-like actors, however, can deepen the divide 
between (state) donor and (citizen) recipient, especially if interventions are sanctioned by 
legislative authority and lack a means of redress. Like other organizations, governments deploy 
humanitarian reason to legitimate decisions and actions as being for a “greater good.” 
Compounding the power of governmental authority – or the authority of NGOs acting as 
territorial authorities – is the state’s frequent role as a provider of welfare, its responsibility for 
regulating public life, and its capacity to turn to the military or civil defense apparatus to deliver 
5 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 1–17. 
6 Lynn Festa, “Humanity without Feathers,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development 1, no. 1 (2010): 3–27. 
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aid in emergency situations. Coercive power can also be deployed to enforce a humanitarian 
agenda.7 What sets humanitarian governance by the state apart from other forms of humanitarian 
administration is the state’s developed capacity for intervention and its maintenance of a 
monopoly of force. The “governance of governments” has significant capacity to bringing about, 
and maintain change.  
While humanitarian governance draws from a broader social and political milieu of 
ethics, authority, concepts of rights and obligation, and can be practiced by a range of actors, it 
the fusion of official decision-making and humanitarianism that has the strongest salience for 
this project. Examining this overlap, Michael Barnett has argued that “although humanitarian 
governance operates in the name of the victims of the world, governance is about rule, and rule is 
about power.”8 Studying the paradoxes built into the overlap between state-citizen and donor-
recipient relationships engages concepts of how the state understood its role, and conversely was 
interpreted, as a humanitarian agent. 
The self-consciously humanitarian annexation of New Zealand established a relationship 
of domination and assistance. This colonial relationship was predicated on ameliorating the 
impact of British settlement in the colony while nevertheless transforming indigenous 
landscapes, economies, and patterns of landholding to fit British notions of progress. Intertwined 
throughout the paternalism expressed by the European settler community toward indigenous 
tangata whenua who lived in New Zealand was a second paternalist relationship between an 
imperial metropole in London and a far-flung colony in New Zealand. 
7 Jane Samson, Imperial Benevolence: Making British Authority in the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1998). 
8 Barnett, “Humanitarian Governance,” 382. 
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Historical Genealogies of Humanitarian Governance 
A series of military interventions by western governments during the 1990s and 2000s – 
in the Balkans, Somalia, Iraq, and Sierra Leone – spurred interest in understanding how states 
frame political action in humanitarian terms.9 In the early 2000s, United States politicians also 
couched national security concerns in humanitarian language to justify invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq.10 Thousands of lives and over a decade later, US and allied soldiers remain in both 
countries further testing the relationship between strategic goals and a claims to be acting in the 
interests of humanity. Debate preceding, concurrent with, and following these interventions 
raises questions regarding connections between politics and humanitarianism and discussion of 
whether a florescence of humanitarian intervention is a mask for more conventional state action 
or instead reflects a heightened degree of international cooperation characteristic of the post-
Cold War world.11 
While humanitarian interventions in the form of military invasions constitute a 
particularly drastic category of action, research into connections between political decision-
making and humanitarianism focus on the presence of moral suasion, structural confinement, 
coercion, and international law to understand the varying ways in which humanitarian sentiment 
infuses and shapes government policy.12 Among the first scholars to place post-Cold War 
interventions in their historical context, Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trimm proposed the 
9 Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2008). 
10 Matthew Jamison, “Humanitarian Intervention Since 1990” in Brendan. Simms and D. J. B. Trim, Humanitarian 
Intervention: A History (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2011), 373–80. 
11 Bass, Freedom’s Battle; Simms and Trim, Humanitarian Intervention.  Michael Ignatieff considers the Bosnian 
interventions in the early 1990s as constituting the beginning of humanitarian intervention in Michael Ignatieff, 
Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003).  
12 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); John Galbraith, “The Humanitarian Impulse to Imperialism,” in British Imperialism: Gold, 
God Glory, ed. Robin Winks (Hinsdale (IL): Dryden Press, 1963), 71–74.  
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seventeenth century, particularly the emergence of a state system following the Treaty of 
Westphalia, as the originating moment for using humanitarianism to justify territorial 
transgression.13 In the case of New Zealand, the extension of humanitarian attention to a new 
colonial space took the form of a treaty and efforts to extinguish indigenous sovereignty adopted 
a language of protection.14 Forms of “social management” that arrived with colonial 
governments who sought to control and structure indigenous communities even if their origins 
were understood as benevolent within contemporary moral rubrics.15 
The last quarter of the 18th century marked a qualitative shift, at least in western Europe, 
about assessing the plight of distant strangers and the obligations to take action on behalf of 
those strangers.16 In earlier centuries, Anglo-American humanitarians had not necessarily 
imagined their charitable obligations extended far beyond an immediate community.17 A long 
tradition of founding almshouses, schools, and hospitals testifies to rich histories of philanthropy, 
but these efforts were largely parochial, independent from state power, and focused on 
ameliorating local poverty, illiteracy, or unemployment. Toward the end of the 1700s, groups 
emerged within Europe that were organized across a wide scale of humanitarian action from 
assisting stranded sailors to proposing abolition of the slave trade. What set these movements 
13 Simms and Trim, Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3. 
14 Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830-1847 (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 1977). 
15 Penelope Edmonds and Anna Johnston, “Empire, Humanitarianism and Violence in the Colonies,” Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History 17, no. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1353/cch.2016.0013. 
16 Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1795-
1865 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Thomas Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative,” in The 
New Cultural History, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley (CA): University of California Press, 1989), 176–204; Karen 
Halttunen, “Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture,” American Historical 
Review 100, no. 2 (1995): 303–34; Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 2007). The late-18th century is prominent date in the history of humanitarianism and human rights though the 
ideas of course have historical antecedents including the Spanish colonies in the 16th century with Bartolemeo de las 
Casas’s Apologetic History of the Indies. 
17 Amanda Moinz, “Saving the Lives of Strangers: Humane Societies and the Cosmopolitan Provision of Charitable 
Aid,” Journal of the Early Republic 29, no. 4 (2009): 607–40. 
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apart was their generous remit rather than a specific religious, linguistic, or national community 
remits.18 Claims to a larger, even universal, shared humanity sparked a new scale of moral action 
that argued on behalf of humanity and could be linked to a sense of national pride, status, or 
redemption.19 
Central among these humanitarian movements was the campaign against slavery.20 From 
its emergence in the 1780s, the anti-slavery movement succeeded with Britain’s abolition of the 
trade in 1807 and gradual emancipation from 1833. The organized and sustained moral outrage 
that propelled abolitionism drew from a trans-Atlantic evangelical religious awakening and a 
broader sentiment of emotional connection and responsibility between European, American, and 
African. Covalent with perceptions of moral suffering was what Thomas Haskell has argued was 
an emergent sense of popular participation and complicity in slavery derived from involvement 
in networks of capitalist purchase and exchange.21 Anti-slavery campaigners asked Britons to 
recognize slavery as morally bankrupt, promoted the institutional prohibition of servitude, and 
established organizational and strategic models for organizations that took up causes like ending 
convict transportation Australia, improving the working conditions of sailors, and regulating the 
use of child labor.22 By being an organized campaign targeting the welfare of a group manifestly 
different than those in Britain, the campaign against slavery provided a rallying cry for constant 
18 Caroline Shaw, Britannia’s Embrace: Modern Humanitarianism and the Imperial Origins of Refugee Relief 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
19 Christopher Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006). 
20 Andrew Porter, “Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism,” ed. Andrew Porter, vol. 3, Oxford History of 
the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 201–6. 
21 Thomas Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 1,” The American Historical 
Review 90, no. 2 (1985): 339–61; Thomas Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 
2,” The American Historical Review 90, no. 3 (1985): 547–66. 
22 John Ritchie, “Towards Ending an Unclean Thing: The Molesworth Committee and the Abolition of 
Transportation to New South Wales, 1837-40,” Historical Studies (Melbourne) 17, no. 67 (1976): 144–64. Adam 
Hochschild, Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire’s Slaves (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2005), 352. 
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vigilance, an inspiration for subsequent efforts, and a yardstick against which the methods and 
successes of other humanitarian causes in the empire might be compared.23 
If abolitionism established a pattern for organizing around a cause and lobbying 
government for effecting policy change, the campaign to end slavery showed how humanitarian 
concern also operated from within government and drew upon political discourses about the role 
and purpose of empire.24 Following the successes of abolitionism, some Britons adopted a sense 
that their empire was one of liberty, itself a force for moral good in the world that reframed the 
exercise of power as a force promoting liberal, though not democratic, ideals.25 Claims that 
British imperialism was an emancipatory project and based on the extension of liberty, however, 
coexisted with its possession of, and repression of, a growing colonial empire.26 
Connections between empire and the promotion of economic liberalism has also garnered 
interest as a facet of humanitarian governance that promoted efficiency, production and order as 
a beneficial result of “the doctrine of moral competence that markets were deemed to 
promote.”27 Referring to the education of African-Americans in the United States, Katharyne 
Mitchell has demonstrated how ideas about the protection and management of colonized 
populations also impacted the governance of internal populations through “underlying 
23 Richard Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2012). 
24 Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002); Amanda Moinz, From Empire to Humanity: The American Revolution and the 
Origins of Humanitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
25 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Andrew Sartori, Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History (Oakland: University of 
California Press, 2014). 
26 Among the most prominent conservative interpretations of British imperialism as a progressive force is Niall 
Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (New York: Penguin, 2003). Within Australian 
historiography’s History Wars, Keith Windshuttle’s writing is among the best known for positing a case for empire’s 
virtues. 
27 Reid-Henry, “Humanitarianism as Liberal Diagnostic: Humanitarian Reason and the Political Rationalities of the 
Liberal Will-to-Care,” 425–28. 
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rationalities of a ‘progressive imperial agenda’ connecting African-American enfranchisement 
and connection to national development and imperial aspirations.”28 Humanitarian principles 
could also frame liberal political economic models as “part of the disciplinary apparatus of 
governance.”29 Humanitarian governance, therefore, was not immune to the flights of imperial 
fancy that envisioned the reordering of colonial society. 
Sandwiched between historiographical attention focused on anti-slavery and drawing 
from the large expansion of humanitarian institutions and actions following WWII, the century 
following Britain’s abolition of slavery in 1833 has been characterized as a lull between two 
humanitarian high points. Now emerging from the historiographical wilderness, interest in the 
history of humanitarianism and its intersection with empire is burgeoning. Michelle Tusan notes 
it was during this period when empire and humanitarianism became linked in a “concrete” 
way.30 Paralleling the uneven qualities of British control, instances of humanitarian governance 
spanned the spectrum of formal legal interventions, informal pressure, military cooperation, and 
naval patrols. 
Outlining historical connections, Skinner and Lester posited that “historians of empire 
that they could usefully consider the history of humanitarianism as a fundamental component of 
imperial relations and a way of bridging trans-imperial, international and transnational 
approaches.”31 Barnett also has pointed out the slippage between peace-building and state 
28 Katharyne Mitchell, “Education, Race and Empire: A Genealogy of Humanitarian Governance in the United 
States,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 42, no. 3 (2017): 349–62. 
29 Rob Skinner and Alan Lester, “Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas,” Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 40, no. 5 (2012): 734. 
30 Michelle Tusan, “Crimes Against Humanity: Human Rights, the Armenian Genocide and the British Empire,” 
American Historical Review 119, no. 1 (2014): 101; Kevin Grant, A Civilized Savagery (New York: Routledge, 
2005); Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Edmonds and Johnston, “Empire, Humanitarianism and Violence in the 
Colonies.” 
31 Skinner and Lester, “Humanitarianism and Empire,” 731. 
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building arguing that “humanitarianism and imperialism have been bound together in a series of 
mutually constituting histories, which the ideas and practices associated with imperial politics 
and administration have both been shaped by and have in themselves informed developing 
notions of humanitarianism.”32 Interest in humanitarianism and empire reveals the complex 
relationship between these two processes and that no simple demarcation can be made between 
humanitarian opposition to empire and imperial neglect of humanitarianism. 
The dramatic territorial expansion of European empires in the 19th century intensified 
global connections and established colonial relationships that brought distance and difference 
into view. The management of extended political communities entailed serious consideration of 
how to administer new peoples and territories.33 Protection of indigenous peoples in the British 
Empire during this period was only one way in which humanitarianism became “organized and 
part of governance, connected the immanent to the transcendent, and directed at those in other 
lands.”34 Humanitarian organization and expertise, as Tahlia Sasson demonstrates for the 
Interwar period, formed part of British claims to global moral authority and “humanitarian ethics 
became part of a project of global governance.”35 Administering to crisis, proposing systemic 
metrics of relieving the suffering of distant strangers, and establishing a framework for 
international human rights connected humanitarianism, governance, and empire.36 
32 Skinner and Lester, 731. 
33 Skinner and Lester, 732. 
34 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 21. 
35 Tahlia Sasson, “From Empire to Humanity: The Russian Famine and the Imperial Origins of International 
Humanitarianism,” Journal of British Studies 55, no. 3 (2016): 521. 
36 Michelle Tusan, Smyrna’s Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide, and the Birth of the Middle East (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012). 
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Capitalizing on the successes of abolition, the 1830s and 1840s are often characterized as 
the peak of humanitarian influence in British government.37 One of the causes inspired by the 
successes of abolitionism was an effort to ameliorate the treatment of indigenous peoples 
throughout Britain’s empire. Like concern about corruption stemming from Britain’s territories 
in South Asia, the perception that other the colonies could also be a source of concern for the 
metropole warranted investigation.38 In 1837, the efforts of Anna Gurney and Thomas Fowell 
Buxton on this question deployed formal politics and drew from personal networks to implement 
and organize multi-year Parliamentary investigation into the circumstances of indigenous 
peoples in areas of British settlement.39 Though far from universally successful, the committee’s 
report was significant in that British policy could present “moral influence a substitute for 
military force, and protection a substitute for government.”40 The treatment of indigenous 
peoples formed part of larger debates about the relationship between metropole and colony on 
the question of who should govern though settlers often enjoyed metropolitan standards of 
justice and rights that were denied to aboriginal peoples.41 The moment of the 1830s and 1840s, 
contextualized by  favorable British perceptions of Māori, and alight with discussions about land 
37 Stuart Ward, “Imperial Identities Abroad,” in The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Sarah Stockwell 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 224. The positive assessments of humanitarian influence claimed by the 
humanitarians themselves not, however, mean the universal and unquestioned ascendency of humanitarian thought. 
38 Zoë Laidlaw, “Investigating Empire: Humanitarians, Reform and the Commission of Eastern Inquiry,” Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 40, no. 5 (2012): 749–68. 
39 Elizabeth Elbourne, “The Sin of the Settler: The 1835-36 Select Committee on Aborigines and Debates over 
Virtue and Conquest in the Early Nineteenth-Century British White Settler Empire,” Journal of Colonialism and 
Colonial History 4, no. 3 (2003), https://doi.org/10.1353/cch.2004.0003.; GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select 
Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements). 
40 C. H. Wake, “George Clarke and the Government of the Maoris: 1840-45,” Historical Studies: Australia and New 
Zealand 10, no. 9 (1962): 342.  
41 Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, eds., Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 
2005), 12; Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura. Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois 
World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern, eds., Empire and 
Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 289. 
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use, suffrage, and labor, provides important context for New Zealand’s annexation as during a 
period in which “reform” was in the air. 
If the abolition, reconsideration of working conditions, and annexation of territory by 
treaty illustrated how humanitarian governance could be linked to ideas of progress and reformist 
ideology, the middle decades of the nineteenth century would test the limits of that potential as it 
applied to the indigenous peoples of the settler empire. The broad influence of humanitarianism 
in government was sorely tested by revolts, uprisings, and perceptions of a lack of progress by 
the non-white peoples of the empire.42 The second half of the nineteenth century has been 
characterized as an era of shaken confidence in realizing sweeping transformations for 
indigenous peoples and a hardening of racial attitudes featuring skepticism about the feasibility 
of social change.43 The moment of the mid-nineteenth century, then, is one that featured an 
intersection of possibilities that was open to communities of people connected by the empire and 
receptive to practices of reform and improvement. The case of New Zealand brought together an 
indigenous people held in high esteem by their European interlocutors as “brighter and whiter” 
than other indigenous peoples with a moment of serious consideration within Britain about what 
form colonization might take.44 
42 Kenton Storey, “Colonial Humanitarian? Thomas Gore Browne and the Taranaki War, 1860–61,” Journal of 
British Studies 53, no. 1 (2014): 111–35. In the case of New Zealand points to the continuing salience of 
humanitarian language by both proponents and opponents of military action thereby complicating narratives of a 
rapid decline in the perceived utility of such language. 
43 Andrew Bank, “Losing Faith in the Civilizing Mission: The Premature Decline of Humanitarian Liberalism at the 
Cape, 1840-60,” in Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850, ed. Martin 
Daunton and Rick Halpern (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 364–83; Porter, “Trusteeship, 
Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism,” 209; James Heartfield, The Aborigines’ Protection Society: Humanitarian 
Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1836-1909 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011). 
44 James Belich, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders, from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the 
Nineteenth Century (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), 124–25; Hall, Civilising Subjects, 434–41; 
Leonard Bell, Colonial Constructs: European Images of Maori, 1840-1914 (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
1992). 
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 Humanitarian Governance and the British World 
The decades following the defeat and exile of Napoleon formed an accelerated moment 
of the era of European emigration James Belich has termed the “settler revolution.”45 In the 
British case, hundreds of thousands of emigrants set out for farms, gold fields, and military posts 
throughout Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand.  Revolutionary due to radical 
demographic, economic, and legal changes wrought by the new arrivals and the intensity and 
speed with which indigenous peoples confronted new political and economic systems, by mid-
century the United Kingdom and the settler colonies formed part of an integrated market, a 
common legal and political culture, and geographically dispersed networks of kith and kin.46  
Zones of demographic transformation formed part of what has been termed the “British 
World.” Articulated in the late 19th century, the idea of a British World as a unit of analysis was 
reinvigorated as a concept in the 1970s.47 Endeavors to look beyond national historiographies, 
instead focusing on connections between and among the Atlantic archipelago and overseas 
components of the British World, can account for the ways in which the expansion of Britain and 
45 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). The overlap between visions of moral improvement and far-flung colonial 
spaces also extended outside the British sphere through a shared sense of a universal mission of bringing religious, 
economic, and political improvement to the far corners of the world despite internal disagreement about methods, 
Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 
1840-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
46 Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, eds., The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity (London: Frank Cass, 
2003); Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, eds., Rediscovering the British World (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 2005); Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
47 Articulated by C. W. Dilke in Greater Britain (1868) and John Seeley in his The Expansion of England (1883), J. 
G. A. Pocock, “British History: A Plea for a New Subject,” Journal of Modern History 47, no. 4 (1975): 601–21; 
John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); James Vernon, “The History of Britain Is Dead; Long Live a Global History of 
Britain,” History Australia 13, no. 1 (2016): 19–34. The British Isles and self-governing white dominions 
encompass the British World and a diffused web of commercial success constituting part of a wider “world system.” 
Darwin, The Empire Project. 
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the peopling and building of a trans-oceanic British World connected communities, products, and 
perceptions in ways that transplanted British society overseas. Following a key precept of the 
interconnectedness demonstrated by new imperial history’s attention to how the empire 
influenced Britain highlights ways in which networked imperial spaces reveal the empire’s 
“complicated and contradictory genealogy” of circulation and mobility.48 
The connected zones of the British World, following this model, guided the flow of 
information, goods, and people through channels based on political or personal affinity and 
provided one way of making sense of, and finding the familiar within, a geographically 
expansive polity.49 Imperial networks, or “webs” reflecting a high degree of interconnection, 
served as conduits for discussions of the humanitarian governance of that empire.50 Reports from 
humanitarians, official correspondence from civil servants, and personal communication between 
families, circulated alongside newspapers to link colonies with each other and the British Isles. 
The role of “paper and the printing press in enabling and sustaining the operation of British 
humanitarianism as a truly global moral and political formation” reminds us that connections and 
48  Damon Salesa, Racial Crossings: Race, Intermarriage, and the Victorian British Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 8–9; Simon Potter and Jonathan Saha, “Global History, Imperial History and Connected 
Histories of Empire,” Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 16, no. 1 (2015), 
https://doi.org/10.1353/cch.2015.0009.  
49 These circuits have ben conceptualized in both the abstract flows of information, deeply personal and intimate 
connections of family, and professional circulation of colonial administrators. Duncan Bell, “Dissolving Distance: 
Technology, Space, and Empire in British Political Thought, 1770-1900,” Journal of Modern History 77, no. 3 
(September 2005): 523–62; Adele Perry, Colonial Relations: The Connolly-Douglas Family and the Nineteenth-
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flows of information were material.51 Among pages of correspondence, readers learned about the 
dispossession of indigenous peoples in settler colonial spaces and could consequently 
conceptualize the operations and impacts of a global process.52 
Especially prominent in reporting settler treatment of indigenous peoples in European 
empires were missionaries and missionary societies who could rely on confessional networks for 
information.53 The significance of religious networks and missionary societies entangled 
sensibilities about a Christian empire with political and organizational relationships.54 Despite its 
distance from Britain, debates about New Zealand as a site of British colonization and 
experiment in humanitarian governance did not transpire in an information vacuum as 
administrators, settlers, and Māori forged global ties and situated themselves as participants. 
Creating the British World was also a process of imagining and reshaping local 
environments as migrant communities sought to render landscapes “productive” or recreate the 
political ecology of England, Scotland, Wales, or Ireland.55 Within the context of a settler 
empire, the movement of peoples, plants, and animals forged what Alfred Crosby termed “Neo-
Europes” in zones of demographic transformation.56 New Zealand’s landscape, along with 
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Canada, South Africa, the United States, and Australia formed part of the “Great Land Rush” of 
alienating lands inhabited by non-European peoples.57 The contested ownership and legal history 
thereof has a rich historiography especially in New Zealand where land ownership became a 
central component of the late 20th century claims for redress through the Waitangi Tribunal.58 In 
New Zealand and elsewhere in the British World, land-holding was also connected to the 
extension of political and economic rights as a way to consolidate the successes of a model of 
liberal economic ideas. The idea of individual tenure held an emancipatory vision and 
transforming native title into Crown-derived title was understood as endowing the holders with 
liberty (and an entitlement to vote) within colonial political economy.59 
Often described in Biblical terminology, British methods of pastoral production and crop 
management, as much as direct human impacts and wrangling over legal ownership, could 
reshape colonial landscapes.60 Botanical and geographical knowledge also contributed to the 
progress of developing trade, part of a larger process of “Christianity and Civilization.”61 Plants 
and animals, as much as people, capital, commodities, information, and ideas, worked together to 
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make the British World something that was recognizable to European eyes, fund development 
and fuel the operation of empire.62 The ways in which settler governments sought to structure 
space, encourage constellations of plants and animals to occupy that space, and direct which 
human entities controlled that that space was, and continues to be, a central question of 
governance. 
Imperial structures are premised on inequality. Difference could be used to create, 
cement, or capitalize upon imbalances existing within colonies, between colony and metropolis, 
and between empires “and while empires certainly did not create difference they thrived on the 
politics of difference associated with race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, and religion.”63 The 
flows of information, officials, and people through the webs of empire were no different as 
power connected divergent and uneven spaces of authority and impacted perceptions of 
humanitarianism. While the mid-19th century saw the development of humanitarian infrastructure 
in Europe, most prominently the Red Cross movement, the Great Land Rush and settler boom 
resulted in expropriation of land by European empires. The contradictions posed by an 
emergence humanitarian organizations within Europe on the one hand with the florescence of 
colonial conquest and control outside of Europe on the other contrasts a focus on the relief of 
individual suffering as arising from Eurocentric origins while a “political desire to change the 
world arose out of their colonial encounters and activities.”64 Instructions to govern colonial sites 
humanely, like those proposed by the Select Committee on New Zealand, transpired alongside 
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the annexation and dispossession of indigenous peoples in New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, 
and Canada.65 Mark Duffield, Alan Lester, and Fae Dussart characterize the dissonance between 
processes of expansion and humanitarianism as a paradox in need of explanation because 
empires established an “ambivalent foundation” to subsequent registers of humanitarian action.66 
Complicating the implementation of humanitarian governance throughout the British 
Empire was settler advocacy about self-government. The 1830s marked a transition period from 
the efforts at autocratic control to an acknowledgement of the growing importance of colonial 
self-government, at least for settler colonies.67 Just as notions of good government could be 
translated from Britain to the empire, so too might settler societies adopt a model of responsible 
and effective government that balanced settler representation with notions of effective imperial 
power based on statistical evidence and rationalized administration.68 Negotiations between the 
metropole, local government, settlers, and indigenous communities constitute, for Caroline 
Elkins and Susan Pedersen an “ideal type” for settler colonialism that “derived in response to the 
challenges presented by the reality of encountering indigenous peoples with highly differentiated 
political, cultural, and social structures.”69 
Questions of efficient administration and economic production were also of interest in 
movement to repeal Britain’s Corn Laws and Navigation Acts in the 1840s. A disavowal of 
mercantilism formed part of considering colonization’s benefits and what the social, economic, 
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and political purposes and forms of colonization should be. Reflecting a new interest of how the 
empire should be administered and by whom, advocates of indigenous peoples organized 
inquiries as territories in Australia, western North America, and southern Africa came under 
British administration. The degree of self-governance societies should hold raised questions 
about the relationship between the metropole and settler populations overseas and questions 
about the latter’s capacity to independently and objectively administer to aboriginal 
communities. 
Ideas about colonial management, the efficacy of protection, and the role of empire 
became increasingly influential within Britain as they intersected with and helped to reformulate, 
British discourses of class, ethnic, and gender differences.70 Caroline Shaw has shown the ways 
in which the identification of an oppressed community conceptualized as independent, 
industrious, and oppressed was “part and parcel of [activists’ and public commentators’] 
aspirations to reform their own polity” or carve out a position for themselves.71 Humanitarian 
organization, communication, and action formed a thread connecting Britain to its expanding 
global empire or a foil against which Britain could be compared as Britain underwent its own 
period of social and political turmoil.72 
As Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose note, moments of crisis or contention the empire 
could become a central preoccupation in Britain that informed, if not always through material 
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ways, understandings of the world and its people. The personal connections between Britain and 
New Zealand made what was transpiring in the colony especially relevant as a place where 
authority and rights were debated and the developing notions of New Zealand as a place where 
“better Britain” could be built by “better Britons.”73 Engagement with the processes of 
humanitarianism and adding a thread to the new imperial history that situates the ways in which 
empire impacted those at home. 
Historiographical work has brought attention to the extension of global empire as tied 
into the advancement of an ideal of a reforming political regime that, during the first half of the 
19th century, meant humanitarian ideas formed an “intrinsic aspect of [British colonial] 
governmentality.”74 Proposals for planned settlement like those advocated by Wakefield 
represented an attempt to institute those ideals in practice. Intentional settlement like that 
proposed by the New Zealand Company constituted an attempt to “regulate and order colonial 
societies in humane ways which were different again, and which were expressed in broad 
temporal succession, as projects of emancipation, amelioration, conciliation, protection and 
development.”75 The articulation and development of humanitarian governance in early colonial 
New Zealand constitutes the central line of questioning in this dissertation and traces the ways in 
which humanitarian governance balanced the tension of dispossession and social advancement. 
Interest in understanding how humanitarianism operated in imperial spaces approach the topic as 
a way of understanding the operation of empire as a global system.76 Imperial power, however, 
was imagined, formulated, and resisted through multiple sites and in forms that included 
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indigenous peoples. With revived interest in the histories of Britain’s settler colonies, it is 
important not to presume colonial governments were uncontested in implementing their plans 
“empires are defined by power, but the modalities of power are crafted, limited, formed, and re-
formed through the very relations power seeks to harness.”77  
 
New Zealand as a Site of Humanitarian Governance 
In the early 19th century, New Zealand occupied a positive status within Britain’s colonial 
imagination. Visited by European ships from the 17th century, sustained contact between Māori 
and Pākehā intensified after surveying work by British explorers Cook (1769-1770, 1773, 1777) 
and Vancouver (1791). Though visitors tended to gloss over distinctions among Māori based on 
perceived similarities in language, kinds of food, and communal housing, many European 
arrivals viewed the islands’ indigenous peoples favorably. Referring to the light skin color, 
stratified social organization, martial capacity, and settled agricultural practices of indigenous 
New Zealanders, British observers thought Māori had potential to be the “Britons of the South 
Seas.”78 The islands’ geographic and climactic similarities to the British Isles and the successes 
of Anglican missionaries also set New Zealand apart from contemporary areas of settler 
expansion in Australia, southern Africa, and British Columbia.  
Compounding British concern about New Zealand’s future was the use of weapons as a 
trade good. The flood of guns radically altered Māori warfare as first coastal hapu and eventually 
the majority of Māori groups gained access to gunpowder technology. The Musket Wars, a series 
77 Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present (New York: Cambridge 
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of intermittent conflicts from 1800s through the 1840s, reshaped the colony’s indigenous 
political boundaries and demographic distribution.79 The violence and chaos Europeans 
perceived in New Zealand ran counter to impressions of its people and landscapes as full of 
potential. A reputation as a wild frontier also undermined possibilities for effective governance 
in New Zealand. Reports of physical violence, moral debasement, and lawlessness characterized 
European actions in New Zealand with perpetrators largely beyond the reach of consular 
officers.80 
New Zealand’s perilous mix of violence, lawlessness, and moral corruption led the 
Aborigines’ Protection Society to characterize the islands as a “theater of dangers” in its annual 
report. The APS argued that territorial annexation would be a humanitarian gesture by bringing 
order and stability to a wild frontier.81 Leaving New Zealand in an unregulated state was no 
longer morally justifiable. Assessing how to protect indigenous rights, therefore, focused on the 
vulnerability of Māori persons as economic agents and ensuring that Māori would benefit from 
being under European protection. Through a utilitarian calculus, the loss of sovereignty would be 
balanced by the implementation of the rule of law and the regulation of labor and land. The dire 
picture painted by advocates of intervention, however, should be contextualized with the relative 
isolation that many Māori, especially inland Māori, had from Europeans in the decades before 
1840.82 The crisis European observers perceived, therefore, was far from universal but an 
understanding of its perilousness was widely proclaimed back in Britain.83 For their part, 
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colonists believed that Great Britain controlled local affairs in spite of its great distance and 
perceptions of the Colonial Office’s inefficiency.84 
Debate about what form of administration would be appropriate for New Zealand took 
two sides. One perspective conceptualized protecting Māori through establishing British rule in 
the islands and integrating Māori into a well-regulated and lawful colonial society. The other was 
a perspective shared by many in the missionary community who advocated protecting Māori 
from Pākehā through mediated contact and limited exposure.85 In an era confident in the 
elevating power of British law and in light of the 1837 Select Committee on Indigenous Peoples, 
annexation could be couched in the language of protection, progress, and reform. 
What precipitated a general crisis of governance and the annexation of New Zealand was 
the departure of the New Zealand Company ship Tory and its arrival in New Zealand in August 
of 1839. Large-scale land purchases entered into by William Wakefield and the Company’s 
enlistment of hundreds of prospective settlers had the potential to create a de facto British colony 
in New Zealand without the requisite legal apparatus. In January 1840, spurred by the actions of 
the New Zealand Company, Governor Bourke of New South Wales extended the borders of that 
colony to include the islands of New Zealand. Four days later William Hobson set sail from 
Sydney with a commission appointing him as New Zealand’s lieutenant governor. To 
consolidate British authority in the islands Hobson drafted a treaty, hastily translated into Māori 
by two resident missionaries, and signed by about forty Māori chiefs at Waitangi on February 6, 
1840. If Hobson and British officers saw the Treaty as offering protection, missionaries 
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interpreted it as a “covenant” between the Queen and Māori, while Māori leadership saw it 
offering shared rank and power with the new colonial administration.86 
New Zealand’s 1840 annexation and the Treaty of Waitangi established a strong 
humanitarian narrative at the moment of the colony’s foundation. The importance of the treaty 
document itself, largely dismissed for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, only achieved 
more sustained historical attention as part of the Waitangi Tribunal process in the 1970s.87  Since 
the 1970s, the Treaty of Waitangi as a legal and foundational text has been the subject of 
renewed historical, legal, and cultural interest.88 Though the treaty facilitated the “exploitative 
transfer of land from Māori to settler … it also acknowledged a different constitution of 
sovereignty” and the process of achieving that acknowledgement has been the source of much 
debate.89 The nineteenth-century government’s general refusal to recognize Māori entitlement 
over their lands on either an individual or collective level, however, abrogated treaty rights.90 A 
disjuncture between the goals of humanitarian governance – signified by the Treaty and an 
earnest efforts to mitigate the negative impact of settler colonization in New Zealand – and the 
actual practices of colonial administration is generative for considering where a discursive 
framing of colonial governance as humanitarian nevertheless brought about the same qualities of 
dispossession characteristic of other settler spaces. 
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Shortcomings in humanitarian governance were well understood during the early decades 
of New Zealand’s colonial administration. One governor in the 1860s noted a shortage of staff 
and resources with the observation that “the Government is, and always has been, unable to 
perform its duty, for want of a sufficient number of agents so trained and qualified for the service 
required of them.”91 The lean budget of a colonial administration, therefore, limited the extent of 
humanitarian governance in the colony and entailed the uneven deployment of its resources. One 
goal of this dissertation is to understand how a shortage of resources impacted various initiatives 
in education, territorial administration, legal assimilation, and health practices. 
The context of New Zealand as a site of “benign” relations between settlers and 
indigenous peoples also worked to establish the colony as having a distinct identity characterized 
by racial equality and cooperation that was separate from the brutality that characterized 
Australian settlement or military conquests in South Asia.92 Both contemporaries and later 
scholars pointed to Waitangi as evidence that the extension of formal empire could indeed 
transpire with good intentions and a spirit of humanitarianism.93 The nearly three decades of war 
that followed Waitangi, however, and the contested presence of the Treaty within contemporary 
New Zealand politics suggests that the legacy of that ostensibly humanitarian document are still 
debated and that the structure of humanitarian administration were either ineffective or 
abandoned in the decades following formal annexation. Paternalism’s combination of care and 
control adopted a variety of forms.94 
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 Conversations about the shape and purpose of colonial governance in New Zealand drew 
upon writing about the suffering of Māori and that annexation worked to alleviate the chaos of a 
vacuum of power. That an awareness of suffering contributed to New Zealand’s annexation and 
the resulting loss of indigenous self-government demonstrates how a humanitarian narrative 
could be used to justify a paternalist approach to a population deemed to be in a state of 
danger.95 There is, however, less work demonstrating how colonial administrators developed 
practices and policies of humanitarian governance. Much scholarship on humanitarianism and 
empire has prioritized the rich connections between colonial spaces with a resulting “tendency to 
gloss over the historical, political, and spiritual specificities” of a particular place.96  What did 
humanitarian governance look like on the ground as government officials, settlers, and tangata 
whenua charted the formation and practice of this new experience?  
 A history of practices of humanitarian governance in the years following New Zealand’s 
incorporation into the British Empire also reveals how the islands’ history is one of a negotiated 
order between Māori and the colonial government.97 Examining humanitarian governance as part 
of colonial administration in New Zealand demonstrates how political discourses and practices 
became stabilized in a particular time and place.98 New Zealand, therefore, was one site among 
others – but due to its geography and anthropology a unique one – in which the British World 
was extended, reassembled and narrated through multiple histories of settlement.99 Unlike 
archetypical spaces of settler colonialism predicated on erasure and elimination of the indigenous 
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and its replacement with the culture of the settler, the relationship of the New Zealand state with 
Māori is “central in a way which is quite different from any of the other principal settler colonies 
(Australia, Canada, the United States, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil).”100 This distinction 
makes the consideration of humanitarian governance in New Zealand useful for understanding 
how the empire’s “rule of difference” developed in a setting that was part of the settler boom but 
also retained a robust indigenous presence. 
Protection as a project of humanitarian governance was not limited to New Zealand. In 
what became British Columbia and the Australian colony of Victoria, Protectors of Aborigines 
became part of the government in the 1840s.101 Elsewhere in the empire, Protectors of Slaves 
operated in Mauritius and the West Indies.102 In West Africa, anxieties about the efficacy of 
humanitarian government also extended to concern about the failure of the humane management 
of apprentices in Sierra Leone, thereby calling into question the colony’s status as “a bastion of 
post slavery humanitarian governance.”103 What connected projects of improvement and 
elevation in Africa, the Americas, and New Zealand was a sense of reform, that the persons 
targeted by programs of protection and humanitarian governance were rational, and that that 
attention to health, education, and spiritual care of indigenous communities would encourage 
their path to “civilization.”104 When “placed under proper moral and religious training, and left, 
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under the protection of the laws, to provide for their own maintenance and support,” indigenous 
peoples could achieve the degree economic self-sufficiency seen as a key component of liberal 
ideology.105 
In addition to the context of a Treaty, optimistic assessments of its indigenous people and 
geography further established New Zealand as a particularly favorable sight for experiments in 
colonial administration.106 Though the early efforts of the New Zealand Company and colonial 
government failed to achieve their intended purpose, their plans represent a serious effort to 
“reform” practices of colonial administration even if the reality of Māori-settler relations never 
reached the ambitious heights advocates of planned settlement had hoped for.107 Wakefield’s 
plan stemmed from a premise “that men and women, through reason and moral sentiment, could 
successfully diagnose what was wrong in society and remedy the evils.”108 If humanitarian 
governance in other areas of the British Empire focused on the treatment of emancipated slaves, 
nomadic indigenous peoples, and porous borders, the insular geography and dense Māori 
populations meant a more sustained engagement between indigenous and immigrant 
communities. Despite favorable assessments of Māori intelligence and capacity for acquiring 
European customs, humanitarian governance contained elements of violence, assertions of 
colonial power, and the management of racialized difference.109 
This project is an effort to situate humanitarian governance in New Zealand during the 
first decades of British administration within larger frameworks of imperial knowledge, 
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circulation of expertise about indigenous peoples, ideas concerning the management of settler 
populations, and ideas about cultural, economic, and political change. Efforts of the New 
Zealand Company and the colonial government to develop a program of humanitarian 
governance can easily be dismissed as either a Machiavellian project or a naive exercise doomed 
to failure from its inception. This dismissal, however, overlooks the ways in which the 
implementation of policy drew from loftier goals even if the pragmatic administration of empire 
bore only a piecemeal resemblance to original plans for humanitarian governance.110 A quick 
dismissal of humanitarian governance removes one possibility for understanding the exercise of 
power framed along moral lines rather than “realpolitik.” 
In an era before the “project of whiteness” became more concrete in the early 20th 
century, ideas of racial change and assimilation allowed a more expansive idea of imperial 
citizenship and participation in colonial societies.111 Humanitarian governance in New Zealand 
shifted from the early conception of establishing infrastructures and systems that would support a 
system to one that adopted a stronger and more narrowly defined idea of progress and 
development. The failure of the colonial state to make room for a liberal idea of Māori 
subjecthood influenced the forms and nature of humanitarian governance’s goals. The 
dissertation proposes this consideration of New Zealand as a site of humanitarian governance 
and tracing the intertwined threads of what interventions were thought feasible, meaningful, and 
appropriate for a changing colonial context. 
That an inflated imperial hubris was punctured and reformed by realities on ground is not 
a new story, but New Zealand is a unique case given the initially favorable outlook towards 
110 Ballantyne, “Moving Texts and ‘Humane Sentiment’: Materiality, Mobility and the Emotions of Imperial 
Humanitarianism.” 
111 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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European racial amalgamation with Maori and perceived geographic similarities between New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom. The assumed compatibility of aboriginal people and the 
familiarity of local landscapes allowed colonial theorists and governments to formulate plans for 
the colony’s future that were inconceivable in other imperial settings. New Zealand was the 
laboratory in which a new and better Britain could be built and colonial laws constituted a central 
means through which government officials sought to realize their visions of the future. 
42
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: A Theatre of Dangers 
Theories of Humanitarian Governance and Māori Protection (1833 - 1840) 
 
In May of 1838, the membership of the Aborigines’ Protection Society assembled at 
Exeter Hall in central London to celebrate the organization’s first anniversary. Gathered in the 
same building that had hosted meetings of the Anti-Slavery Society, the crowd unanimously 
affirmed the APS’s vigilant advocacy of indigenous peoples. For the Society, “a new and better 
era” had dawned, one that marked a departure from what had been the “derogatory” effect of 
colonization; henceforth Britain’s colonial policy would promote the “progress of civilization.”1 
Self-consciously positioning itself at the vanguard of a broadened understanding of humanitarian 
action, the APS saw its mission as alerting Britain to colonization’s negative impact on 
indigenous peoples.  
The Society argued that if colonization was to reflect positively on Britain’s national 
character, any expansion must proceed in a planned and purposeful manner, which protected 
aboriginal populations. Establishing colonies in places like New Zealand, southern Africa, and 
North America could be delegated to rogue adventurers or private companies. Such an important 
undertaking must not, in the eyes of the APS, be left open to chance. Instead, the Society 
advocated that the British government had a moral obligation to mitigate the impact of European 
colonization. A combination of legal protections and the vigilance of concerned individuals was 
essential to secure the future success of aboriginal people. 
1 Aborigines’ Protection Society, First Annual Report of the Aborigines’ Protection Society (London: P. White and 
Son, 1838), 6. 
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New Zealand figured prominently in the Society’s catalogue of colonial ills. Among the 
APS’s concerns was widespread and unpunished physical violence, lawlessness resulting from 
the absence of legal infrastructure, and the unsavory influence that whalers, sailors, and escaped 
prisoners could have on Māori. These conditions created a “theatre of dangers which no friend to 
the Aborigines can overlook, and no Minister of the British Crown … safely despute [sic].”2 
Depredations by visiting ships, criminal behavior fostered by runaway Australian convicts, and 
the unchecked ravages of introduced diseases made New Zealand emblematic of the dangers the 
Society attributed to unregulated colonization. Resolutions passed at the moment of the Society’s 
first anniversary urged the British public and a committee of the British Parliament then 
considering New Zealand to act quickly. The APS’s hope was that Māori would not become 
another example of an indigenous people destroyed through contact with Europeans. 
The APS formed one facet of a larger groundswell of social and political reform within 
Britain.3 Alongside colonial questions, the Great Reform Act of 1832 had – albeit in a very 
narrow fashion – broadened suffrage in the United Kingdom, the abolition of slavery the 
following year had confirmed the connection between Britishness and freedom, and the 1833 
Factory Act had posed the first in a series of laws regulating child labor in industry. In the 
colonies, Thomas McCauley’s 1835 “Minute on Indian Education” advocated the educational 
potential of British subjects in South Asia. As a response to rebellions in Upper and Lower 
Canada in 1837 and 1838, the Durham Report of 1839 considered the balance of authority 
between the imperial government in the United Kingdom and the administration of colonies with 
substantial populations of European immigrants. The report’s findings accelerated pressure to 
2 Aborigines’ Protection Society, 21. 
3 Catherine Hall, “Culture and Identity in Imperial Britain,” in The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. 
Sarah Stockwell (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 203; Llewellyn Woodward, The Age of Reform 1815-1870, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
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devolve legislative power from London to local capitals in Canada and, over the following 
century, to other areas of white settlement in Australasia and southern Africa. The unsteady 
transition from slavery to emancipation revealed that “the problem of freedom” was long, 
difficult, and uncertain.4 Like the legacy of slavery, debate regarding the forms that imperial 
legal, social, and labor networks should take invoked questions about the nature of ethical 
obligation, about the atonement for past wrongs, and about how to secure a better future. 
As part of reforming the role of government and reimagining the purpose of empire, 
during the 1830s the relationship between Britain and its colonies received widespread attention 
from politicians, public intellectuals, and academics.5 Charged with negotiating these 
relationships, and located at the nexus of colonial reform, governance, and concern for 
indigenous peoples was Britain’s Colonial Office. This government department, whose remit 
included the administration of the United Kingdom’s overseas territories, was strongly 
influenced by principles of humanitarian action during the 1830s.6 Shaping interpretations of 
humanitarian action as they applied to colonial settings were free-trade economics, a confidence 
in the ability of indigenous peoples to adopt European customs and languages, and a strong faith 
in the moral benefits of Christianity.7  
A close relationship between humanitarianism, imperial rationales, and government 
practice allowed Britons in the 1830s to frame colonization as having positive effects. By 
protecting indigenous peoples against the disruption caused by European arrivals, imperial 
4 Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). 
5 Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 6. 
6 Rob Skinner and Alan Lester, “Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas,” Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 40, no. 5 (2012): 733–55; John Cell, British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century: The Policy-Making Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 3–44. 
7 Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2002), 3. 
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control could be described as a boon even if colonization meant extinguishing indigenous 
sovereignty and placing aboriginal populations in a position of dependence.8 In common with 
their counterparts in other sites of European empire, humanitarians in New Zealand deployed 
“grammars of difference” to categorize the cast of characters in colonial spaces as either victims 
or victimizers, as morally sound or ethically dubious, and as agents of positive change or 
enablers of injustice.9 Identifying indigenous peoples as distant, needy, and helpless others 
required describing aboriginal populations as passive entities requiring external protection. 
Interventions undertaken to provide that protection, even if those interventions infringed upon 
sovereignty, could then be considered legitimate. Even when undertaken with humanitarian 
intent, however, colonization limited the degrees of freedom and autonomy for those populations 
under its rule.10 A humanitarian logic for establishing and maintaining colonial rule eschewed 
overt violence towards indigenous people but, like other imperial modalities sites of 
humanitarian empire, it nevertheless created and consolidated hierarchies of difference.  
Within Britain there was no ready agreement about what a successful humanitarian 
intervention in New Zealand should take, nor was there consensus about how to organize a 
colonial administration promoting humanitarian policies. Ideas drew from a range of political, 
economic, and social factors with combinations thereof informing proposals for Māori 
protection. Optimism about the potential of indigenous populations, confidence in government 
action as a tool for social change and improvement, and the amenability of the Colonial Office to 
humanitarian influence meant that the 1830s was a particularly fertile moment for developing 
8 Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 3.  
9 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura. Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
10 Ann Stoler, “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty,” Public Culture 18, no. 1 (2006): 134. 
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ideas and concepts of humanitarian empire. Once implemented, concepts of humanitarian 
governance became part of existing tangled relationships between indigenous peoples, elements 
of British society and government interested in international affairs, and the structures and 
limitations of colonial rule. The process of translating humanitarian ideal into administrative 
practice was rarely straightforward. 
This chapter examines how competing ideas about the form and purpose of humanitarian 
governance shaped proposals for Britain’s colonization of New Zealand. To do so, the chapter 
refers to three examples of how humanitarians, colonial entrepreneurs, and government 
administrators advocated a range of interventions, assimilations, exclusions, or isolations with 
regard to Māori. Plans put forward by each group reflected their understanding of the 
relationship between land, labor, and government policy in colonial spaces. An intentional and 
purposeful arrangement thereof reveals what each constituency thought British intervention was 
supposed to accomplish for indigenous peoples. During the late 1830s, as conversations about 
intervening in New Zealand gathered steam, these plans were invoked to justify a case for or 
against an increased British presence, while also proposing a slate of policy interventions geared 
toward protecting Māori. 
The chapter first introduces the specificities of New Zealand as a site of humanitarian 
intervention and identifies social, political, and economic aspects of Māori society that were of 
concern in the 1830s. A second section contextualizes ideas of how Britain’s epistemic 
community interested in colonization drew from, and reacted to concepts of imperial governance, 
humanitarian action, and establishing British settlements overseas. The final piece examines how 
three distinct but overlapping entities — a government committee, a private corporation, and a 
lobbying group — each deployed a vision of British humanitarian governance in New Zealand. 
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New Zealand 1791-1840 
 
European ships first arrived in New Zealand’s waters in 1642. Sustained contact between 
indigenous Māori and Pākehā arrivals, however, did not occur until after visits by the British 
explorer James Cook in the 1760s and 1770s and George Vancouver in 1791.11 The 
establishment of a convict settlement at Sydney in 1788 further developed British interests in the 
southwest Pacific and contributed to a growing volume of maritime traffic. Early connections 
between New Zealand and the wider world centered on the marine industries of sealing and 
whaling, victualling ships, and growing provisions for the penal colonies of New South Wales. 
Māori laborers, mostly Ngāpuhi living at the Bay of Islands in the north of the North 
Island, formed part of European encounters from their earliest moments. It was through service 
on a British ship that the first recorded Māori visitor to the United Kingdom, a Ngāpuhi man 
named Moehanga, reached London in 1806. Māori expertise was also requested through official 
channels. In 1798 Lachlan Macquarie, the Governor of New South Wales, paid two Māori living 
in the Bay of Islands to come to Norfolk Island to teach Australian convicts how to make New 
Zealand flax into linen.12 Upon arrival, the men were unable to be of much assistance since the 
preparing of flax in Māori society was largely done by women. Their recruitment, however, 
signaled government interest in developing New Zealand’s terrestrial resources with the aid of 
indigenous expertise and labor. During an initial period of contact from the 1790s to the 1820s, 
Māori largely determined the extent of their engagement with European arrivals and whether to 
contribute their labor or sell provisions and supplies to a wider Pacific World. Māori inhabiting 
11 Pākehā - A term for a person who is not of Māori descent, the first record of the word in English usage is from 
1817. 
12 New Zealand flax (Phormium tenax), or harakeke, is not related to its European linen flax namesake (Linum 
usitatissimum) but has similar uses as a source of fibers for rope and cloth making. 
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the islands’ interior could largely remain aloof from direct contact with the largely British, 
European, and American arrivals. 
In addition to providing commercial contacts and opportunities, European influence in 
the islands also included Christianity. In 1814, the Reverend Samuel Marsden, then Colonial 
Chaplain of New South Wales, organized the first Christian service in New Zealand and 
purchased land for a mission station at Rangihoua in the Bay of Islands. Marsden’s mission 
formed the nucleus of the first permanent European settlement in New Zealand. Evangelization 
was not immediately successful. The first recorded baptism did not take place until 1825 with 
momentum only gaining pace later that decade.13 Despite a slow start, by the 1830s, missionaries 
played an important role in the printing of Māori-language books and had gained influence with 
indigenous authorities.14 Other Protestant evangelists, mostly Methodists, arrived during the 
1820s Three Catholic missionaries led by Jean Baptiste François Pompallier began their work in 
1838. By 1840, roughly 170 Anglicans and 70 Methodist missionaries and their families, all 
concentrated in the north of the North Island, tended to the spiritual welfare of Māori 
communities. In the 1830s and 1840s, the circulation of missionary reports and personnel 
between the South Pacific and Europe also constituted a central conduit for transmitting 
information, while missionary testimonies formed a common means of publicizing awareness of 
New Zealand amongst the British public.15 
An official presence in New Zealand emerged slowly. During the 1810s, reports that 
visiting ships were abducting Māori for service as sailors caused Governor Macquarie to appoint 
13 Harrison Wright, New Zealand, 1769-1840, Early Years of Western Contact (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1959), 43. 
14 Tony Ballantyne, Entanglements of Empire: Missionaries, Maori, and the Question of the Body (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2014). 
15 Andrew Porter, “An Overview 1700-1914,” in Missions and Empire, ed. Norman Etherington (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 50. 
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a justice of the peace in New Zealand. Macquarie appointed Thomas Kendall, then working at 
Marsden’s mission at Rangihoua, to the office. A further proclamation in November 1814 
forbade the removal of any native from New Zealand without the express permission of the local 
chief and a signed contract approved by Kendall. Despite these measures, stories of violence and 
depravity continued to circulate through imperial networks. Many in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and New Zealand asked what was to be done to curb the dangers and violence of the 
islands and what mechanisms might prevent the destruction of and collapse of Māori 
populations. 
Increased British legal authority in New Zealand, however, took another decade to arrive. 
A Parliamentary act extended the authority of New South Wales courts to all British subjects in 
New Zealand in the 1820s, but the court’s ability to enforce any rulings remained difficult given 
the transitory and international nature of maritime commerce. Māori, not being subjects of the 
Queen, remained outside the reach of British justice, but Europeans who violated the law could 
theoretically be arraigned by Australian authorities. Extending British authority to the islands 
and waters of New Zealand reflected British government’s feeling of ambiguity about wanting to 
extend Britain’s legal reach and punish crimes committed against Māori while also expressing 
apprehension at the prospect of British authority transgressing Maori sovereignty. 
Contact between Europeans and Māori was widespread throughout coastal New Zealand, 
but during the 1830s, the north of New Zealand, centered on the Bay of Islands’ natural harbors, 
remained the hub of sustained Māori–European encounter and exchange. Some Europeans, 
called Pākehā-Māori, adopted local customs and lived as guests of Māori notables. Early in the 
19th century, their presence could provide prestige and commercial contacts for a hapu, while for 
the Pākehā-Maori, the protection of a local chief offered security and status. Like the tales of 
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beachcombers shipwrecked in the Pacific and who made homes among island communities, 
Pākehā-Māori perspectives appeared mainly as curiosities to the British public through being 
republished as exotic accounts of the South Seas. Their voices rarely made it into official 
discourse.16 
During the first third of the 19th century, contacts between Māori and Europeans 
increased as populations of escaped convicts, runaway sailors, and other European arrivals grew. 
By the 1830s, the violent actions of Europeans, abductions of Māori, and violence between 
Māori communities established New Zealand’s reputation as a lawless place. Missionaries 
struggling to establish godly communities and whalers living outside of recognized legal 
jurisdictions did not often see eye to eye. Nor did they share a common vision or plan for what 
the future of New Zealand would be. Missionaries understood the scope of their work as 
redeeming souls and insulating Māori from the wicked ways of European sailors and escaped 
convicts.  
Perhaps no place more symbolized the struggle between order and chaos like Kororāreka, 
a port and victualling station in the Bay of Islands. From 1833, the settlement’s role as a 
commercial entrepôt established its importance for the first British Resident, James Busby, a 
Scottish-born viticulturist who had spent time in New South Wales and written reports for the 
Colonial Office about New Zealand. Busby, who took up his post in May 1833, was the first 
representative of British law and governance in the islands and acknowledged he was fighting an 
uphill battle. Kororāreka, with a population of several hundred, was known as the “Hellhole of 
16 Trevor. Bentley, Pakeha Maori: The Extraordinary Story of the Europeans Who Lived as Maori in Early New 
Zealand (Auckland: Penguin, 1999); Gordon. Ell and Sarah. Ell, Explorers, Whalers and Tattooed Sailors 
(Auckland: Random House, 2008). 
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the Pacific”; Busby had little infrastructure at his command to enforce order. 17 The absence of 
any monopoly of power – with a visiting ship’s crew or group of Māori equally capable of 
starting a fracas – contributed to Charles Darwin characterizing the port during his 1835 visit as 
“addicted to drunkenness and all kinds of vice.”18 Successful merchants traded kauri gum, wheat, 
and timber with the settlement at Sydney while, closer to home, Māori sold provisions to visiting 
ships and provided the flax that Governor Macquarie had so eagerly desired. In exchange, Māori 
acquired manufactured goods, especially guns. 
An increased supply of guns intensified an ongoing series of violent conflicts between 
iwi and hapu across the length and breadth of New Zealand. Known as the Musket Wars, the 
period of New Zealand’s history from 1807 (though rapidly intensifying from 1818) through the 
early 1840s led to a significant reorganization of indigenous political geography.19 The 
destruction and displacement caused by this process led a growing number of settlers to see New 
Zealand as in state of perfect anarchy. One British observer remarked in 1837 that Māori 
energies were directed not toward the “improvement of his country, [rather] he has hitherto 
fought and prayed for the extirpation, or at least, subjugation of his fellow countrymen.”20 
Though this violence remained largely internal to Māori communities, Europeans became 
involved through providing supplies or coastal transport. Lawlessness, to advocates of 
colonization, was intolerable given the preeminence of New Zealand as a site of colonization 
17 Parliamentary Papers of Great Britain [GBPP], 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines 
(British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 26 June 1837, 15. In April of 1834 there were 29 vessels in 
Kororāreka’s harbor 
18 Wright, New Zealand, 1769-1840, Early Years of Western Contact, 31. Quoting “Darwin, ‘Journal’ in FitzRoy, 
Narrative, III, 500.” 
19 Angela Ballara, Taua: “Musket Wars”, “Land Wars”, or Tikanga?: Warfare in Māori Society in the Early 
Nineteenth Century (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003); Ron Crosby, The Musket Wars: A History of Inter-Iwi 
Conflict, 1806-45 (Auckland: Libro International, 2012). 
20 Joel Samuel Polack, New Zealand: Being a Narrative of Travels and Adventures During a Residence in That 
Country Between the Years 1831 and 1837 (London: Richard Bentley, 1838), 321. 
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favored in terms of both landscape and the perceived amenability of its indigenous people to 
adopt European forms of civilization. 
A positive estimation of Māori capacity for British civilization, the violence and 
lawlessness of the Musket Wars, and the threat moral degradation caused by whalers and sealers 
created an uncomfortable feeling for those Britons who felt it was part of their country’s national 
character to act as a global moral force. The insular geography of New Zealand and sustained 
contact between Māori and Europeans meant that European observers could gain a sense of the 
scale of destruction, demographic decline, and dispossession accompanying inter-iwi violence. 
By the late 1830s, the chaos in New Zealand motivated parliamentary inquiries. The theater of 
dangers seen by the Aborigines’ Protection Society was, therefore, not only populated by threats 
external to New Zealand. Dangers also stemmed from the internal and effective adoption of 
European weapons by Māori to accomplish destructive ends. This combination of hazards 
contributed to an understanding of New Zealand as a place particularly fraught with peril. 
Māori also recognized the cost of this increasingly bloody conflict and the destructive 
impact that warfare entailed for indigenous communities. Partly resulting from the violent 
encounters of the Musket Wars, in 1833, thirteen chiefs living at the Bay of Islands sent a 
petition to King William IV asking to be put under the protection of the British Crown. Though 
the request was declined because the British did not wish to usurp Māori sovereignty, there was 
growing recognition in London and Sydney that New Zealand was suffering from an absence of 
law and order. It was this recognition that prompted the British government to send James Busby 
to Kororāreka. His instructions were to do everything within his power so that Europeans would 
not “excite the Natives to revenge their injuries by an indiscriminate slaughter of every British 
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subject within their reach.”21 The question of sovereignty within New Zealand was a vexed one 
for British officials in the 1830s, who were cognizant of the formidable martial capability of 
local Ngāpuhi, and who therefore mulled over a range of possibilities for establishing some 
degree of protection.22 
If politicians, concerned individuals, and humanitarian groups understood some type of 
British intervention in New Zealand as becoming increasingly urgent by the late 1830s, 
proposals for protecting Māori spanned a range of possibilities. Among the options were 
insulating Māori from contact with Europeans to ensure they did not become unwitting sailors on 
foreign ships or sell their land through dubious contracts. Others advocated trusting missionary 
communities to mediate contact between Māori and less virtuous arrivals. Concern for Māori 
prioritized the violability of their persons as economic agents, their liberty as political actors, and 
concern for their moral well-being.  
Given that Britain’s capacity for enforcing order in New Zealand was weak, 
underpinning these concerns was a lack of legal and juridical infrastructure. Māori were 
simultaneously seen as capable of incredible violence - thus in need of regulation – and yet were 
vulnerable to being swindled through an ignorance of legal language about contracts. The 
position of Māori as both victims and victimizers contained contradictory elements, but British 
officials and observers interpreted the lack of any legal and political infrastructure as creating 
harm. 
21 Sir Richard Bourke to James Busby, 13 April 1833 in H. Hanson Turton, An Epitome of Official Documents 
Relative to Native Affairs and Land Purchases in the North Island of New Zealand (Wellington: George Didsbury, 
1893), Section A: Province of Auckland, 2-5. 
22 Robert Grant, “New Zealand ‘Naturally’: Ernst Dieffenbach, Environmental Determinism and the Mid 
Nineteenth-Century British Colonization of New Zealand,” New Zealand Journal of History 37, no. 1 (2003): 26; P. 
G. McHugh, “A Pretty Gov[Ernment]!: The ‘Confederation of United Tribes’ and Britain’s Quest for Imperial Order 
in the New Zealand Islands during the 1830s,” in Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850, ed. Richard J. Ross and 
Lauren Benton (New York: NYU Press, 2013), 233–58. 
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Interest in humanitarian principles as they applied to governance, a confidence in an 
ability to mitigate the negative impact of colonization, and a heightened perception of the moral 
obligations of Britain’s global empire contextualized debate about of New Zealand as a site of 
colonial interest in the 1830s. New Zealand’s verdant landscape and archipelagic qualities 
sparked British imaginations with observers frequently likening the climate and topography to 
places in the British Isles.23 The high regard in which many observers held Polynesians as “noble 
savages” made the islands a particularly promising canvas on which to project ideas about the 
proper relationship between indigenous peoples and empire. 
 
Humanitarianism, Empire, and Indigenous Peoples 
 The epistemic community of the early 19th century interested in Britain’s evolving 
relationship with New Zealand wanted to ameliorate the negative impacts of European contact. 
While confident in the virtues and superiority of European civilization, those concerned with 
New Zealand’s future thought settler colonization need not inextricably result in the destruction 
of indigenous peoples. By adopting lessons learned from previous colonial ventures, limiting the 
capacity of colonists to disrupt indigenous peoples, and proposing forms of imperial expansion 
that protected aboriginal interests, many held that colonization could benefit Māori. Including 
Māori within colonial society, rather than considering them inextricably alien to it, proponents of 
23 An 1841 account likened the lush verdure of New Zealand to Britain’s “woods in the month of May, or rather, I 
should say, like a gentleman’s park in that month.” Richard Hodgskin, A Narrative of Eight Months’ Sojourn in New 
Zealand, with a Description of the Habits, Customs, and Character of the Islanders (Coleraine, 1841), 3, 23. 
Enthusiasm for New Zealand as a fertile land was frequently misleadingly optimistic and built on a long history of 
fantasy as applied to the islands of the Pacific. Bernard Smith, European Vision and the South Pacific (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1985). In his official account of Captain James Cook’s voyages to New Zealand John 
Hawkesworth promoted the idea of the islands as uninhabited and fertile. Eric Pawson and Tom Brooking, Seeds of 
Empire: The Environmental Transformation of New Zealand (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 15; Thomas Dunlap, 
Nature and the English Diaspora: Environment and History in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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colonization believed that Māori could avoid the negative outcomes that European empire had 
entailed for the indigenous populations of North America and Australia. Apart from a sense that 
the status quo in New Zealand was untenable, in the years before New Zealand became a formal 
colony in 1840, there was little unity across proposals for what form intervention might take. 
Proponents of intervention overlooked the deep dissonance between the loss of 
sovereignty, on one hand, and notions of economic and moral progress that accompanied ideas of 
humanitarian empire. They believed in the interdependence of the colony’s moral and economic 
success, suggesting that modifications to one would have a cascading effect and mutually 
reinforcing influence on the other.24 With the added impetus of Christian evangelism, proposals 
for New Zealand’s future engaged three central tensions. First was the relationship between the 
imperial center and the colonial periphery and the delegation of responsibility to agents charged 
with negotiating that relationship. Second, the degree to which intervention would isolate Māori 
from, amalgamate Māori within, or adapt Māori to, a larger settler colonial society. A third 
question concerned the spatial and legal forms through which the first two tensions could be best 
resolved. The importance of land to these questions was especially important in the context of 
proposals advocating the transfer of large numbers of Europeans from Britain to New Zealand. 
Establishing exclusive control over land lies at the heart of settler colonization. Despite an 
intentional approach to colonization, New Zealand’s settlement did not spare indigenous 
landholding. 
New Zealand’s annexation and the discussion of the terms of British engagement with the 
islands emerged during a time of reflection about the United Kingdom’s role in the world. 
Having outlawed the slave trade in 1807, abolished slavery in 1833, and ended the transportation 
24 Harris, Making Native Space, 9. 
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of convicts to New South Wales by 1840, the 1830s marked a crucial moment in Britain’s 
humanitarian history. This humanitarian inheritance fostered a positive moral valence for 
developing new chapters in Britain’s expanded imperial activities. The successes of the anti-
slavery movement drew its strength from networks of engaged citizens and politicians. In light of 
what they perceived as Britain’s leadership in world affairs, these people continued to organize 
and agitate on behalf of causes throughout the empire, including legal reform, the standardization 
of criminal punishment, and the protection of aborigines.25 
Many of those active in the anti-slavery movement, like the evangelical reformer Thomas 
Fowell Buxton and the Gurneys, a noted family of Quakers, took up the cause of aboriginal 
rights in the 1830s.26 Networks of interest and calls for humanitarian interventions in settler 
colonies, therefore, flowed through religious and familial channels, which were frequently 
connected with events occurring in both colonial spaces and within the British Isles.27 Family 
networks and individual personalities lost some of their power and influence across the 1830s, as 
colonial administrations become more bureaucratic and systematized. Still, familial and 
corporate connections remained key avenues of communication, connecting discussions about 
protecting the empire’s indigenous peoples with humanitarian causes resonant within British 
circles.28 
25 Lisa Ford, “Anti-Slavery and the Reconstitution of Empire,” Australian Historical Studies 45, no. 1 (2014): 77–
79. 
26 Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern, eds., “Introduction: British Identities, Indigenous Peoples and the Empire,” in 
Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 2; Zoë Laidlaw, “‘Aunt Anna’s Report’: The Buxton Women and the Aborigines Select 
Committee, 1835–37,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 32, no. 2 (2004): 2–3. 
27 Elizabeth Elbourne, “The Bannisters and Their Colonial World,” in Within and Without: Canadian History as 
Transnational History, ed. Karen Dubinsky, Adele Perry, and Henry Yu (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
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Personal connections were also important within the government and bureaucracy. 
Within the relatively small staff of Britain’s Colonial Office – numbering about three-dozen 
individuals in two houses on Downing Street near the Prime Minister’s residence – the influence 
and cross-pollination between colonial reform and humanitarian action were strong. Charles 
Grant, who became colonial secretary in 1835, was the son of a noted evangelist of the same 
name who as Chairman of the East India Company had pursued both evangelization and 
government reform in South Asia. James Stephen, the Colonial Office’s indefatigable Permanent 
Undersecretary of State for the Colonies from 1836 to 1847, had served on the board of the 
Church Missionary Society and was married to a daughter of a leading member of the Clapham 
Sect. The flurry of conversation, both official and popular, in the late 1830s about the future of 
New Zealand transpired during a period of intense debate about the structure and form of 
governance and within an environment that featured imbricated networks of communication and 
information sharing through personal, political, and official ties.29 
In addition to providing familial and confessional networks experienced in anti-slavery 
activism, humanitarian organizations in the 1830s also inherited from the anti-slavery movement 
a slate of methods and concepts useful for thinking about the relationship between indigenous 
peoples and colonial administration. They called for committees of enquiry, visited members of 
Parliament and government ministers, and published documents in periodicals and newspapers 
about indigenous issues built upon the methods of abolitionist organizers. Based on precedents 
from earlier in the 19th century, advocates for humanitarian governance in New Zealand had 
antecedents on which to base their claims that it was the responsibility of government to protect a 
29 Julie Evans et al., Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights: Indigenous Peoples in British Settler Colonies, 1830-1910 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 28.; A.G.L. Shaw, “Sir James Stephen (1789-1859),” in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Accessed March 21, 2018. doi: 
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group of people considered vulnerable. These antecedents provided examples for how 
humanitarian governance in New Zealand might look and what form intervention might take.30  
Debate about humanitarian governance transpiring in 1830s drew upon discussions about 
government’s responsibility to protect vulnerable populations, reflection about the nature of 
imperial expansion, and an interest in the situation of the empire’s indigenous people. An 
intentional approach to colonization would be a new form of colonization that eschewed the 
away from the chaos and uncertainty of earlier North American settlement. The North American 
context was prone to violent clashes between indigenous and settler populations, who occupied a 
porous and expansive frontier. In a series of lectures given from 1839-184, Herman Merivale, the 
University of Oxford’s Professor of Political Economy, summarized the grim history of 
colonization in North America and around the world. Merivale’s analysis of the history of 
colonization saw possible outcomes for Māori as either being killed, enslaved, insulated from 
contact with Europeans, or amalgamated with a settler population. He favored the last, 
amalgamation, as the only acceptable course of action for a civilized society.31  
Planned colonization, Merivale noted, engaged questions of political economy by 
considering the relationship between capital, labor, and land, and the ways in which ownership 
of land shaped social relationships in settler societies.32 One of the most audible practitioners of 
planned settlement in the 1830s was Edward Gibbon Wakefield. Wakefield’s model of 
colonization revolved around the idea of “sufficient price” for land. This price, low enough to 
encourage investment by capitalists but high enough to defer its acquisition by laborers, would 
30 Andrew Porter, “Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism,” ed. Andrew Porter, vol. 3, Oxford History of 
the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 198–207; Lester and Dussart, Colonization and the 
Origins of Humanitarian Governance, 10. 
31 Herman Merivale, Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, vol. 2 (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and 
Longman, 1841), 179. 
32 Harris, Making Native Space, 5. 
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ensure a supply of labor, provide investment in a colonial setting, and preserve an English model 
of social order overseas. 
Wakefield’s theories were first applied in the new settlement of South Australia. 
Established in 1834, the colony’s administrative policies sought to balance the ratio of land to 
labor in a manner that encouraged immigration and economic growth. South Australian officials 
also endorsed religious freedom and established the rights of the aboriginal population to 
continue to occupy land. Although it was not an immediate success, many voices in Britain 
praised the South Australian example, the first non-convict settlement on the continent, as a 
significant endeavor in planned settlement.33 Colonial reformers like Merivale and Wakefield 
expressed a confidence that the bane of European imperialism - the lawless chaos of a wild 
frontier - could be regulated and structured in a way to make colonization beneficial for settler, 
indigenous, and metropolitan communities. 
Humanitarians who applied ideas of systematic colonization to the islands of New 
Zealand largely overlooked the possible unwillingness of Māori to accommodate settler 
communities. New Zealand was also not a blank slate from a non-native perspective. European 
beachcombers, squatters, and agriculturalists were scattered across New Zealand by the 1830s. 
They had, in many instances, purchased land from local hapu.34 From the beginning of sustained 
imperial interest in New Zealand, planning for the islands’ colonization overlooked existing 
complexities. Patterns of indigenous land ownership and decades of land sales to Europeans, 
33 Process of moral improvement and economic growth/transformation were also occurring in the United Kingdom 
which was going through a process of revisiting its relationship toward property rights and debate about the rights of 
landlord and tenant, collective ownership or individual development that stemmed from some of the same 
ideological questions about production and appropriate use of a landscape discussed in the colonies with Chartism 
and Owenism. Daunton and Halpern, “Empire and Others,” 6. 
34 John C. Weaver, “Frontiers into Assets: The Social Construction of Property in New Zealand, 1840–65,” The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27, no. 3 (1999): 17–54; Katherine Smits, “John Stuart Mill on the 
Antipodes: Settler Violence against Indigenous Peoples and the Legitimacy of Colonial Rule,” Australian Journal of 
Politics & History 54, no. 1 (2008): 1–15. 
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which had transpired without a documentary record legible to English laws, further complicated 
the development of land tenure in New Zealand. Māori, as colonial administrators would soon 
find out, eschewed the role of grateful and docile recipients of humanitarian intervention.  
The moment of New Zealand’s colonization – and the character and form of that 
colonization – was one receptive to ideas of how government could act within humanitarian 
principles. This unique receptivity resulted from the confluence of liberal ideas of domestic 
political economy promoting an ideal of independent and self-sufficient membership, an 
understanding of the relationship between government and governed as based on the success of 
utilitarian models of planned settlement and rational administration, and the success of 
humanitarian movements in the first third of the 19th century.35 Joint action by a range of 
colonial actors from overlapping imperial networks, including missionaries, travelers, and naval 
officers. These diverse parties “facilitated shared discourse on the nature of and prospects for 
peoples” while spanning the range of opinions about how to effectively and efficiently apply 
colonialism’s perceived benefits while mitigating the ills of settler empire.36 A combination of 
reform-mindedness, imperial expansion, and humanitarian sentiment influenced ideas of colonial 
governance as they pertained to both British and indigenous populations of the empire. The 
afterglow of abolitionism, the lingering salience of humanitarian sentiment within Parliament, 
and the favorable reception of humanitarian concern within the colonial office staff marked the 
decade as an auspicious one for considering new projects and principles of colonial governance. 
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Humanitarian Interventions 
To explain the competing visions for New Zealand’s colonial future and how proposals 
about structuring protective regimes reflected diverse approaches to humanitarian governance, 
the remainder of the chapter turns to three perspectives: an official Select Committee of the 
British Parliament, a plan set out by the New Zealand Company promoting planned settlement of 
the kind favored by Wakefield, and the humanitarian organization of the Aborigines’ Protection 
Society, whose report began this chapter. These three entities shared an understanding that the 
state of affairs in New Zealand as it existed in the late 1830s was untenable. Each organization 
drew from similar currents and understandings of Britain’s imperial role. Their differences reveal 
how varieties of protection and humanitarian governance transformed from theoretical 
understanding to proposed practice. Each reflected upon the role of governance as a force for 
moral improvement and the ways in which that governance could be applied to protect New 
Zealand’s indigenous peoples. Their impressions and arguments influenced what became the 
official policy of the colonial government in New Zealand following the colony’s formal 
annexation in 1840 and established the groundwork for how humanitarian governance developed 
from a theory, to an idea, to an official policy. 
 
The Select Committee on Aborigines 
Following reports of violent clashes between colonists and indigenous peoples, 
particularly between Xhosa and European settlers on the eastern border of the Cape Colony, in 
1835, the British Parliament began a formal inquiry into colonization’s impact on the empire’s 
aboriginal populations. Tasked with investigating the state of native affairs throughout British 
territories and recommending what measures would best prevent future conflict, the Select 
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Committee on Aboriginal Peoples (British Settlements) had a remit to “secure to [indigenous 
peoples] the due observance of Justice, and the protection of their Rights; to promote the spread 
of Civilization among them, and lead them to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the 
Christian Religion.”37 This mandate guided the committee’s work across two parliamentary 
sessions during which they heard testimony from forty-six witnesses - including clergymen, 
soldiers, and politicians - with experience from American, African, and Australian contexts. 
The committee’s fifteen members were strongly influenced by humanitarian sentiment. 
Witness testimony also reflected a conviction that Britain’s role as a guarantor of liberties should 
stretch, albeit unevenly, to all the corners of its global empire. Chairing the committee was 
Thomas Fowell Buxton, who had, earlier in the decade, played a central role drafting legislation 
that ended slavery. Other members of the committee included William Gladstone, future Prime 
Minister, and Sir George Grey, cousin of a future governor of New Zealand and himself a future 
Secretary of State for Colonies. Largely supportive of the type of humanitarian causes promoted 
by Buxton, witness testimony portrayed colonization as perilous to Britain’s moral standing as an 
“enlightened and Christian” nation.38 Compounding negative outcomes for indigenous peoples 
was the corresponding corrupting influence of colonization on settlers, who often resorted to 
violence against indigenous people.39 British settlement, in the opinion of the Select Committee, 
almost invariably had negative economic, political, and social ramifications for both indigenous 
peoples and the European migrants who oppressed them. 
37 GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 
26 June 1837, 3. 
38 Elbourne, “The Sin of the Settler.”; GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British 
Settlement), Report of the Committee, 26 June 1837, 3-4. 
39 This fear echoed eighteenth-century concerns about the challenges Britain’s growing presence in South Asia 
posed for the administration of justice. Nicholas Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial 
Britain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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To inform its report, published in the summer of 1837, the committee gathered material 
from an imperial network of humanitarian interests. Though weighed in favor of accounts sent 
form southern Africa, witnesses included Shah Wundais, a member of “the Grape Island part of 
the Chippeway Indians,” Henry William Macauley who had lived in Sierra Leone for seven 
years as a merchant and commissary judge charged with suppressing the slave trade, and John 
Henry Pelley, chairman of the Hudson’s Bay Company.40 Witnesses shared a common goal of 
encouraging indigenous peoples to become Anglophone Christians. The final report owed much 
to the efforts of Thomas Fowell Buxton’s family, also participants in anti-slavery work, who 
played a role in drafting and circulating the report. Buxton’s sister-in-law, Anna Gurney, wrote 
and edited substantial portions of the final document. Though her membership in the minor 
gentry privileged her entry to elite circles, Gurney’s contributions reveal the broader framework 
of intellectual and political production accompanying humanitarian action in the years following 
abolition. The involvement of family members and dispersed networks of informants is a 
reminder that humanitarian concern operated both across and beyond official political 
structures.41 
In its findings, the Select Committee referred to a broad chronology of precedents, 
ranging from Charles II’s Council of Foreign Plantations (convened in 1670) to a 1834 address 
from the House of Commons to William IV, which re-iterated "the duty of acting upon the 
principles of justice and humanity in the intercourse and relations of this country with the native 
inhabitants of its colonial settlements, of affording them protection of their civil rights."42 
40 GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 
26 June 1837, 28, 32, 68. 
41 Laidlaw, “‘Aunt Anna’s Report,’” 3. 
42 GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 
26 June 1837, 4. 
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Evidence from Buxton’s global network of missionary contacts and witness testimony 
demonstrated that despite its nearly two-century history, the trajectory of settler colonization 
contained few success stories.43 Presenting a lengthy catalogue of injustices, the report stressed 
the need to atone for this grim precedent. Britain had a moral imperative to ensure that future 
instances of colonization did not repeat the mistakes of earlier eras.44 
New Zealand and other islands in the Pacific, like Tahiti, shared in this history of 
negative impact of European contact on indigenous peoples. The committee’s report saw the 
unregulated European presence throughout much of the region, particularly the physical and 
moral threat represented by escaped convicts, as an impediment to the development of 
indigenous peoples. European contact had also created a demand for a curiosity trade in 
shrunken Māori heads taken as war prizes, had brought about instances of sexual violence or 
abduction, and had encouraged wasteful expenditure on alcohol. Additionally, the Select 
Committee’s report observed further systemic harm through the usurpation of territory and 
property, a noticeable demographic decline, and increased destruction wrought by firearms.45 A 
negative assessment of Māori futures marked a change from Cook’s portrayals of a robust pre-
contact population and raised the question of whether New Zealand’s indigenous people would 
be able to survive unregulated violence. 
In the eyes of the committee, the mobility and fluidity of the region’s maritime traffic 
made the South Seas particularly vulnerable to negative moral influences. An abundance of 
islands and the resultant disaggregated form of indigenous governance provided numerous 
43 Ralph Crane, Anna Johnston, and C. Vijayasree, eds., Empire Calling: Administering Colonial Australia and 
India (Bengaluru: Foundation Books, 2013), 8. 
44 Laidlaw, “‘Aunt Anna’s Report,’” 1. 
45 GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 
26 June 1837, 4. 
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opportunities for ship’s captains to abduct, steal, or kill. The Committee’s findings highlighted 
instances where Europeans had either aided Māori in internal struggles or, in the case of the ship 
Elizabeth, were complicit in the abduction and transportation of Māori for purposes of conflict 
and war.46 The degrading impact of violence not only left individuals and local communities 
vulnerable but, according to the committee, discredited Europeans in the eyes of Māori, thereby 
impeding the latter’s conversion to Christianity. If Māori, esteemed by Britons as a robust, 
independent, and martial people, found it difficult to resist European expansion, the committee 
apprehended that there was little hope for the empire’s other indigenous peoples unless the 
government created policies designed to safeguard their interests. 
In the absence of protection, the transformation of Māori society, economy, and religious 
practice into European forms would be impossible. The Select Committee’s report reveals an 
understanding of Māori as capable of achieving civilization but also vulnerable to deleterious 
outside influences. Based on the evidence regarding exposure to European civilization, Māori 
seemed to lack the institutional capacity to assimilate into a British settler society without 
running an unacceptable risk of being defrauded, pauperized, or killed. The tension between 
recognizing Māori as having the potential to become like Britons, yet deeming them incapable of 
achieving those civilizational metrics by themselves, formed the kernel of a humanitarian 
perspective that placed the imperial government in a position of trusteeship.  
This perspective explains how the Select Committee could be both adamantly 
humanitarian and also unopposed to imperial expansion. The committee did, however, assert that 
if colonization was to proceed, European control needed to preserve the rights of those who were 
brought under its administration. Concerns about labor practices also informed the report’s 
46 GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 
26 June 1837, 16-17. 
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emphasis that British policy should not tolerate any “scheme which implies violence or fraud[,] 
that it will not longer subject itself to the guild of conniving oppression [i.e. slavery], and that it 
will take upon itself the task of defending those who are too weak and too ignorant to defend 
themselves.”47 The specter of slavery would not be allowed to return in the guise of British 
colonization. Colonization, therefore, could be a boon for indigenous peoples if British 
administration secured Māori rights over person, property, and contract threatened by the 
absence of legal institutions and infrastructures.  
The committee’s report expressed an understanding of rights and humanitarian action as a 
type of trusteeship. The legitimacy of this trusteeship derived from what the committee 
articulated as Britain’s ability both to confer upon native New Zealanders the benefit of Christian 
civilization and to provide structures protection them from European “encroachments” on the 
other.48 The power imbalance between Māori and European created a disparity that called upon 
the British people as “a new and irresistible appeal to our compassionate protection.”49 
Consequently, the committee’s recommendations for humanitarian intervention in New Zealand 
took two forms, one a set of recommendations advocating for the limitation and structuring of 
European power and the other a focus on means and mechanisms for elevating Māori. 
Humanitarian intervention, as conceptualized by the Committee, required weighing the 
impact of transgressing the sovereignty of New Zealanders on the one hand against the protective 
apparatus that British rule could provide on the other. The committee thought that settler 
populations were, at best, unsuited or, at worst, incapable of balancing their interests with those 
of the indigenous population. By virtue of “having either disputes to adjust with the native tribes, 
47 GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 
26 June 1837, 76. 
48 Ibid., 3. 
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or claims to urge against them, the representative body is virtually a party, and therefore ought 
not to be the judge in such controversies.”50 As a consequence, the committee recommended that 
control over indigenous affairs should remain in the hands of the colonial executive. A governor 
appointed by London could administer the colony without an immediate personal interest and 
with the benefit of expertise gained in other colonial settings. The combination of reporting to 
the imperial government rather than to the government of the colony, along with a more detached 
perspective, would allow an appointed governor to mediate between settler and indigenous 
interests. 
The Select Committee’s recommendations also included a slate of proposals regulating 
the political economy of a colony. To protect against labor abuses, they suggested limiting the 
length of labor contracts to twelve months, ensuring that contracts would be signed in the 
presence of a government officer. Other policies advocated for stronger regulation of the 
alienation and annexation of new territories, underscored the necessity of providing education to 
aboriginal peoples, and advocated the appointment of consular agents with visiting naval ships, 
who could authorize the immediate infliction of punishment, “especially of the punishment of 
removal from the island.”51 The committee was also skeptical of treaties, as such agreements had 
often acted as “apologies for disputes” rather than any “securities for peace.”52 The committee’s 
interventions focused on establishing a legal apparatus within a British settlement that would 
insulate aboriginal populations from being defrauded, would provide a counterweight to the 
acquisitive impulses of local European populations, and also provide a means through which 
violations of the law could be punished. Established governance, rather than “the most degrading 
50 GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 
26 June 1837, 77. 
51 Ibid., 85. 
52 Ibid., 78-80. 
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and intolerable of all forms of tyranny, that, namely, of brigands triumphing, by mere audacity, 
over every restraint of morality and law” would ensure the success of the empire’s indigenous 
peoples.53 
The Select Committee expressed confidence not only in the potential of Māori but also 
that the rights that needed to be preserved formed part of the “righteous and the profitable laws 
of justice.”54 The committee’s report “native inhabitants of any land have an incontrovertible 
right to their own soil: a plain and sacred right” was not one universally shared by Europeans 
already living in New Zealand.55 The future envisioned by the committee was one that would 
establish the legal structures and institutions through which rights could be asserted and 
affirmed. Only after structures of humanitarian governance were in place could Māori be able to 
take full advantage of the fruits of European civilization along the Christian lines favored by the 
committee. 
The committee deemed that it was irresponsible of Britain to leave New Zealand to a 
state of nature as the runaway convicts, sailors, whalers, and traders “frequently act in the most 
reckless and immoral manner when at a distance from the restraints of justice.”56 The absence of 
governance allowed all kinds of villainous acts, murder, and abduction, for which the remedy 
was a system of reliable, responsible government. 
After presenting a decidedly negative view of the political and social conditions 
prevailing in New Zealand and outlining their recommendations, the committee stopped short of 
advocating annexation. Not prepared to countenance the annexation of a people about whom 
53 GBPP, 1837 (425) Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlement), Report of the Committee, 
26 June 1837, 85. 
54 Ibid., 4. 
55 Ibid., 5. 
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they felt they still knew little, the Select Committee deprecated any further plan to interfere with 
the internal affairs of New Zealand and the South Sea Islands.57 The committee’s attempts to 
protect aboriginal populations and to establish protocols to ensure cooperation between 
indigenous and immigrant – the moral dilemma at the center of humanitarian governance in a 
settler-colonial context – vested authority in the Crown but remained silent about how the Crown 
would acquire land for emigrating British settlers.58 
One of the committee’s recommendations that was adopted in New Zealand was a system 
of government-appointed protectors of aborigines. These officers represented a concrete effort 
toward the “institutionalization of humanitarian ideas directly within the apparatus of the state” 
and the implementation of protectorates, first in South Australia and Honduras, and later, in New 
Zealand, which formed “the only specific governmental attempt to render colonization humane 
from the very start.”59 Protectors formed part of the New Zealand Company’s plan to annex the 
islands, but the Select Committee’s articulation of New Zealand as a place of moral, political, 
and economic hazard was not universally accepted. One voice of opposition, articulated most 
clearly by the New Zealand Company, proposed a different form of intervention. Instead of 
isolation or carefully administered regulation, the New Zealand Company proposed a system of 
native reserves, protectors of aborigines, and Māori participation in the colonial economy as 
forms of protection. 
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The New Zealand Company 
Though the Select Committee’s report declined to individually name any entities 
threatening aboriginal populations, members may well have been thinking of the New Zealand 
Association when they prevaricated about extending Britain’s rule in the South Pacific. 
Organized in 1837, though inheriting most of its leadership from an earlier organization called 
the New Zealand Company established in 1825, the New Zealand Association was one of several 
European entities investigating establishing a colonial presence in the islands.60 After failing to 
gain Parliamentary sanction for their plan to begin a settlement, the New Zealand Association 
disbanded and reformed as a joint-stock enterprise called the New Zealand Colonialization 
Company. The company took shape over the summer of 1838 with the goal of purchasing land 
and establishing a British settlement in New Zealand. The publications of the Association and 
the Company reflected a shared understanding of Māori as capable economic actors whose future 
and security would be assured through mediated participation in the colonial economy.61 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, the company’s leading intellectual light, endorsed an 
understanding of colonial political economy based on a “sufficient price” for land and the 
reproduction of English social hierarchies overseas. The central theory of what was known as 
Wakefieldian colonization postulated that the distribution of land in colonial settings needed to 
be restricted in such a way as to ensure that settlers were not too widely dispersed. While 
“capitalists” could immediately purchase land, those of modest means would emigrate as 
laborers for the capitalist class and only slowly build up enough savings to allow them to become 
landholders. Proceeds from the sale of land would underwrite costs of poor emigrants to the 
60 Peter Tremewan, French Akaroa: An Attempt to Colonise Southern New Zealand (Christchurch: University of 
Canterbury Press, 1990); Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830-1847 (Auckland: 
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colonies. Wakefield intended for his system to make colonies financially independent while 
achieving a social purpose by managing the ratio of land and labor in a way that ensured colonial 
proprietors would have access to affordable labor. The NZC thought that in New Zealand, unlike 
in Wakefield’s settlement in South Australia, Māori could join immigrant British settlers as a 
possible source of labor. The indigenous aristocracy might be potential allies in establishing the 
company’s vision of what colonial society could be. 
In 1838, the New Zealand Association, the Company’s predecessor, had sought 
Parliamentary sanction for its colonizing efforts. Leading this effort in the House of Commons 
was Francis Baring, MP for Portsmouth and scion of the eponymous merchant banking family. 
Baring would later join the board of directors of the New Zealand Company. The proposal 
stipulated “that all persons of the native race … shall, without any condition of naturalization or 
otherwise, be entitled to and enjoy all the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities of 
British subjects therein.”62 The Association’s governing documents also called for system of 
Native Protectors, who would oversee interactions and commercial transaction between 
European colonists and Māori, though the terms of protection were only cursorily discussed. In a 
vote on 20 June 1838, the bill was defeated by a vote of 92 to 32. William Gladstone 
summarized the negative view of the House of Commons with the observation that while it was 
well and good to speak of extending the rights of British subjects to Māori, the structures 
proposed by the Association for enforcing rights were thin, giving too much leeway to the 
62 GBPP 1837-38 (443) A Bill for the Provisional Government of British Settlements in the Islands of New Zealand, 
Article 12, 1 June 1838, 6. 
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Association.63 Furthermore, annexation was, in Gladstone’s mind, the prerogative of the 
government and should not be exercised by a capitalist enterprise. 
Despite the negative vote, a majority of parliamentarians agreed with the need for more 
robust government structures in New Zealand than those provided by local missionaries-qua-
magistrates, the efforts of the British Resident in the Bay of Islands, or the passing crews of the 
Royal Navy. The vague details in the plan put forward by the New Zealand Association about 
what form protection would take were compounded by a lack of “evidence that the chiefs of New 
Zealand had parted with any of their rights of sovereignty.”64 Parliamentarians were hesitant 
about transgressing territorial rights and endorsing a rushed and unwelcomed extension of British 
authority. In 1838, Parliament, like the Select Committee on Aborigines, which had wrapped up 
its work the previous year, remained unwilling to sanction efforts to make New Zealand into an 
official colony. This finding was based on an assessment of Māori as capable of exercising their 
individual liberties and their sovereign rights over their territory. 
It was this negative vote, denying a charter to the New Zealand Association, that caused 
the NZA to reform as the New Zealand Company. Undeterred by the absence of a charter, in 
August of 1839, the NZC dispatched a ship, the Tory, to New Zealand under the command of 
Colonel William Wakefield. The Company argued that their land purchases were akin to those 
made by mission societies, who had acquired land in the Bay of Islands without government 
sanction. Colonel Wakefield, a younger brother of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, sailed to New 
Zealand with instructions to purchase thousands of acres of land around the Cook Strait. That the 
company’s venture was not affirmatively sanctioned by the British government did not deter the 
63 United Kingdom, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, Volume 43, Vict. 1, Column 874, House of 
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NZC; they intended to purchase land from Māori and establish a colony concurrently with efforts 
to legitimize their venture. 
In Wakefieldian fashion, there was an unsanctioned underlying theory about how the 
colony would develop. The NZC proposed that commissioners acting on the company’s behalf 
would purchase land from Māori and upon the cession of sovereignty would convert the lands 
into British territory “to be governed by British law, making, however, exceptional regulations, 
in favour of the natives, to protect them from their own ignorance and to promote their moral and 
social improvement.”65 If the British Parliament was reticent to impinge upon Māori sovereignty, 
the directors of the NZC described their own goal as bringing order to the islands. By 
establishing British law, with slight modifications, they would create the required framework for 
improving Māori society. 
The directors conceptualized Māori as independent agents capable of signing contracts 
and understanding the sale and transfer of land but also as in a position of dependence because 
they were unaccustomed to European legal formalities. A limited understanding of European 
governance meant that Māori, in the eyes of the NZC, could not be fully autonomous agents 
within the Company’s vision of colonial society.66 The Company recognized Māori interest in 
the land by offering to purchase it rather than simply take it, as had been the case with the British 
occupation of Australia. Having legitimized the acquisition of land through purchase, the 
Company anticipated serving as a custodian over land reserved for Māori while encouraging 
indigenous adoption of European customs. Thus, the flexible approach of the NZC vis-à-vis the 
rights of Māori allowed the company to profess an adherence to the law while setting the 
65 New Zealand Company, “First Report of the Directors,” in Supplementary Information Relative to New Zealand 
(London: J. W. Parker, 1840), 165. 
66 New Zealand Company, 165. 
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groundwork for a paternalist approach to humanitarian governance with Māori positioned as the 
beneficiaries of corporate largess. 
Wakefield took pains to persuade the Colonial Office and the newly formed Aborigines’ 
Protection Society that a positive relationship would develop between Māori and settlers. The 
NZC undertaking would not replicate the grim precedents of Australian settlement.67 Invoking 
the long history of British humanitarianism, the NZC expressed confidence that their plan for 
colonization would “shield the natives effectually against injury and wrong, [but] it remained in 
the power of any foreign state to pursue a contrary policy.”68 In this context, the foreign threat 
was France. The Company used the specter of a Catholic colony finding a foothold in New 
Zealand to create anxiety about political and sectarian challenges to British interests in the 
southwest Pacific.69 The Company proposed that administrative infrastructure would not only 
protect Māori from harm but also would establish and consolidate a British presence in the area. 
The centerpiece of the NZC’s proposals for Māori protection was a system of reserves 
designated for the benefit of Māori who sold land to the Company. One-tenth of the land the 
Company surveyed for settlement was to be set aside as native reserves “in trust for the future 
benefit of the chief families of the ceding tribes.”70 Like the Company’s scheme for European 
settlers, the reserve system was to serve simultaneous social and economic purposes.  The 
Company’s prospectus conceptualized these “Native Tenths” as accruing value by being in the 
vicinity of European settlements. With time, proximity to European towns would not only render 
the land more economically valuable but, by being interspersed with settler allotments, was also 
67 Smits, “John Stuart Mill on the Antipodes,” 46; Adams, Fatal Necessity. 
68 New Zealand Company, “Supplementary Information Relative to New Zealand,” 181. 
69 New Zealand Company, 181. 
70 GBPP, 1844 (556) Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand, Instructions from the Directors of the 
Company to Edmund Halswell, 10 October 1840, Appendix 668. 
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geared toward the social improvement of a Māori elite who would spend time occupying some of 
the reserve lots as residents. This plan ran counter to the Parliamentary committee’s vision for 
indigenous protection, which saw most commercial contact between indigenous and settler 
communities as deleterious. Instead, the Company’s proposals opened the door to integration, at 
least by a local elite whom the company perceived as able to mediate the impact of European 
colonization. 
The principal danger that colonization posed to indigenous peoples, the directors wrote, 
was that of “finding themselves entirely without landed property, and therefore without 
consideration, in the midst of a society where, through immigration and settlement, land has 
become a valuable property.”71 With the assistance of Nayti, a Ngāti Awa who had lived in the 
UK for a number of years and was now travelling with the Company, Colonel Wakefield was 
instructed to present European settlement as a net boon for Māori living where purchases were 
made. When negotiating purchase offers Nayti and Wakefield were to emphasize that since land 
set aside for the sellers’ benefit would increase in value with further arrivals. In contrast to the 
“common practice as to Indian reserves in North America, whereby settlement is impeded, and 
the savages are encouraged to continue savage, living apart from the civilized community” Māori 
living in proximity to Company settlements would benefit from proximity into colonial society.72 
Securing land to Māori would preserve not only their population base and potential as a 
labor supply, but, by limiting the reserves to elite Māori families, would compel the bulk of 
Māori to work as laborers rather than benefitting from the proceeds of land located within the 
settlements. Rights in land, assigned to chiefly strata, would ensure the continuation of a graded 
social hierarchy. Having “property in land intermixed with the property of civilized and 
71 New Zealand Company, “Supplementary Information Relative to New Zealand,” 119. 
72 New Zealand Company, 120. 
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industrious settlers,” claimed the NZC, “… [traditional authorities] will thus possess the means, 
and an essential means, of preserving in the midst of a civilized community, the same degree of 
relative consideration and superiority as they now enjoy in their own tribe.”73 Humanitarian 
governance, in the eyes of the Company, required the maintenance of indigenous hierarchies. 
These would preserve the social and economic gradations that Wakefield so carefully planned 
for European settlers. 
The New Zealand Company thought that Māori were capable of decision-making. This 
capacity included the ability to give up sovereignty. The NZC could justify the extension and 
establishment of British law in New Zealand as a humanitarian measure by ensuring that elite 
Māori maintained possession of increasingly valuable property. Economic security would ensure 
the continuation of social gradations while facilitating the assimilation of Māori, at least elite 
Māori, into a Wakefieldian society. Though the NZC affirmed the property rights of Māori in 
their communication with the Colonial Office, London-based bureaucrats remained wary of the 
legitimacy of Company purchases throughout much of the 1840s.74  Reserves, however, became 
part of non-NZC humanitarian governance in the years following New Zealand’s annexation. 
 
The Aborigines’ Protection Society 
In the aftermath of the Select Committee Report, a group of concerned individuals met to 
organize advocacy on behalf of the indigenous peoples of the world. The members of the 
Aborigines Protection Society understood that they stood at a moment of great importance in 
colonial history. New Zealand, in particular, held a central place in the attention of the British 
73 New Zealand Company, 120–21. 
74 Mark Hickford, “‘Vague Native Rights to Land’: British Imperial Policy on Native Title and Custom in New 
Zealand, 1837–53,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 38, no. 2 (2010): 196. 
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public.75 By raising awareness of the challenges faced of indigenous peoples, the APS saw itself 
following in the footsteps of a longer humanitarian tradition established by Britain’s 1807 
outlawing of the slave trade and the subsequent abolition of slavery in 1833. 
Modelling its actions on the successes of the anti-slavery movement, the APS not only 
organized political pressure within Britain but also gathered information from a globally-
dispersed network of correspondents. Unlike the anti-slavery campaigns that pre-dated the 
foundation of the APS, the Society was never a mass movement.  Membership rolls never 
exceeded several hundred. Those who did join were mostly middle-class professionals and others 
involved in commerce and industry. As opposed to some other organizations, which benefited 
from aristocratic patronage, the APS could only draw upon one or two minor peers, a few 
bishops, and a number of baronets, former military officers, and knights.76 Its subscribers were 
either Nonconformist or evangelical Anglican and from a political perspective, the organization 
tended to favor the Liberal Party.77 Throughout the lifetime of the APS, general policy favored 
the possession of property as a guarantee of native rights and freedoms.78 The real agency of the 
Society, however, was vested in the office of Secretary, who was responsible for scheduling 
meetings, organizing correspondence, and supervising the APS’s network of contributors. Akin 
to the broad remit of anti-slavery organizing, the APS envisioned an expansive geographic scope 
to their activities. From the banks of the “Orinoco and the Amazon” to “the frozen dwellings of 
Labrador to the palmy banks of the Indus,” the Society advocated intervention in support of all 
indigenous people displaced, disadvantaged, or degraded by colonial encounters.79  
75 Aborigines’ Protection Society, First Annual Report of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, 5, 20. 
76 Charles Swaisland, “The Aborigines Protection Society, 1837-1909,” Slavery & Abolition 21, no. 2 (2000): 266. 
77 Swaisland, 266. 
78 Porter, “Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism,” 216. 
79 Aborigines’ Protection Society, First Annual Report of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, 10. 
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The Society used the occasion of its first anniversary in 1837 to appeal to British 
humanitarian sentiment and to make their case to the British Parliament for why Britain’s status 
among nations depended on protecting Māori from the physical violence and moral degradation 
of British interlocutors. Thomas Fowell Buxton, who had chaired of the Select Committee on 
Aborigines, served as the Society’s first chairman. The APS’s vision of rights and protection 
focused on insulating Māori from the corrupting influence of Europeans. Missionaries, by virtue 
of strong moral character, formed the Society’s favored vectors for communicating with Māori. 
The large number of British subjects already in New Zealand made moot the question of whether 
or not to intervene. For the APS, New Zealand “demand[ed] some legislative interference in the 
way of countroul [sic].”80 The continuing violence and growing European presence on the 
islands required the establishment of law and order or “a new race of buccaneers will appear in 
the southern ocean, under whose oppressions the natives will sink, while they will make war on 
the commerce of mankind at large.”81 The evils that would result from the status quo, according 
to the APS, justified intervention and the transgression of Māori sovereignty.  
The APS, aware of the paradox of annexation as a form of protection, hoped that Great 
Britain would never “exert her power to destroy the political rights of these comparatively feeble 
and defenseless people.”82 In the case of New Zealand, however, the APS felt that non-
interference had gone on too long. Establishing humanitarian governance was, by 1838, an 
“imperative necessity.”83 The APS understood that Intervention was still a transgression of 
sovereignty; in this case, it was also the lesser of two evils. Their first annual report observed 
that it would “not be friendship to the Aborigines to leave them a prey to the unprincipled and 
80 Aborigines’ Protection Society, 20. 
81 Aborigines’ Protection Society, 21. 
82 Aborigines’ Protection Society, 21. 
83 Aborigines’ Protection Society, 21. 
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lawless, under the plea of the injustice that might be done them.”84 That this urgency was 
motivated by the violent treatment of indigenous peoples at the hands of British subjects 
reflected poorly on the United Kingdom’s claim to be a force of moral authority. The progress of 
Māori along the scales of civilization, however, could only develop within a secure framework 
provided by European government. Pointing to Canada and South Africa as evidence that “with 
fair means of culture [indigenous peoples] can attain a rank of equality with the other races,” the 
APS was confident that intervention, undertaken by missionary societies and other like-minded 
entities attuned to moral questions, would result in the preservation, conversion, and progress of 
New Zealand’s indigenous peoples.85  
Like the Select Committee, the APS was not anti-colonial. Instead, the grim precedent of 
settler colonization and the competitive and enterprising spirit that the Society saw at the center 
of planned colonization “cannot but effect the speedy deterioration, diminution, and final 
destruction of the Aborigines.”86 The paradox of enhancing a people’s liberty by controlling and 
assimilating them to European patterns did not seem to bother the APS in its early years. By 
1840, however, the British government’s decision to annex New Zealand meant that it was no 
longer possible to leave colonization to missionary societies. After the Treaty of Waitangi, the 
question the APS had to consider was how to lobby for the creation and implementation of 
policies and practices of colonial governance that protected Māori from the evils associated with 
European settlement.  
 
84 Aborigines’ Protection Society, 20-21. 
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Conclusion: Humanitarian Governance in New Zealand 
Debate about the form and nature of the relationship between a colonial state and 
indigenous peoples intermingled with a perception of crisis in New Zealand. This debate 
contributed to recognition that the status quo in New Zealand was no longer tenable. While the 
Select Committee advocated for further planning and information gathering, and while the 
Aborigines’ Protection Society echoed the moral imperative of colonial responsibility, it was the 
New Zealand Company’s dispatch of the Tory that brought the question of New Zealand’s 
annexation to a head. 
 The unsanctioned colonization efforts by the New Zealand Company spurred the British 
government into action. Marking a shift from a previous policy of non-interference, and in 
opposition to the arguments of the APS to limit European contact to a morally-sound few, the 
British government hurried to establish a colonial administration in New Zealand. With the 
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the new colonial government had to quickly develop 
policies that balanced isolation (the prevention of any contact between settlers and indigenous 
peoples), insulation (the slow or mediated process of cultural exchange), and assimilation into 
European society.  
Partly because the NZC had presented the government with what was largely a done deal 
and partly because the Company had developed proposals for their colonial undertaking, a 
Parliamentary committee that convened in 1840 to discuss New Zealand adopted a model of 
indigenous protection “similar to that adopted by the New Zealand Company, [since it] would be 
attended with the most beneficial effects to the native race in New Zealand, and affords the best 
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prospect of securing to them the benefits of civilization.”87  What Parliament found favorable in 
the Company’s plan was the creation of a class of elite Māori who, through obtaining access to 
reserved land, “would not only be preserved from degradation themselves, but also be able to 
shield the inferior order of natives from wrong and oppression. The experiment of reserving 
lands for the native chiefs under proper regulations, may justly be regarded as one of high 
importance to the interests of humanity, and one well deserving of the sanction of Parliament.”88 
While the vision outlined by the New Zealand Company of Māori rights secured through land 
tenure under the trusteeship of European colonists appealed to the reform-minded Wakefieldians, 
the competing ideas of humanitarian governance played out differently on the ground. 
Conversations about the future of New Zealand’s indigenous peoples during the 1830s 
featured a range of perspectives about how to protect Māori, about the forms that protection 
would take, and about the ethical calculus of intervening on humanitarian grounds. A long 
history of British interactions with indigenous peoples provided an often-grim portrait of the 
consequences that European settlement had on native populations. In the 1830s, politicians, 
humanitarians, and corporate directors hoped they could forge a new type of relationship 
between colonial government and colonized peoples. In addition to British examples, 
contemporaries looked to the United States and referred to the policies of William Penn and the 
later Proclamation Line of 1763 as evidence of earlier efforts to establish a geographic separation 
between settler and indigenous populations.89 In the early 19th century, the United States was 
also grappling with its own ideas of how to accommodate or exclude native populations within 
87 GBPP 1840 (582) Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand, Report of the Select Committee, 30 July 
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the boundaries of an emerging state, though American commentators saw the expanses of 
territory to the west of the Mississippi as a large frontier, something that the insular 
characteristics of New Zealand’s geography precluded.90 
One aspect of protection established at the moment of colonization derived from an 
understanding that Māori would eventually become part of the British colonial society and would 
therefore lose their identity as an indigenous people. William Brown, a member of New 
Zealand’s Legislative Council in the 1840s, characterized Māori as having moral and intellectual 
“capacities … [that] eminently fit them for amalgamating easily, at no distant period, with their 
civilized brethren[.]”91In the late 1830s, it was possible to envision Māori assimilating into the 
colonial state. Improvement and cultural adaption, however, were defined on terms favorable to 
the British colonists, which posited racial amalgamation as the metric for what constituted 
civilized society. The proposals for humanitarian governance that developed out of this approach 
encouraged policies, structures, and laws encouraging Māori adoption of European habits and 
patterns of resource production and distribution,    
Using Māori labor to accelerate the colony’s economic development formed another 
element of humanitarian governance. The anticipation that Maori could become part of a wider 
settler society was founded upon the idea that they had the moral and intellectual capacities to 
become Christian, but the temporality of that assimilation remained open to question.92 
Economic considerations joined moral considerations in favoring the idea of Māori working 
alongside immigrant European workers in order to present a possible short-cut to New Zealand’s 
development as an agricultural economy. One account testified to Māori’s industrious work ethic 
90 James Ronda, “‘We Have a Country’: Race, Geography, and the Invention of Indian Territory,” Journal of the 
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and willingness to work for less remuneration than settlers, two important considerations for a 
nascent colonial state.93 Investing Māori in the material success of the colonial state would not 
only provide an economic boost but would also be a boon to security and internal order. 
93 Hodgskin, A Narrative of Eight Months’ Sojourn in New Zealand, with a Description of the Habits, Customs, and 
Character of the Islanders, 25. 
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Chapter 2: An Uneasy Submission 
The New Zealand Company and the Protectorate of Aborigines (1840 – 1846) 
In 1846, George Clarke had served as New Zealand’s Chief Protector of Aborigines for 
six years. Official duties had taken him across the North and South Islands, involved him in 
consultations about policies designed to benefit Māori, and required his mediation between and 
among Māori and European constituencies. As the Chief Protector, Clarke embodied 
humanitarian governance in New Zealand. Clarke was also the inaugural holder of his office and, 
as such, had the responsibility to translate theories of indigenous protection into practices of 
colonial administration. Clarke was to be the colony’s first and only Chief Protector. A new 
governor, George Grey, soon dismissed the Chief Protector and incorporated the functions of the 
Protectorate into the executive portfolio. Clarke’s dismissal marked the end of a model of 
indigenous protection that featured a degree of distance between agents charged with 
safeguarding aboriginal interests and the authority of Crown’s representative in New Zealand. 
Though Clarke had been employed by the state, his departure heralded the beginning of a closer 
connection between the colonial state and practices of humanitarian governance. 
Grey began his appointment during a moment of crisis in New Zealand in the aftermath 
of the Flagstaff War (March 1845 - January 1846). Assuming office in November 1845, the new 
governor faced uncertainty about what position the colonial state should take regarding Māori 
sovereignty. The unresolved status of many pre-treaty land claims complicated government 
efforts to secure title to property, and a reliance on income from land sales meant New Zealand’s 
budget was in a precarious position. The delay in establishing title to land frustrated the 
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implementation of humanitarian governance in the colony as government officials, settlers, and 
Māori debated the form and function of official interventions. 
The new governor’s ability to shut down the Protectorate was promulgated both by 
turbulence caused by financial and administrative factors as well as the successful pillorying of 
Clarke and the Protectorate before an 1844 Parliamentary Select Committee in London. The 
fusion of both local and imperial doubts concerning the forms of humanitarian governance 
practiced in New Zealand, of which native reserves played a key role, created an opportunity for 
Governor Grey to restructure the colony’s native administration. In closing the Protectorate, the 
governor consolidated decision-making about humanitarian governance in the hands of the 
colonial executive. 
This chapter begins in 1840 in the immediate aftermath of Britain’s annexation and 
examines initial efforts at translating theories of Māori protection into policies of humanitarian 
governance. Reserves of land set aside for the benefit of Māori formed the main intervention of 
both the New Zealand Company and the British colonial government. Advocates of reserves did 
not see the full scope of social and economic transformations they hoped for, but in a more 
modest form the reserve system demonstrated how the colonial state implemented ideas of 
humanitarian governance in a settler colonial setting. Between 1840 and 1846, the sluggish pace 
of assigning responsibility for reserves, lingering administrative tension between the imperial 
government and the New Zealand Company, and the slow resolution of title and purchase 
agreements between Europeans and Māori meant that visions for what reserves could accomplish 
did not come to full fruition. 
Accounting for this failure is particularly important as many contemporaries in Britain 
understood New Zealand’s incorporation into the British Empire as a humanitarian experiment 
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unique in the annals of imperialism. Even opposition to annexation was often based on 
humanitarian – rather than financial or military – arguments expressing concern that the 
European colonization would be detrimental to Māori by transgressing indigenous sovereignty. 
The apprehended “fatal impact” of unregulated contact between Māori and European left open 
the possibility for British complicity in the destruction of a population; this outcome was no 
longer acceptable to a British nation that championed humanitarian causes like abolitionism and 
the welcoming of refugees. Intervention based on an assessment of the perilous situation faced 
by Māori in the late 1830s was central to Britain’s decision to colonize the islands. The 
transformation of the intentions, institutions, and agents charged with developing humanitarian 
governance illustrates shifts in how the colonial state implemented a moral obligation as 
administrative policy. 
This chapter documents how the New Zealand Company and the British government 
established and organized native reserves as part of a program of humanitarian governance. 
Though geographically remote, New Zealand formed part of global circuits of information and 
knowledge production.1 Alongside groups like the Aborigines’ Protection Society (APS) and 
missionary organizations like the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the imperial government 
was attuned to events in the colony with New Zealand forming the subject of multiple 
Parliamentary inquiries during the early 1840s. The chapter addresses how an epistemic 
community interested in New Zealand’s people, lands, and position within an imperial 
framework understood and interpreted humanitarian governance. Couched within a larger 
analysis of the practices of humanitarian governance in New Zealand, the chapter concludes with 
an account of what factors and events created the context in which it was politically viable – both 
1 Alan Lester, “Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire,” History Compass 4, no. 1 
(2006): 124–41. 
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in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand – for Grey to disband the Protectorate as a signature 
institution of humanitarian governance. 
Tension between imperial idealism and the consequences of colonial dispossession 
shaped humanitarian governance in New Zealand. By examining how officials implemented 
native reserves and other forms of humanitarian governance, this chapter engages changing 
perceptions of indigenous protection. In so doing, it is possible to unpack how policy makers 
conceived the role Māori people and Māori lands had in the colony’s future. Imperial expansion 
was simultaneously a process of a hopeful imagined future and an instrument of the destructive 
and disruptive consequences of conquest. In addition to bringing sheep and sawmills, wheat and 
whalers, colonization also carried narratives of improvement and hopes for the future that were 
influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment, Malthus, and Mill.2 Territorial growth formed a “way 
of moving forward in time; the ‘prospect’ [of settlement] that opens up is not just a spatial scene 
but a projected future of ‘development’ and ‘exploitation.’”3 New Zealand, in other words, was a 
place where, under humanitarian governance, advocates saw the beginning of a new, hopeful 
chapter in the history of settler colonization. 
Despite a humanitarian inflection, creating legal, programmatic and spatial aspects of 
colonial governance in New Zealand also established empire’s rule of difference within a 
colonial setting.4 For decades preceding colonization, there were few universal rules structuring 
the sale of New Zealand land to Europeans. Displacement within Māori communities following 
the Musket Wars had also resulted in multiple and overlapping claims to land that were in the 
2 Michael Cowen and Robert W. Shenton, Doctrines of Development (London: Routledge, 1996), 12–59. 
3  W.J.T. Mitchell, “Imperial Landscape,” in Landscape and Power, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell, 2nd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 17. 
4 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
88
process of resolution at the moment of the Treaty of Waitangi. Uncertainly over title, rather than 
the question of sovereignty itself (given the weakness of the colonial administration and its 
inability to exert a monopoly of violence), delayed confirming and issuing titles to land. 
Disagreement surrounding the accommodation of Māori custom vis-à-vis British law infused 
discussions about humanitarian governance during this era with an awareness that British laws 
and notions of contract and sale could not be immediately and uniformly imposed on Māori.  
The two main actors in this chapter, the New Zealand Company and the Protectorate of 
Aborigines, each grappled with how to implement theories of humanitarian governance in the 
form of land reserved for Māori. Amidst a growing settler society that eagerly sought access to 
land, the NZC and the Protectorate discussed how to transform idea into practice as they 
simultaneously engaged with, reacted to, and justified their actions to Māori groups, settler 
constituencies, and the local and imperial governments. Within an arena that was already fraught 
with vexed questions of sovereignty, land ownership, the purpose of imperialism, and the degree 
to which Māori could or should become part of Britain’s imperial experiment in New Zealand, 
implementing a reserve program faced substantial challenges. 
 
The New Zealand Company and Humanitarian Governance 
The New Zealand Company, established in the 1830s by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, 
proposed New Zealand as a site for realizing a vision of systematic colonization. The Company’s 
plan included a system of reserves designated for the benefit of Māori that – like its scheme for 
European settlers – was socially hierarchical. In a letter to Colonel William Hayward Wakefield, 
the Company’s Principal Agent in Wellington and younger brother of Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, the NZC Board of Directors outlined their rationale for establishing reserves. Their 
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instructions to Wakefield expressed a prediction that any money or goods conveyed to Māori as 
payment for land would be quickly spent with the result that, after a short time, New Zealand’s 
indigenous people would be not only destitute but also landless. The NZC considered reserves of 
land, therefore, to be “far more important to the natives than anything [given] in the shape of 
purchase-money” in that the reserves would act as a continuing source of revenue for Māori.5  
William Wakefield arrived in Port Nicholson in late 1839 and began negotiating land 
purchases with Te Āti Awa and Ngāti Toa. Between 1839 and 1843 the New Zealand Company 
made agreements with multiple Māori leaders. Transactions exchanged £45,000 in trade goods 
for roughly 20 million acres including the northern third of the South Island and a large section 
of the southern North Island.6 The scale and legality of the Company’s land claims was at odds 
with the clause of the Treaty of Waitangi stipulating that the Crown was the only entity legally 
authorized to alienate land. The discrepancy about who had authority to alienate land caused 
further confusion as the government and Company worked to ascertain the legality of purchase 
agreements.7 Both the NZC and individual purchasers had entered into lease or sale agreements 
before annexation with the intention of later converting it into a fixed title, a practice that also 
held true on numerous colonial frontiers in North America, South Africa, and Australia.8 
5 Parliamentary Papers of Great Britain [GBPP] 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Instructions from the 
Directors of the Company to William Wakefield, May 1839, Appendix 578. 
6 Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830-1847 (Auckland: Auckland University 
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to Alaska (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 65. 
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To facilitate land purchases, and also convince Port Nicholson Māori that the reserve 
system would be beneficial, the New Zealand Company’s Board of Directors had instructed 
William Wakefield to rely upon Nayti, who, in addition to claiming to be the son of a Ngāti Toa 
chief, had also lived with Edward Gibbon Wakefield in London for two years and was returning 
to New Zealand as an interpreter with the Company’s fleet.9 With linguistic and cultural 
facilitation provided by Nayti, the Company anticipated it would be possible to convince local 
Māori that “that, after English emigration and settlement, a tenth of the land [held as reserves] 
w[ould] be far more valuable than the whole was before.”10 For his part, Nayti was to emphasize 
that reserves were not to be made in large blocks as had been the common practice in North 
America, but would rather be scattered throughout the European settlements. The Directors felt 
that isolating Māori on land far from European settlements precluded their assimilation into 
colonial society by allowing them to “continue savage.” 
Reserves were selected through the same ballot process by which settlers were allocated 
lots. Of the 1100 sections of one “town acre” and 100 “country acres,” the NZC designated as 
native reserves. Drawn up in London on August 1st 1839, the lots a Company agent selected for 
native reserves ranged from numbers 7, 15 and 20 to the 1066, 1080, and 1086th selections.11 
Upon arrival in New Zealand, Company representatives did not consult with local Māori when 
selecting sites for reserves in Port Nicholson. Choosing reserves was left to Captain Smith, the 
Principal Surveyor to the New Zealand Company, who selected the town lots and many of the 
9 Peter Tremewan, “French Whalers and the Maori,” in Pacific Journeys: Essays in Honour of John Dunmore, ed. 
Glynnis M. Cropp (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 145. 
10 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Instructions from the Directors of the Company to Colonel 
Wakefield, May 1839, Appendix 578. 
11 Archives New Zealand [ANZ], Land Orders of Native Reserves, 1 August 1839, New Zealand Company [NZC] 
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country lots. Actual surveying work, however, progressed slowly. Out of the 1100 parcels sold 
by the New Zealand Company, by January of 1844, only 475 sections (43%) had been surveyed 
and an even smaller percentage of native reserves with only 34 (7%) being platted.12 
The NZC intended reserves to have a social purpose. The Company’s plan suggested 
assigning reserves to the families of native chiefs or notables as a way of maintaining the graded 
social hierarchy of the indigenous population and “preserving,” in the midst of the disruptive 
process of colonization and emigration, the “same degree of relative consideration and 
superiority” chiefs had enjoyed among their own people in the years before European contact. 
By stabilizing local social hierarchies, the Company’s plan for Māori reserves paralleled their 
intention to reproduce an ordered vision of British society for the European colonists.13 
To oversee and administer the Company’s reserves, the Board of Directors appointed 
Edmund Halswell to be the Administrator of Native Reserves. Halswell received no additional 
remuneration for these obligations though he later received the additional waged office of local 
magistrate. His remit was to implement the Company’s stated goal of “civiliz[ing] the native race 
by means of a deliberate plan.” 14 While directors admitted the plan was “confessedly 
experimental” they argued it was still notable for being “the only systematic attempt ever made 
to improve a savage people through the medium of colonization.”15 The principal purpose of the 
110 sections reserved for Port Nicholson Māori was to sustain, by establishing property in land, a 
12 ANZ, Land Office Papers, n.d. [1839], NZC 33 4 9. Land Office Papers. The reserves were scattered throughout 
the Port Nicholson District ranging from eight of 81 of the surveyed sections in the Lower Hutt, to one out of 34 in 
Horokiwi. 
13 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Instructions from the Directors of the Company to William 
Wakefield, May 1839, Appendix 578. 
14 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Instructions from the Directors of the Company to Edmund 
Halswell, 10 October 1840, Appendix 668. 
15 Ibid., 668. 
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high relative position for native chiefs and for promoting moral and religious instruction of those 
elite families. 
The Directors, however, knew very little about both the people whom the reserves were 
supposed to benefit and the geographical characteristics of the reserves themselves. Halswell was 
therefore requested to inquire into the reserves’ “situation, quality, and natural circumstances” 
and describe their potential value in terms of agricultural production, timber, or mineral 
resources. Furthermore, Halswell was also supposed to gather anthropological information about 
local Māori 
“distinguishing their ages and sexes, and the rank they hold in the tribes … their habits, 
character and manner, and their capacity for instruction and civilization, observing their 
ability and disposition to labour, and what may be their qualifications for the possession 
or administration of property of any kind ... [and to] what extent native industry is carried 
on whether in agriculture or in the rude manufactures of the country.”16 
 
The administration of native peoples, in the Company’s eyes, formed part of a larger effort to 
gather information about New Zealand’s people, landscapes, and resources. Knowledge of Māori 
would aid the Company’s assessment of how to developing a new colony’s potential, both from 
an economic as well as a demographic angle. 
Towards the end of 1841, Halswell submitted a report to the NZC Directors about the 
condition of the native reserves in Port Nicholson. His report accompanied census figures for the 
whole of New Zealand that estimated a total Māori population of 107,219 with 495 living in the 
immediate surroundings of Port Nicholson at the pas of Te Aro, Pipitea, and Kumototo.17 
Though few of the reserved lots had been surveyed by the end of 1841, Halswell noted that one 
Māori, a man named Moturoa, was cultivating part of one reserve and that a Māori missionary, 
16 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Instructions from the Directors of the Company to Edmund 
Halswell, 10 October 1840, Appendix 668. 
17 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Edmund Halswell to the Secretary of the New Zealand 
Company, 11 November 1841, Appendix 670. 
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Thomas Davis, who lived at Pipitea pa, was building a twelve-ton vessel with which to 
participate in coastal trading of grain and potatoes. 
Overall, however, Edward Campbell, the government surveyor, expressed the opinion, 
one confirmed by the colony’s land commissioner William Spain, that native reserves which had 
been drawn by lot were generally so distant from Māori settlements, themselves not part of the 
reserve allotments, as to be of little value to Māori for cultivation or settlement.18 The 
combination of a delay in surveying, remote position, and scattered distribution made immediate 
utilization of reserve lots difficult. Intended to appreciate in value as the Wellington settlement 
expanded, reserve lots were unable to provide an immediate and ready source of income either 
for Māori directly or indirectly through other programs of humanitarian governance.  
Instead of land, Halswell observed that the great want of local Māori appeared to be 
medical care. He based his assessment of the poor health of Māori, who experienced a high level 
of pulmonary complaints, on the poorly-ventilated huts characteristic of indigenous domestic 
architecture.19 Though both Halswell and others praised the sobriety of Port Nicholson Māori, a 
high rate of infant mortality, widespread tobacco use, and what was perceived as a poor diet of 
steeped, almost fermented maize, caused European health practitioners to worry about the long-
term health of the community.20 Medical efforts included providing smallpox vaccines for fifteen 
children at Te Aro, a process that only went forward after Halswell himself was inoculated as an 
example to Māori who were observing the proceedure. Persuading Māori about the effectiveness 
18 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Vernon Smith to the Reverend John Beecham, 11 July 
1841, Appendix 294. 
19 “Raupo Houses Ordinance,” 3 March 1842, 5 Vict., c17 (New Zealand) imposed a tax upon the use of raupo, a 
type of reed, as a fire-prevention measure. 
20 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, George Clarke Jr. George Clark, 13 December 1842, 
Appendix 123-4. 
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of European medical care required some proof. In 1841 official of the New Zealand Company 
could not compel Māori to receive treatment. The power of visible medical treatment was 
persuasive. A successful amputation on a man named E Toko who had lost his lower arm in a 
musket accident increased the Company’s standing among Māori.21 Medical procedures and the 
clear and immediate results of successful treatment constituted a compelling reason for Māori to 
participate and engage with the Company. 
The NZC’s negative assessment of Māori physical health was tempered by the potential 
use of Māori labor in the colony. Though he critiqued Māori for having a short attention span 
and being “capricious,” Halswell noted that in the two years since the establishment of the 
settlement at Wellington, Māori had undertaken labor worth £30,000. To best deploy the 
“admirable eagerness for information and improvement,” he identified in a report to the NZC 
directors that “nothing short of breaking up the pahs [sic] and locating their inhabitants in decent 
huts, in small villages on their own reserves, and by degrees associating them with the white 
population, will render them generally fit companions for any, even the lowest of the settlers.”22 
This assessment, applied to the majority of Māori, rather than the chiefly elite, articulates a sense 
of protection based upon the reformation of Māori living conditions and a gradual integration 
into local European practices of political economy as individuals and across all classes. In the 
early 1840s, however, the NZC was unable to compel the demographic dispersion of Māori. 
Even a fire that destroyed half of the Te Aro pa did not prompt Māori to move to reserved lots.23 
21 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Edmund Halswell to the Secretary of the Company, 11 
November 1841, Appendix 672. 
22 Ibid., 673. 
23 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Edmund Halswell to the Secretary of the Company, 10 
February 1842, Appendix 676. 
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Māori reticence may have also been due to disputes between William Wakefield, the 
colonial government, and local Māori about whether nor not the initial purchase agreements 
made in 1840 had indeed included the sites of the three Wellington pas. Claiming that they had 
in fact not sold the sites of their residences, cultivations, and burial grounds, the refusal of Māori 
to move illustrates that they were unconvinced by the promises made by Halswell even as they 
adapted and engaged settler society. 
If the implementation of NZC ideals for the reserves was frustrated by an uncertainty of 
title, limited budget, and Māori skepticism about their value and legitimacy, an equally frustrated 
and limited operational structure was apparent in the reserve policy of the nascent colonial 
government. In late 1840, Halswell had received instructions to cordially co-operate with and aid 
officers of the Government who were involved with “protecting the New Zealanders of the 
native race.”24 As the Company established its system of reserve administration, so too, if 
belatedly, did the colonial government begin the task of establishing its own priorities and plans 
for native administration in areas of European settlement. 
 
The Protectorate of Aborigines and Humanitarian Governance 
William Hobson, the first Governor of New Zealand, like his NZC counterpart William 
Wakefield, arrived with a slate of responsibilities and an agenda outlined by London. Lord 
Russell, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had instructed Hobson to take seriously the 
findings of the 1837 Select Committee regarding colonization’s deleterious effects on aboriginal 
populations. Russell encouraged the colonial government to be ambitious with its operations to 
prevent the fatal decline of Māori populations and “leave no rational experiment for the 
24 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Instructions from the Directors of the Company to Edmund 
Halswell, 10 October 1840, Appendix 668. 
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prevention of it unattempted.”25 New Zealand provide a laboratory space for implementing 
theories of humanitarian governance.  
The Colonial Office stipulated that the government’s interventions in aboriginal affairs be 
conducted with a spirit of ecumenical cooperation. This approach recognized the decades-long 
presence of Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic missionaries in New Zealand and the multiplicity 
of agents capable of facilitating interactions between settler and indigenous communities. In its 
initial form, Russell instructed Hobson to focus humanitarian interventions on religious 
instruction, the protection of persons and property, the enactment and enforcement of laws, and 
the encouragement of education, particularly that of Māori youth.26 These priorities stemmed 
from the concern expressed by organizations like the Aborigines’ Protection Society who 
favored creating morally-attuned order out of the violent chaos of the 1830s. 
To administer to the legal and educational progress of Māori, Lord Russell directed 
Hobson to establish a Protectorate of Aborigines. The office would dispense advice and also 
advocate in “whatever concerned more immediately the rights and interests of the natives.”27 To 
carry out his tasks, the Protectorate would retain proper legal counsel, have access to a court of 
criminal justice, and be empowered with authority for summary jurisdiction for “arbitrating on 
all questions controverted[sic] between the native and the European settlers.”28 Government 
infrastructure, in this case the judicial system, would mediate between communities and facilitate 
the success of humanitarian governance.  
25 GBPP 1841 Session 1 (311), Correspondence Relative to New Zealand, Lord Russell to Governor Hobson, 9 
December 1840, 27. 
26 Ibid., 27-28. 
27 Ibid., 27-28. 
28 Ibid., 27. 
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To fill the role of Protector of Aborigines, Governor Hobson selected George Clarke. 
Clarke’s appointment, with a yearly wage of £450, was approved in April of 1840 and the 
governor informed him that his duties as Chief Protector would be analogous to some of the 
work he was already undertaking as a lay missionary for the CMS. Hobson also noted that the 
new office would require travel into the interior to negotiate land purchases and inquired whether 
or not that task would be consistent with his employment by a missionary society.29 The local 
CMS committee released Clarke from his commitments to the organization and took the 
opportunity to express their “deep interest in the welfare of the aborigines of this land and the 
prosperity of Her Majesty’s Government[.]”30 Clarke’s appointment, however, still had to be 
confirmed by the Colonial Secretary in London, and in a letter from the CMS Secretary to Lord 
Russell, Clarke’s sixteen years of experience in New Zealand, and ability to speak Māori were 
highlighted as contributing to his competency. 
The CMS hoped Clarke would be a valuable asset as the government developed “a 
scheme of colonization under which the existence of the Aborigines may be persevered, and their 
legitimate rights and highest interests may be secured and promoted.” 31 The Colonial Secretary 
confirmed Clarke’s appointment, but the ambiguity of his situation, as both advocate of and 
purchaser of land from Māori, and vulnerability to accusations of having divided loyalties to the 
government or the CMS would remain lingering concerns that made Clarke vulnerable to 
criticism from his enemies. 
29 The National Archives [TNA], Governor William Hobson to George Clarke, 4 April 1840, enclosed in Despatch 
2177 from Dandeson Coates to Lord John Russell, CO 209/8. 
30 ANZ, Church Missionary Society to Governor William Hobson, 14 April 1840, Internal Affairs [IA]1 2 1840/107. 
31 TNA, Governor William Hobson to George Clarke, 4 April 1840, enclosed in Despatch 2177 from Dandeson 
Coates to Lord John Russell, CO 209/8. 
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The Protectorate of Aborigines, initially solely staffed by Clarke, was gradually expanded 
to provide for more Protectors in other areas of the North Island. George Clarke Jr., the 19-year-
old son of George Clarke, was appointed in January 1842 to administer the southern North Island 
around Port Nicholson and site of the main NZC settlement, Henry Kemp travelled to the district 
north of Auckland in October of 1842, and John Campbell traveled to Taranaki in July of 1843.32 
These areas represented some of the densest concentrations of Māori population and all would 
eventually experience moments of armed violence between settler and indigenous populations. 
Like efforts to implement humanitarian governance undertaken by the NZC, so too did 
the colonial state need to gain approval among Māori communities in order for its policies to be 
effective. The Protectorate’s official remit called for bringing a stop to “violations of the eternal 
and universal laws of morality,”33 which British observers often defined as cannibalism, human 
sacrifice, and infanticide. The duties of the protector thus covered both the role of legal advisor 
and that of cultural ameliorator. In 1841, Lord Russell encouraged protectors to act as “the 
advocate or attorney ex officio for the natives in all suits.”34 Advocacy and cultural change, 
however, needed to proceed carefully. Reflecting the limited coercive power of the settler state 
relative to Māori, the protector was urged to evaluate what customs might be overcome through 
instruction rather than coercion. Lacking the capacity to establish a ban on indigenous customs 
considered deleterious by the British government, the Protectorate had to rely on a campaign of 
suasion rather than compulsion. 
32 New Zealand Gazette, 19 January 1842, October 26 1842, July 12 1843. 
33 GBPP 1841 Session 1 (311), Correspondence Relative to New Zealand, Lord Russell to Governor William 
Hobson, 9 December 1840, 27-28. 
34 GBPP 1841 Session 1 (311), Correspondence Relative to New Zealand, Lord Russell to Governor William 
Hobson, 28 January 1841, 51. 
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The ability to evaluate customs and practices of Māori to determine indigenous 
amenability to change depended upon the protectors becoming familiar with local communities. 
Like the instructions sent to the NZC, gathering information was explicitly part of the program 
and portfolio of protectors of aborigines. To communicate their findings, the governor directed 
protectors to submit a semi-annual report that would “embrace with the utmost possible 
exactness every topic connected with the increase or decrease of the number, the social and 
political condition, the education, and the intellectual, moral and religious improvement of the 
objects of his care.”35 Like the NZC’s interest in building a repertoire of knowledge, developing 
institutions of humanitarian governance recognized a distinct need for information gathering as 
part of the raw material on which experiments of governance could be based. The two key areas 
of experimentation undertaken by the colonial government were resolving questions about 
sovereignty and land ownership, and the degree to which Māori should be subject to, or 
exempted from, British law. 
Following his arrival in New Zealand, Governor Hobson had not immediately 
implemented a program of reserved land for Māori. Unlike directives sent to representatives of 
the New Zealand Company, initial instructions about humanitarian governance received by 
government officials conceptualized establishing reserves as a gradual process that worked in 
tandem with land sales. Since the Crown had asserted an exclusive prerogative to purchase and 
sell land acquired from Māori in the Treaty of Waitangi (though Governor FitzRoy waived this 
right at times), government officials would mark out reserves within each block or parcel of land 
as part of the process of purchasing, surveyors, and selling. 
35 GBPP 1841 Session 1 (311), Correspondence Relative to New Zealand, Lord Russell to Governor William 
Hobson, 28 January 1841, 51. 
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To identify which Māori exercised ownership over particular areas, and operating with 
the exhortations of the imperial government for colonial officials to gather as much information 
as possible, in January 1841 the London government directed Hobson to conduct a survey of 
Māori land with all “practicable and necessary precision.”36 Like the experience of the New 
Zealand Company in settling purchase claims around Port Nicholson, establishing title and 
ownership complicated the colonial state’s effort to establish territorially-based practices of 
humanitarian government. While hospitals, education, and legal reform could overlay existing 
patterns of territorial ownership, designating land as a reserve – and for whose benefit – was 
more complicated. 
In a movement that caused some to question the capability of the Protectorate to advocate 
for Māori, the Lord Russell outlined a system linking the state’s income to the amount of land 
that could be acquired from Māori. Russell advised that between 15 and 20 percent of the sale 
price of land purchased from Māori and then sold on to settlers would constitute a fund for 
“defraying the charge of the protector’s establishment” and costs authorized by the “protector, 
the governor and executive council … for promoting the health, civilization, education and 
spiritual care of the natives.”37 Russell placed a high priority on retaining Māori villages, 
agricultural plots, and burial grounds and informed Hobson that such areas should be inalienable 
even on the authority of the local government. A directive to maintain Māori villages caused 
conflict with the representatives of the New Zealand Company. In Port Nicholson, Company 
representatives asserted that their purchases of land in Port Nicholson included the valuable 
waterfront land occupied by the three Māori villages. 
36 GBPP 1841 Session 1 (311), Correspondence Relative to New Zealand, Lord Russell to Governor William 
Hobson, 28 January 1841, 51. 
37 Ibid., 52. 
101
Linking state revenue to the purchase and resale of Māori land to settlers raised a thorny 
ethical quandary for the Protectorate. Acquiring Māori land was supposed to sustain the 
humanitarian and civil operations of the government. While land purchases fluctuated over the 
1840s as a proportion of government income, the dual role of the Protectorate as both an 
advocate for Māori and a key player in negotiating land purchase agreements with Māori land 
left the Protectorate vulnerable to accusations of favoritism toward particular iwi or hapu. As 
part of the apparatus of acquiring land, the Protectorate occupied the doubly delicate position as 
both a facilitator of the transfer of land to the colonial state and holding responsibility for 
mitigating the consequences of such sales. 
Though the government had yet to adopt and designate its own system of reserves, the 
colonial state did move, by late 1841, to regulate the administration of the New Zealand 
Company’s native reserves at Port Nicholson and Nelson. Retaining Halswell as an agent, the 
government sought to establish a procedure for generating revenue from the reserved land. Now, 
Halswell was in the position of answering to both the colonial government and the New Zealand 
Company. Halswell received instructions from the government regarding the management of 
native reserves that stipulated that, after advertising in the Government Gazette, the official 
newspaper of the colonial government, and in local papers at least a month ahead of time, native 
reserves could be leased for periods of not more than seven years. Rent was to be paid quarterly 
and include an advance of ten percent on the first year. Any proceeds realized from the reserves 
were to support “education and religious instruction of the natives.” 38 These measures included 
fencing the lots of reserved sections, enlarging the native churches at the villages of Te Aro and 
38 George Clarke to Edmund Halswell, 28 September 1841, H. Hanson Turton, An Epitome of Official Documents 
Relative to Native Affairs and Land Purchases in the North Island of New Zealand (Wellington: George Didsbury, 
1883), Section D: Native Reserves, 3. 
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Pipitea, providing a small salary for both a European teacher and a “Native” instructor, and 
disbursing funds for a dispensary, medical advice, and other assistance for the sick. It took until 
April 2, 1842 for the first lease to be signed. Until rental income began to accumulate, Halswell 
regretted that he was without any means of “promoting the moral improvement” of the Māori.39 
The delay in implementing a systematic approach to renting reserves illustrates how a 
multiplicity of agents and institutions slowed the development of humanitarian governance. 
Opportunity for leasing reserves was further curtailed three weeks later when Halswell 
received notification from Auckland that due to the establishment of a Land Commissioners 
Court in Port Nicholson, which was instructed to investigate contested claims to land, “no 
contracts should be entered into with reference to any native reserve” under a doubtful title.40 
The seven-year limit on leases was also a source of contention. Critics noted it limited demand 
for leases as possible tenants were wary of clearing the land or building a permanent structure 
when faced with the prospect of losing the value of their improvements at the expiry of the lease. 
In the absence of revenue from land sales or leases, Halswell nevertheless continued to survey, 
stake-out, and fence reserved lots and receive one-eighth of any timber sawn from trees on the 
property. While it does not appear that the native reserve fund received money for the timber 
itself, the processed wood was intended for use by Māori in building projects.41 
By mid-1842, native reserves in Port Nicholson were still not fulfilling their intended 
function as a source of income for Māori or as a site for dispersing the indigenous population 
39 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Halswell to Secretary of the Company, February 2 1842. 
The lease was for Barret’s Hotel for the sum of £54.9.0. H. Hanson Turton, Maori Deeds of Land Purchase in the 
North Island of New Zealand, vol. 2 (Wellington: George Didsbury, 1878) 97-98. 
40 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, J. A. Stuart Freeman to Edmund Halswell, April 23 1842, 
Appendix 681. 
41 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Edmund Halswell to Colonel William Wakefield, June 4 
1842, Appendix 678. 
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among European settlers. Halswell lamented that “the native reserves should still remain for the 
most part unprofitable, when so much good might be accomplished.”42 Among the reasons for 
this delay was continuing uncertainty about which Māori group had sold land to the New 
Zealand Company. Concern from prospective tenants about taking a lease with an uncertain title, 
meant not only diminished demand from Europeans but also that Port Nicholson Māori were 
reluctant to move onto reserved land that “other natives have occupied or might occupy.” 43 
Disputes over title and sale did not simply complicate issues of landholding. Because the model 
of funding humanitarian governance for Māori was dependent upon a stream of revenue from 
land sales and leaseholds, uncertainly about title meant reserves were unable to generate funds 
for causes benefitting Māori that would encourage their participation and assimilation into 
colonial society. 
The New Zealand Company reserve system pre-dated the establishment of the 
Protectorate and initially operated as a separate, Company-administered entity though adhering 
to regulations outlined by the colonial government. In June 1842, the Colonial Secretary in 
Auckland wrote to the Company “that by a recent arrangement, the trusteeship of all native 
reserves in New Zealand [would vest] in the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of New Zealand, 
the Chief Protector, and his Honour the Chief Justice.”44 By consolidating reserves under one 
administrative umbrella the government hoped reserves would provide for the education of 
Māori youth, spiritual care, and such programs conducive to “advancement in the sale of social 
42 Ibid., Appendix 679. 
43 Ibid., Appendix 679. 
44 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Willoughby Shortland to Edmund Halswell, 18 June 1842, 
Appendix 682. 
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and political existence.”45 The percentage of funds earmarked for native affairs confirmed the 
figure suggested earlier by Lord Russell at between 15-20 percent of the proceeds from land 
sales.46 Though still operating more at the level of intention rather than as an operative 
institution, the consolidation of native reserves under the control of the Chief Protector and Chief 
Justice, two government officers, and the Bishop of New Zealand –  head of the colony’s largest 
religious body – speaks to a continued interest in humanitarian governance and discussion about 
which offices and entities should have the authority to act as agents of the colonial state. 
This consolidation of government authority, if not yet actionable control, over native 
reserves was an effort to consolidate best practices for humanitarian governance. The 
incorporation of NZC reserves under the umbrella of the colonial government placed Halswell in 
a junior position to Clarke. The two did not get along, but in the absence of a clear replacement 
Halswell was retained by the government. Clarke critiqued Halswell for being too “deeply 
interested in the Company’s affairs, and ignorant both of the language and of the customs of the 
natives.”47 Halswell was not alone in not speaking Te Reo Māori; the lack of Māori-speaking 
agents continued to be a source of difficulty for the Protectorate. Governor Hobson, in a letter to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, underscored the important connection between language 
training and humanitarian governance since “however well-educated a gentleman may be, unless 
he speak the native language, he will be unable to properly to perform the duty of a protector.”48 
Language proficiency also indicates that Māori did not feel compelled to learn English to interact 
with the colonial state and that the colonial administration had to engage Māori. 
45 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Willoughby Shortland to Chief Justice William Martin, 
June 26 1841, Appendix 683.  
46 Willoughby Shortland to George Clarke, 26 July 1842, Section D: Native Reserves in Turton, Epitome of Official 
Documents, Section D: Native Reserves, 3. 
47 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Chief Protector’s Report, 4 January 1843, Appendix 122. 
48 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Acting Governor Willoughby Shortland to Lord Stanley, 21 
November 1843, Appendix 255. 
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The importance of engaging Māori required colonial officials to travel areas where Māori 
lived. Reflecting upon his experience in negotiations with Māori in the Thames Valley in 1842, 
Willoughby Shortland, the Colonial Secretary of New Zealand who went on to serve as Acting 
Governor of New Zealand following the death of Governor Hobson in September of 1842, 
underscored the important role that protectors played as cultural intermediaries. Prioritizing 
moral suasion as a method of governance that suited the limited capacities of the colonial state, 
the “continuance of mild, just and firm measures,” as best calculated to encourage the 
“civilization of a noble-minded and intelligent aboriginal race.”49 Shortland was wary of the 
efficacy of military power and thought that armed interference would be more likely to destroy 
the work of colonization.50 The Colonial Secretary advocated sending “gentlemen of 
intelligence” as magistrates into the different districts with power to redress native grievances 
against each other as well as to prevent the aggressions of Europeans. Confidence in the 
intellectual capacity of Māori and their ability to adopt European forms of laws promised 
eventual adoption, but the policy of moral suasion would undoubtedly, in the minds of colonial 
officials, not be a quick process. 
Moral suasion though practices of humanitarian governance, to Shortland, would have 
the added virtues of convincing Māori chiefs to convert to Christianity and dissuade Māori from 
believing the stories spread by “disaffected” Europeans about the conditions of indigenous 
peoples in Australia, India, and other parts of the globe. Shortland’s account of his visit to the 
Thames Māori also notes that local Māori expressed a “lively desire that a person attached to the 
Government should be commissioned to live amongst them” to serve as a mediator and point of 
49 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Willoughby Shortland to Governor Hobson, 5 August 1842, 
196. 
50 Ibid., 196. 
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contact for questions to the government.51 Having access to administrative infrastructure of the 
colonial state was valued by Māori communities which were alive to the possibilities the 
Protectorate provided as a conduit for petitions, grievances, or claims to the government at 
Auckland. Shortland’s letter suggests a model of humanitarian administration that saw the path 
of just administration as being based on the duality of the gospel and the value of English law 
enforced through a state-controlled monopoly of violence. Religious conversion and a European 
legal system, Shortland hoped, would diffuse into the Māori community. Māori won over by the 
Bible and the law would provide a positive example to other Māori skeptical about the values of 
colonization. 
The degree and mechanisms by which colonial officials sought to incorporate Māori into 
the colonial state, and the power of the state to compel that action, became part of larger 
questions and uncertainties regarding the form that humanitarian governance would take in New 
Zealand. One way of disseminating information to indigenous communities was through 
increased print runs of the Māori-language official newspaper Te Karere o Nui Terene (the 
Maori Gazette). First published on January 1st 1842, by September of that year 1,000 copies a 
month requested by the CMS and WMS alone.52 In 1843, George Clarke Jr. reported from Port 
Nicholson that he had circulated issues of the Maori Gazette “amongst the natives scattered 
throughout the whole of the southern district, and wherever I have been travelling they have 
shown the greatest eagerness to possess them, and acquaint themselves with their contents.”53  
51 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Willoughby Shortland to Governor Hobson, 5 August 1842, 
190, 196. 
52 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Willoughby Shortland to Lord Stanley, 24 September 1842, 
Appendix 189. 
53 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Report of Sub-Protector George Clarke Jr. to George Clarke 
Sr., 14 June 1843, Appendix 350. 
107
Colonial officials saw interaction between Māori and setter populations has having 
positive social and political effects. A supply of indigenous labor relatively proximate to areas of 
European settlement was especially intriguing and a shortage of labor reflected the economic 
realities of early colonial New Zealand. In his opening address to the Legislative Council in 
December of 1841, Governor Hobson noted the generally positive relationship between Māori 
and Pākehā. The governor stated that settler populations were “indebted, in a great measure, for a 
supply of the principal necessities of life” and “for one of the principal elements of national 
prosperity – a due supply of labour.”54 As articulated in the first years of British colonial 
administration, Maori contributions to the settler colonial state were crucial to the economic 
success and anticipated future of New Zealand.  
Labor’s importance to the colonial economy formed part of an 1842 assessment echoing 
the governor’s concerns. Citing the high price of labor, want of capital, and intensity of labor 
required to clear and enclose agricultural land, the possibility of utilizing Māori labor formed a 
short cut to New Zealand’s development as an economy.55 Hobson’s understanding of the 
increasing importance of indigenous labor suggests not only the continued positive perception 
value of Māori to the economy, but also that Māori already comprised a labor pool for European 
employers. The civilizing efforts of regular labor, though not a formal part of humanitarian 
governance, would have a beneficial effect on Māori populations. 
By the end of the 1842, both George Selwyn, the Bishop of New Zealand, and William 
Wakefield could report to their respective superiors that there was finally some progress on 
raising funds from the native reserves. Reserved lands at Nelson were being put to use with 
leases valued at £300 annually and Bishop Selwyn and the NZC’s Nelson agent Arthur 
54 TNA, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 14 December 1841, CO 211/1. 
55 Charles Terry, New Zealand: Its Advantages and Prospects (London: T & W Boone, 1842), 253. 
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Wakefield, another brother of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, had advanced £400 for the 
construction of a school house and infirmary that would serve Māori in the South Island’s 
northwest corner. Since there was no Māori settlement in the immediate vicinity of Nelson, a 
small hostelry was also under construction to provide accommodation for Māori visiting town 
for trade.56 Building humanitarian infrastructure was also underway in Wellington with the 
temporary repurposing of two emigration houses as a school and infirmary for Port Nicholson 
Māori. Medical expenses, however, cost twice as much as the £69 in rental income earned by the 
leases and Halswell had to meet the excess cost out of his own resources.57 The continued 
uncertainly of finances made planning for large-scale humanitarian interventions difficult. 
In an attempt at increasing the number of tenants paying rent on native reserves, the 
seven-year maximum lease on reserve lots was waived in 1842. Before leaving Wellington in 
December of 1842, Bishop Selwyn published guidelines stipulating that native reserves could be 
let for seven years without any restrictive covenant, fourteen years with a commitment to erect 
wooden buildings with the value of at least seven years rent, or twenty-one years with the 
covenant to erect brick or stone buildings worth ten years’ rent.58 These changes acknowledged 
the slower than expected utilization of reserved land as a source of income and sought to balance 
the need to not fully alienate land with the security of tenure and term of contract required to 
motivate potential tenants to lease, clear, and develop a reserved lot. 
56 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Colonel William Wakefield to Secretary of the New 
Zealand Company, September 15 1842, Appendix 684; GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, 
George Selwyn to Willoughby Shortland, December 19 1842, Appendix 185-6. Plans also existed to construct a 
Māori hostel in Auckland with separated living areas for traders and provision for merchants from various iwi and 
hapu. 
57 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Colonel William Wakefield to Secretary of the New 
Zealand Company, September 15 1842, Appendix 684. 
58 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Colonel William Wakefield to Secretary of the New 
Zealand Company, September 15 1842, Appendix 684. 
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If questions and concerns about land comprised a major focus of humanitarian 
governance, a second principal question for the Protectorate, and the government more generally, 
was the extent to which Māori were to be incorporated or isolated from the administration of 
British law. Though not directly linked to the land question at this date, legal assimilation 
increasingly became part of humanitarian governance in the 1840s. Preservation through 
isolation, the policy advocated by the 1837 Select Committee, suggested the maintenance of 
indigenous legal forms and traditions. After deciding on annexation in 1840, British law had to 
now address the legal requirements of settler populations while negotiating aspects of Europe’s 
legal tradition that ran counter to indigenous practices.59 The question for the Protectorate, then, 
became how to apply British law in a manner that balanced a moral obligation to protect 
indigenous interests with an aspiration for consolidating administrative control and establishing a 
monopoly of violence. The colonial state’s lack of military power to coerce adherence or enforce 
decisions meant that the colonial government could not simply impose laws. 
Despite the weakness of the government’s ability to compel enforcement, Māori 
generally abided by the laws of the colony in the early 1840s. Perhaps the most significant 
individual crime came early in Clarke’s tenure as Protector of Aborigines when both he and his 
son served as interpreters during the trial of Maketu, who was convicted and executed in March 
1842 for the murder of a settler household in the Bay of Islands (at the time the household 
included the great-granddaughter of a local chief). The trial did not provoke a violent reaction 
from Maketu’s relations nor from other Māori and Clarke wrote to the governor that he was very 
impressed with how Māori had acceded to the process of the court. Clarke noted, however, that 
the colony’s peaceful relations with Māori had more to do with the “the good sense which 
59 Hazel Petrie, Chiefs of Industry: Māori Tribal Enterprise in Early Colonial New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 2006). 
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actuates [the Māori] than to the prudence and forbearance of Europeans” not just in places like 
the Bay of Islands but throughout New Zealand. 60 The need for caution and care in how Māori 
became part of British administrative practices was required in light of what Clarke observed 
was the “helpless position of the Government, alike known to the natives and ourselves.”61 
Though the forfeiture of Maketu’s life fit with Māori ideas of retribution, Māori willingness to 
adhere to British laws even in the absence of a monopoly of force suggests their evaluation of 
British legal processes as something that they could derive value from and, in some 
circumstances, be useful for them as a form of justice. 
Clarke’s observations about the reaction of Māori led him to believe that the government 
was fortunate given its relatively weak position. The Protector’s Office, however, was spread 
thin and needed to be extended if the benefits of a European presence in New Zealand were to 
outweigh the costs. A robust presence of government officers would provide Māori protection 
from “wily European” subterfuge since “natives who are living at a distance from either a 
protector or efficient magistrates, are left … to the cupidity and selfishness of their own and our 
countrymen who with impunity can now trample native customs without restraint.”62 In the 
absence of being able to utilize reserves as a source of financial support for indigenous peoples, 
Clarke focused his attentions on providing advice and legal consultation.  
Māori interaction with European society, Clarke wrote, was generally deleterious to the 
“native character,” but he agreed that isolation as a form of protection like that advocated in the 
1830s would never work given the engaged participation he had observed by Māori in local 
markets. Growing areas of interaction needed structure to prevent the ills identified by the Select 
60 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, The Chief Protector’s Report for the Half Year Ending 30th 
April 1842, 18 June 1842, Appendix 191. 
61 Ibid., 191. 
62 Ibid., 191. 
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Committee on Aboriginal Tribes and Clarke wrote that British law “can scarcely be expected to 
operate among them, until they have the means of both knowing and making use of those 
laws.”63 The extension of protection and humanitarian governance thus took on a further 
pedagogical aspect of empowering Māori to make use of the legal apparatus. The colonial 
government, however, did not think all laws were universally appropriate for Māori. 
The 1844 Native Exemption Ordinance attempted to foster assimilation through limiting 
the invasiveness of British law as it applied to selected judicial violations.64 One of the main 
stipulations provided that in civil cases involving both Māori and non-Māori, Māori convicted of 
theft could pay up to four times the assessed value of stolen good instead of going to jail. This 
was an equivalent to the traditional Māori custom of utu, or retribution for a crime and replaced 
the existing punishment of incarceration. Being imprisoned was held to be particularly odious in 
Māori society. Furthermore, the Ordinance authorized two principal chiefs of the tribe to which 
the offender belonged to execute warrants on behalf of the Crown and in recompense receive £2 
for delivering the suspect to a court. The passage of this Ordinance reflected a legal 
manifestation of humanitarian governance by modulating the punishments to suit indigenous 
understandings of justice. Delegation of judicial responsibilities to local chiefs also included a 
pedagogical approach to legal acculturation by including indigenous elites in the administration 
of British justice to familiarize, reward, and involve Māori in the administration of crime and 
punishment. 
 Some of the chiefs Clarke dealt with in the northern North Island were well aware of the 
realms in which government power was limited. They told Clarke that their interpretation of the 
63 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, The Chief Protector’s Report for the Half Year Ending 30th 
April 1842, 18 June 1842, Appendix 191. 
64 “Native Exemption Ordinance,” 16 July 1844, 7 Vict., c18 (New Zealand). 
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Treaty of Waitangi was that its jurisdiction only related to Māori interactions with Europeans and 
that in purely native matters and concerns they would be left to their own devices.65 Lord Russell 
had cautioned Governor FitzRoy about overreaching the power and authority of the British 
administration in the islands. Willoughby Shortland, the acting governor, had particularly 
underscored Māori martial prowess and that even though declaring war and making peace were   
“essential attributes of sovereignty, and although we may not always be able to 
prevent recourse to arms between hostile tribes, yet, I think, we should never 
recognize their right to arrange their differences in this manner and should be always 
at hand, by friendly mediation, or, when we have the means, by overpowering force, 
to arbitrate between them, and uphold our arbitration.”66 
 
Though Stanley granted a wide range of discretion to the Governor, with the usual injunctions 
against cannibalism, and despite the basic concession of limited involvement outlined above, he 
held out as possible sanction the withdrawing of British protection both to those tribes which 
quarreled with each other as well as those which practiced cannibalism. 
The importance of preserving face and reputation formed part of the logic of 
humanitarian governance. The illusion of power and strength needed to be preserved at all costs 
through only judicious choices of intervention. Whatever his course of action, Lord Russell 
warned, the governor “must never attempt to interfere, and fail of success.”67 This memorandum, 
sent a month before the Wairau Affray which formed the first major armed conflict between 
settlers and Maori, reflects the limited power of the colonial government and the necessity to 
perform a stronger power than that possessed by the colonial state. Casting any intervention or 
non-intervention as a choice, coming from a position of strength, rather than as a choice of action 
65 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, The Chief Protector’s Report for the Half Year Ending 30th 
April 1842, 18 June 1842, Appendix 191. 
66 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minute from Willoughby Shortland to Lord Stanley, 14 
May 1843, Appendix 189. 
67 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Minute from Willoughby Shortland to Lord Stanley, 14 
May 1843, Appendix 189. 
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that reflected the limited means and uncertain power of the colonial government. Relying on 
moral suasion and humanitarian action, therefore, may well have been considered the most 
influential avenue open to the administrations of Hobson, Shortland, and FitzRoy, and the 
exercise of humanitarian governance, as expressed through the institution of the Protectorate, 
was the most efficacious administrative technique available. 
 For the local government, implementing a practice of humanitarian governance 
acknowledged the limitations of settler power while presenting incentives for Māori to 
participate in governance. As the government was unable to exert a high level of coercion, and 
uncertainty over title hampered efforts to develop the native reserves, the government and the 
New Zealand Company relied upon the mediations of the Protectorate to maintain peace (and 
thus the reputation of the colony back in Britain) and facilitate the acquisition of land from 
various Māori groups. Though it foresaw the assimilation of Māori into the colonial state, the 
type of humanitarian governance proposed for New Zealand during this period recognized the 
capacity for Māori to be semi-autonomous from government control and even, as in the case of 
fulfilling warrants, to act as delegated agents. 
 
 
Māori Reponses to Humanitarian Governance 
In the early 1840s, however, Māori were able to engage the settler colonial state on terms 
largely of their own making. The Protectorate formed channels through which Māori could 
challenge the legitimacy and legality of land transactions with Europeans, and Clarke’s staff was 
also called upon to involve itself in inter-Māori disputes. In the Thames Valley southeast of 
Auckland, Colonial Secretary Shortland noted that local Māori had conferred with Clarke about 
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establishing a “Pakeha chief” and a settlement of Europeans near Tauranga.68 One chief, Tapaia, 
advocated that a European settlement cold even bring peace to the area and volunteered to sell 
some land between them (the Thames Māori) and their inland rivals around Rotoroa “which they 
said would be the means of putting an end to the wars which had so long existed between 
them.”69 The creation of a European settlement as a buffer zone formed part of both Māori 
economic ambitions – the Thames was a fertile area for the production of potatoes and other 
provisions mostly destined for the Auckland market – as well as solving a political concern by 
insulating them from inland political enemies. 
Elsewhere in the North Island, the use of the Protectorate and the language of 
humanitarian governance served as a means for local Māori to consolidate their own territorial 
position. At Port Nicholson Te Puni and “Warepouri” [Te Wharepouri], two Te Āti Awa 
notables asked to meet with George Clarke Jr. to express their concern about their iwi’s security. 
Since 1835 when the Ngāti Mutunga had left Port Nicholson to invade the Chatham Islands (a 
remote island group 420 miles southeast of Wellington), the Te Āti Awa had felt at the mercy of 
the Ngāti Toa and Ngāti Kahungunu, two iwi in close proximity to Port Nicholson. Clarke 
postulated that “by inviting the Europeans to settle down amongst them as a barrier between 
them and their more powerful neighbours” the Te Āti Awa wanted to encourage settlement and 
cultivate the protection of European as a way to secure their own proximate position to sources 
of European goods and sites of commercial exchange.70 
68 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Willoughby Shortland to Governor William Hobson, 5 
August 1842, Appendix 195. 
69 Ibid., 196. 
70 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, George Clarke Jr. to George Clark Sr., 13 December 1842, 
Appendix 123. 
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The selling of land to which title was uncertain, as Europeans did not have a deep 
knowledge of the recent history of the area, could also serve Māori political purposes by bringing 
Europeans as buffers into the post-Musket War balance of power. One Wellington resident, 
Vernon Smith, wrote to the Methodist missionary John Beecham noting the existence of these 
quarrels. Smith argued that Te Puni and Te Wharepouri –  who resided at Petone and Ngauranga 
on the north side of Port Nicholson – had sold the NZC land at the south end of the harbor that 
belonged to that of their rivals.71 The possibility for Te Puni and Te Wharepouri’s to be, as they 
claimed, victims, or, as Vernon Smith argued, opportunists, meant that Māori did not simply 
occupy a passive role as humanitarian subjects. Rather, the Protectorate formed another element 
within the strategic thinking of Te Āti Awa. Beseeched by both sides, the Protectorate had to 
adjudicate and navigate the competing claims of Māori, settler, and NZC voices. Conflicting 
claims to title were not just between Māori and European, but also amongst Māori with 
Europeans forming an added factor in a process of migration and warfare that was, by 1840, 
already decades old.   
Given the small number of civil servants working for the Protectorate and the large 
expanse of territory they had to cover, protectors were among the most mobile and visible 
representatives of the colonial government. While many Māori were in a position to disregard 
the government during the first half of the 1840s, some groups nevertheless engaged with the 
Protectorate to register claims and legitimate their own authority or leverage their claims against 
other parties, indigenous and European alike. The active interest which these negotiations 
frustrated some colonial officials. In 1842, Nopera Pana-kareao, a leader of the Te Patu hapu of 
the Te Rarawa iwi who had allowed the CMS missionaries to establish themselves at Kaitaia in 
71 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Vernon Smith to Reverend John Beecham, 11 July 1841, 
Appendix 294. 
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north of the North Island, declared his priority of right over all the lands in Doubtless Bay. 
Registering his claim with Henry Tacy Kemp, the protector stationed in his district. Pana-
kareao’s petition denied the right of “any other party to sell there without his sanction and 
ratification.”72 Humanitarian governance was not an uncontested process. Māori actively 
challenged decisions of the colonial state’s officials. 
While working alongside Protector Kemp to resolve the disagreement between Warekauri 
and Nopera Pana-kareao about the authority to sell land in Doubtless Bay, Edward Godfrey, a 
land commissioner, wrote to the Colonial Secretary that the month-long process of mediating 
between the “litigious” Māori was too much. Kemp and Godfrey referred the matter to Chief 
Protector Clarke who had purchased some of the claims in 1840 and thus had personal 
experience with the chiefs.73 Māori participation in negotiating of the terms of humanitarian 
governance under the Protectorate suggests that they took this facet of humanitarian governance 
seriously as an avenue to appeal grievances and articulate their claims. 
In 1843, Clarke noted in a report that since the establishment of British sovereignty “new 
and almost unheard-of claimants among the natives are coming forward, grounding their titles to 
lands from which they had been driven by their more powerful neighbours many years ago.”74 
The Protectorate attempted to resolve competing claims through purchase agreements, but 
protectors often also became the destination of claims lodged by Māori that either asserted their 
ownership of the land or declaimed the rights of other to establish a claim. The Treaty of 
Waitangi was thus not a “reset” moment in the history of inter-Māori conflict over land, but 
72 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, H. Tacy Kemp to George Clarke Sr., 10 February 1843, 
Appendix 124. 
73 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Edward L. Godfrey to Willoughby Shortland, 16 February 
1843, Appendix 127. 
74 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, George Clarke Sr. to Willoughby Shortland, 4 January 
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rather the arrival of the British restructured the possibilities for contesting and settling territorial 
disputes. 
Clarke asked for more resources to help mediate Māori and European conflicts in the 
colony. A small staff meant it was difficult to cover a colony that had limited communications 
infrastructure and an anxiety about the government’s knowledge of Māori communities and their 
loyalty to the government. In a report to Governor FitzRoy in 1843, Chief Protector Clarke 
observed that since there “never was there a people more uneasy under the yoke of submission to 
authority than the New Zealanders,” only the “uniform kindness” of the colonial government was 
maintaining peace in the colony.75 Clarke’s awareness of the precarious position in which the 
colonial government existed was informed by an witnessing the unresolved tension about access 
to and purchase of land, the co-existence of British and indigenous justice and the limited reach 
of British law, and the resistance to British sovereignty expressed and exhibited by some Māori 
leaders. To Clarke, humanitarian governance could be a way of implementing “uniform 
kindness.” Māori authority in New Zealand was such that the colonial state needed to campaign 
for hearts and minds through actively engaging with and negotiating with Māori. British officials 
in the colony relied on humanitarian governance to soften the hard edges of empire and make 
colonization amenable to Māori. 
 
The Wairau Affray 
On the morning of June 17th 1843, near the banks of the Wairau River at the north end of 
New Zealand’s South Island, fifty Europeans faced a group of about two hundred Māori. The 
75 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, George Clarke Sr. to Willoughby Shortland, 4 January 
1842, Appendix 122. 
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Europeans, employees or affiliates of the New Zealand Company, had come to arrest Te 
Rauparaha, a rangatira of the Ngāti Toa, on the charge of destruction of NZC property.76 By the 
end of the day, twenty-two Europeans and three Māori were dead and news of what became 
known as the Wairau Affray, Wairau Incident, or the Wairau Massacre, radiated outward from 
this corner of New Zealand. Wairau marked the first post-annexation instance of armed violence 
between organized groups of Māori and colonists. The violent result set off a ripple of anxiety 
both locally among settler and Māori communities as well as in the distant imperial metropole. 
Wairau, though not the immediate cause of further armed conflict, highlighted the tenuous hold 
of colonial authority in New Zealand and challenged perceptions of how humanitarian 
governance might function when threatened by violence.   
The collision between humanitarian governance, uncertainty about land purchase 
agreements, and continued strength of Māori autonomy illustrated both the limited power of the 
colonial government and the fine line the Protectorate had to traverse as it became, along with 
local missionaries, a key intermediary between the government, the Company, Te Raupraha, and 
Rangihaeta. Following the affray, the Protectorate restated their perspective that the colonial 
state lacked a monopoly of force and that the best way forward would be to censure the 
Company and admit fault. Clarke remained deeply skeptical about the activities of the NZC that 
preceded the affray and his office was clear that “the only step” that should be taken by the 
government was to “avow, in the strongest terms, their disapproval of the conduct adopted by the 
Nelson settlers, and the deep horror … at the very severe measures pursued by the aborigines” 
who had killed surrendered prisoners.77 The main concern expressed by Clarke, even at the 
76 rangatira: hereditary Māori leaders of hapu 
77 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, George Clarke Sr. to Willoughby Shortland, 8 July 1843, 
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potential risk of humiliating the government, was the importance of re-establishing confidence 
between the European and Māori populations. Governor FitzRoy followed Clarke’s advice when, 
along with Sub-Protector George Clarke Jr., he visited Te Raupraha and Te Rangihaeta at Otaki, 
near Wellington. The repercussions of this event, however, brought the young antipodean colony 
to the attention of the metropolitan public. 
As news of the Wairau Affray reached Britain, representatives of both the government 
and the New Zealand Company faced criticism from the British press. Both sides endeavored to 
create favorable impressions back in the United Kingdom. The Company’s strategy involved 
touting the virtues of its own plan and decrying the influence of the local government. Framing 
the reserve plan as the “refinement of modern ideas” about the treatment of aboriginal people 
that reflected the “enlarged humanity” of a post-emancipation age of progress, the Company put 
itself as the next step of a process of “humanized English colonization” begun by William Penn 
in the North American context.78 Having lost the administrative responsibility for the reserves, 
the Company was also free to attack the policies of the local government, contrasting the period 
of “harmony” with the “dissention” of the local government. 
Joseph Somes, the Director of the New Zealand Company, painted a grim picture of how 
the local colonial government in New Zealand had fumbled the development practices of 
humanitarian governance. Though the NZC had been compelled to transfer the native reserves, 
Somes wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that little had been done by colonial 
authorities who were lacking both “sound appreciation of the wants of the native, or of thought 
sedulously applied to the bettering of their condition.” 79 Furthermore, the Company leveled 
78 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Joseph Somes to Lord Stanley, 25 January 1843, Appendix 
33. 
79 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Joseph Somes to Lord Stanley, 25 January 1843, Appendix 
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accusations of parsimony, citing that out of a colonial budget of £50,000, only £40 was 
earmarked for a school-teacher, Somes also suggested that the Protectorate seemed more a means 
of providing a living for the Clarke family rather than comprising an efficient advocate of 
aboriginal issues.80 Discrediting the colonial state’s practices of humanitarian government in the 
eyes of the British public referred to the administration of Māori welfare as beyond the 
competence of the present set of colonial administrators. 
Favorable accounts based their support on a critique of what they saw as the flawed 
operation of the Colonial Office. The argument tended to favor the decentralization of power 
from the Colonial Office, considered as a “meddling” influence, and instead proposed that more 
power be placed in the hands of the settlers and responsible government. The Liverpool Mercury, 
a weekly newspaper following reformist and Liberal principles, singled out Governor Hobson, 
the first governor of New Zealand, for establishing a pattern of lax communication between 
various manifestations of the colonial project.81 Getting information to and from New Zealand 
was, until the arrival of international telegraph cables in 1876, difficult, but the hasty signing of 
the Treaty of Waitangi and preemptive arrival of the New Zealand Company surveying and 
settlement ships meant that from even before the establishment of the colony as a legal entity 
there was confusion as to the rights and obligations of the local government, the Colonial Office, 
and the New Zealand Company to each other.  
The Mercury saw the Wairau Massacre as symptomatic of a larger awkwardness in the 
colonial system. Britain’s colonial empire, the paper argued, was too large to be administered 
efficiently from London under a centralized system. Instead of relying on the Colonial Office, 
80 Ibid., 34-35. 
81 “The Colonial Secretary and the New Zealand Company,” Liverpool Mercury, April 26, 1844, n.p.. 
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the Mercury thought self-government would “avoid the recurrence of such catastrophes as New 
Zealand massacres, Canadian rebellions and Port Natal emigrations.”82 This comparison is 
noteworthy for putting Wairau on equal footing with a number other colonial crises throughout 
the empire in the 1840s. The newspaper linked the examples of violence through a perceived 
unwillingness to grant authority to the local settler governments. 
John Bull, a London paper that appealed to a Conservative and Anglican audience, 
underlined the evolution of the settler empire in the wake of imperial crisis noting that 
“pecuniary assistance is not what the New Zealand Company directors ask” but rather “the 
establishment of a “protective force ... which is certainly necessary for the safety of the 
colonists.” 83 The promotion of colonial military capacity was considered as even more important 
with the transition from a type of British involvement in New Zealand characterized by a 
maritime trading economy, called by the paper “the reign of the tobacco and blankets,” to a 
terrestrially-based extractive economy. As colonial modes of production solidified and 
intensified with the growth of the of the settler state, those interested in colonial governance saw 
a need for the strengthening of an apparatus to enforce the rule of law and order. 
The local government defended its actions with a set of more sanguine reports about the 
exercise of humanitarian governance, and referred to a wider range of geographical spaces than 
the Company settlements of Port Nicholson, Nelson, and New Plymouth. In addressing the 
Colonial Office, their assessments of the scope and possibility of government intervention, 
especially militarily, were limited. Uncertainly about the future direction of colonization in New 
Zealand and public interest in the aftermath of Wairau was such that in 1844 Parliament 
established a Select Committee inquiry into the affairs of New Zealand. At the request of the 
82 “The Colonial Secretary and the New Zealand Company,” Liverpool Mercury, April 26, 1844, n.p.. 
83 “Meeting of the New Zealand Company,” John Bull, March 30, 1844, 208. 
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Company, the committee was to be a clearinghouse for both written and verbal evidence about 
Wairau and the British settler project in New Zealand more generally. 
The Committee met six times between the 21st of May and 23rd of July 1844 with an 
additional ten sessions to hear testimony from fourteen witnesses.84 Professionally, the witnesses 
were all some type of colonial expert from surveyors to a former member of New Zealand’s 
Legislative Council. In its report the committee stated an assimilationist approach to protection 
in that “reserves ought to be made for the natives interspersed with the lands assigned to settlers” 
to “incorporate them into the community of British subjects.” Indeed, the committee argued “that 
every effort should be made to amalgamate the two races.”85 No longer then, was land to be held 
in trust just for the families of chiefs who, along with missionaries, would mitigate the impact of 
colonization. Rather, native reserves were, according to this vision, to be used as a space in 
which Māori could live, work, and become European.’ 
Amalgamation was to take place in contact with Europeans and consolidated a shift 
toward considering contact through commerce to be elevating. Assimilation formed a goal of 
humanitarian governance that could mitigate the prospect of future violent encounter. New 
Zealand’s physical characteristics, a high volume of rainfall and moderate climate, favorably 
compared New Zealand with drier Australian regions, and the booster literature of the New 
Zealand Company claimed that the new colony could support as large a population as the British 
Isles.86 This perceived similarity between New Zealand and Britain, allowed the Select 
84 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Expenses of Witnesses, xxx. All of the witnesses were from 
England, Scotland, or Wales. Of the total five had to travel to London to give evidence. 
85 GBPP 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Report of the Committee, 23 July 1844, xvii, xxix, xi. 
86 New Zealand Company, Information Relative to New Zealand, Compiled for the Use of Colonists, by John Ward 
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Committee and advocates of assimilation to envision a future based on the accelerating 
amalgamation of Māori into a settler society. 
 
The Native Trust Ordinance 
As the Select Committee on New Zealand considered witness testimony and other 
evidence in London, the question of how to administer land held in trust for Māori was still not 
fully enshrined in New Zealand’s government policy. Since 1840, the colony’s Legislative 
Council had passed laws geared toward structuring Māori customs to align more with those of 
European settlers. Among other interventions, the short-lived Prohibition of Distillation 
Ordinance of 1841 attempted to curtail the availability of alcohol, the Raupo House Ordinance of 
1842 sought to limit the use of indigenous building materials, and the Cattle Trespass Ordinance 
of 1843 allowed magistrates to award damages to victims of stray cows who had wandered off 
unfenced (largely Māori) pastures. But nothing was on the books about the regulation of native 
reserves.87 
The Legislative Council finally turned to the regulation of local practices of humanitarian 
governance in 1844 and approved a Native Trust Ordinance on June 29th 1844. The ordinance 
proposed that the Governor, the Lord Bishop of New Zealand, the Attorney General, the 
Commissioner of Land Claims, and the Chief Protector of Aborigines were to serve as “Trustees 
for Native Education and Improvement in New Zealand.” In this capacity, commissioners would 
oversee the Native Reserves that were now designated for “the bodily and spiritual welfare of the 
native race and to their advancement in the scale of social and political existence.”88 Outlined 
87 “Distillation Prohibition Ordinance,” 23 June 1841, 4 Vict., c5 (New Zealand); “Cattle Trespass Ordinance,” 14 
March 1842, 5 Vict., c16 (New Zealand); “Raupo Houses Ordinance,” 3 March 1842, 5 Vict., c17 (New Zealand). 
88 “Native Trust Act,” 29 June 1844, 7 Vict., c9 (New Zealand). 
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specifically in section ten of the Ordinance was that income from the reserves should also benefit 
the children of Māori and Pākehā unions. The bill’s approval suggests a desire on the part of the 
local government to revisit the inefficiencies and confused lines of communications that had 
characterized the administration of the reserves from the colony’s establishment, address the 
purposes and alienability of the reserves, and provide what appears to be a financial safety net 
for the children of mixed-raced couplings. Furthermore, the Ordinance was directed toward rural 
areas and recognized the fact that to a large degree, especially during the 1840s, the Māori 
population was not in regular sustained contact with the settler population. 
The fusion of spiritual and secular concerns informed both the theory and practice of 
humanitarian governance in the colony during the early 1840s. Missionaries provided education 
to and information about Māori communities, and conversion formed part of a vision of progress 
for Māori. In debate over the ordinance, however, three councilmen perceived a flaw that the bill 
left “in the hands of the Trustees an unlimited power to teach … the religious opinions of a 
particular class of Christians to the exclusion of those of every other class.”89 An imprecise 1845 
estimate of New Zealand’s Māori population put the total number just under 110,000 with 
confessional divisions numbering 42,700 Anglicans, 16,000 Methodists, and 5,100 Catholics. 
With the incumbents of the proposed trustee offices all Anglican, there was some grounds for 
concern on the part of the colony’s other faith groups.90  Although the Colonial Office overruled 
the objection on the basis that it was better for Māori to be any type of Christian rather than 
“pagan,” the dispute reveals that the settler community did not always speak with a single voice.  
89 TNA, Minutes of the Legislative Council, 29 June 1844, 74-75. CO 211/1. 
90 TNA, Minutes of the Legislative Council - Return of the Native Population of New Zealand, 3 April 1845, 
Appendix A. CO 211/1. 
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The Native Trust Ordinance received royal confirmation in August of 1845, but was 
never printed in the Government Gazette, part of the usual process of bringing a law into effect. 
Robert FitzRoy, the governor who had initially approved the ordinance, was unpopular with 
many settlers and the NZC. The NZC’s lobbying to have FitzRoy recalled was successful, and 
London sent a dispatch to this effect in November 1844. The new governor, George Grey, 
refused to gazette the Ordinance and thereby denied its implementation. Grey wanted more 
gubernatorial control over the process of land use in New Zealand and adopted a more active 
position regarding the incorporation of Māori into the state. Grey, however, did approve a Native 
Land Purchase Ordinance of 1846 prohibiting the occupation or use of Māori land without a 
license from the governor, but the ordinance made no exception for reserves. Indeed, no further 
legislation for the administration of Māori reserves was introduced until the 1850s.91 
Conclusion 
In a period when implementing theories of humanitarian governance as a government 
practice was frustrated by changes in policy, the capacity of Māori to remain autonomous from 
European control, and continuing uncertainty about title to land, it is perhaps not surprising that 
colonial administration achieved a tenuous start. A lack of systemic policy rendered 
humanitarian governance localized and reactive rather than assertive and uniform. 
The relative strength of various Māori groups relative to the government meant that inter-
iwi conflict was often resolved internally and that the reach of colonial law was often curtailed. 
A shift from advocating protection through isolation to protection as assimilation, however, 
already in the 1840s shaped the form humanitarian governance would follow in the future by 
91“Native Land Purchase Ordinance,” 16 November 1846, 10 Vict., c19 (New Zealand). 
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closing a possible practice that maintained Māori autonomy and pursued a policy of indirect 
influence and control. By not seriously considering isolation as a humanitarian option, the failure 
of the government to pursue protection constituted part of a wider racialization of New Zealand’s 
landscape as a settler space in which Māori would have to assimilate.  
The arrival of Governor Grey and the beginning of open armed hostilities in March 1845 
in the Bay of Island between the government and iwi began a period of episodic conflict known 
as the New Zealand Wars. The shift to armed struggle further distanced the government from 
returning to an 1830s ideal of protection. The shift away from pursuing policies that protected 
Māori through the actions of the Protectorate in favor of pursuing Māori amalgamation shows 
how humanitarian governance shifted from one that required Māori investment and participation 
to administrative techniques that were increasingly prescriptive. 
Efforts to integrate indigenous space and labor into the colony’s political economy of 
settler society remained a feature of humanitarian intention. Conflict between the Crown and the 
New Zealand Company regarding the administration of reserves precluded most meaningful 
development as they served as a proxy for debate about the future of Māori within the colony. 
Reserve administration was thus a casualty of both minimal resources as well as indecision about 
the purpose and role of the reserves. In a dispatch to the Colonial Office, Governor Grey was 
unsparing in his criticism of how the Protectorate had administered Māori. Grey occupied an 
ambiguous position as advocate of aboriginal rights and privileges while also being an agent of 
the colonial government and thus a comprador for the purchase of Māori land for settlement. 
Shortly after his arrival, Grey dissolved the Protectorate and incorporated the responsibilities of 
the office more tightly to that of the executive government. 
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One reason why the Protectorate and the reserve system failed as policies of humanitarian 
governance can be found in the confusion that surrounded the legal transformation and 
consolidation of the islands as a space of British settler colonization. Legal debates about the 
transfer of sovereignty, the linguistic aspects of the Treaty’s translation which left ambiguity as 
to exactly what rights and duties has been transferred, and the phases by which British authority 
slowly expanded and intensified over the islands, has been a subject of rich scholarship since the 
19th century.92 Humanitarian governance was a way of making the development of colonial 
administration palatable to Maori during a moment when the colonial state lacked the resources 
to enforce its policy. The intertwined aspects of moral reform, economic development, and 
incorporating Maori land into the colonial state would continue as threads, but the role of the 
colonial state would shift from one that had to appeal to Maori to one that was able to reframe 
practices of humanitarian governance on terms that increasingly sought to accomplish their own 
goals.  
92 Michael. Belgrave, Historical Frictions: Maori Claims and Reinvented Histories (Auckland: Auckland University 
Press, 2005). 
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Chapter 3: To Gain their Confidence and Attachment 
Humanitarian Governance in Health, Education, Economy and the Law (1845 – 1856) 
In late 1845, George Grey, the 33-year-old Governor of South Australia, answered a call 
from Lord Edward Stanley, Britain’s Secretary of State for the Colonies and a future Tory prime 
minister, to take up a new role as Governor of New Zealand. Grey’s appointment, however, was 
not part of the British Empire’s regular circulation of imperial administrators.1 Instead, his 
posting arose out of Lord Stanley’s recall of Governor Robert FitzRoy to London after only two 
years in New Zealand.2 Displeased by the colony’s unstable financial situation, troubled by a 
lack of communication, and under pressure from the New Zealand Company’s lobbyists, the 
British government believed New Zealand would benefit from different leadership. 
Compounding FitzRoy’s political difficulties was the outbreak of armed conflict on the South 
Island in 1843 and two years later on the North Island. To fill the vacancy, Lord Stanley 
nominated Grey as a suitable candidate to resolve the colony’s financial and administrative 
troubles.  
A tenuous economic environment, political restlessness among both European and Māori 
communities, and confusion over the legality of government revenues meant Grey arrived during 
a period of crisis. In this tumultuous situation, the new governor proposed a series of programs 
that departed from the indigenous policy pursued by his predecessor. Among the changes was 
dissolving the Protectorate of Aborigines. Established by New Zealand’s first governor in 1840, 
1 David Lambert and Alan Lester, Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
2 Paul Moon, FitzRoy: Governor in Crisis (Auckland: David Ling Publishing, 2000). 
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the protectorate liaised between the colonial administration, settler groups, and Māori. Justifying 
the office’s closure only five years after its formation, Grey argued that protectors were generally 
inefficient, non-communicative, and insinuated they undermined the government’s authority 
among Māori. By early 1846, Grey had dismissed the protectorate’s half-dozen staff and brought 
the administration of native affairs under the gubernatorial portfolio. Centralizing indigenous 
management within the governor’s office consolidated his authority in official interactions 
between the settler-colonial administration, the imperial government in London, and Māori. 
One of the protectorate’s main purposes had been managing the colony’s system of 
native reserves. Constituting a central element of humanitarian governance and included within 
initial prospectus for European settlement, plans for native reserves stipulated that one-tenth of 
the land surveyed for settlers was to be set aside “in trust for the future benefit of the chief 
families of the ceding tribes.”3  These lands, also called “Native Tenths,” were to accrue in value 
based on their proximity to European settlement. A growing population would not only render 
the land more economically valuable but, by being interspersed among settler allotments, was 
also intended to promote the adoption of European customs by a Māori elite. Māori might reside 
on some of the reserved land, use others to grow food or commodities, and lease surplus sections 
to Europeans or other Māori as a source of passive rental income. 
In its first years of operation the reserve system was unsuccessful. Though a colonial 
ordinance specified who was to serve as trustees of the native reserves, the administrative 
structure proposed by the ordinance was never fully developed on a colony-wide level. George 
Selwyn, the Anglican Bishop of New Zealand who was to serve as one of the five trustees, 
recused himself from responsibility for the trust in 1845 and left the rest of the trustees in a state 
3 Parliamentary Papers of Great Britain [GBPP] 1844 (556) Select Committee on New Zealand, Instructions from the 
Directors of the Company to Edmund Halswell, 10 October 1840, 668. 
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of limbo – they seem to never have met as a full committee.  Nor were reserves fully surveyed. 
Out of the 110 reserve lots allocated around Wellington in 1840, by January of 1844 only 34 had 
been demarcated.4 An absence of administrative resources, lingering uncertainty about which 
lands had clear and unencumbered title, and the inability of the colonial government to compel 
action influenced the implementation of humanitarian governance during New Zealand’s early 
colonial history. The precariousness of the settler-colonial state meant that at the time of Grey’s 
arrival in New Zealand native reserves exerted little of the transformative potential that London 
planners had hoped for. 
If William Hobson and Robert FitzRoy, the colony’s first two governors, subscribed to 
ideas of humanitarian governance that permitted a large degree of Māori autonomy, under 
George Grey humanitarian governance featured a broader slate of interventions seeking to 
incorporate Maori more universally within the colonial state. Following the abolition of the 
protectorate and lasting the duration of Grey’s first term as governor (1845 - 1853), reserves – as 
a category of land designated for the benefit of Māori – became part of the larger workings of 
native policy. Unlike native reserves intended to support chiefly families as conduits of European 
social, economic, and cultural practices, Grey’s vision for humanitarian governance saw the state 
as able to engage the whole breadth of Māori society. 
This chapter argues that humanitarian governance remained focused on ameliorating the 
suffering and mitigating the precarity of indigenous New Zealanders even as official policies 
shifted to prioritize integration over maintaining indigenous autonomy. Under Grey’s 
administration, policies amalgamating indigenous bodies, lands, and modes of production as part 
4 Archives New Zealand [ANZ], Land Office Papers: Description of Native Reserves in Wellington Settlement, n.d., 
New Zealand Company [NZC], 33/4/9. The reserves were scattered throughout the Port Nicholson District ranging 
from two of 81 of the surveyed sections in Lowry Bay, to one out of 34 in Horokiwi. GBPP 1845 (369) Despatches 
from the Governor of New Zealand, Table Showing the Land Surveyed and Under Survey, 31 January 1844, 95. 
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of the settler-colonial state reframed practices of humanitarian governance in ways that colonial 
administrators hoped would accelerate, broaden, and consolidate Maori adoption of European 
customs and behaviors.5 Grey was no stranger to thinking in terms of systemic change. 
Contributing to Lord Stanley’s favorable impression of Grey’s suitability for the role was the 
positive reception of the latter’s 1840 pamphlet proposing the gradual and nuanced application of 
British laws to indigenous Australians as the “course pointed out by true humanity[.]”6 By 
following a shift in humanitarian governance from practices largely accommodating difference 
to an administrative philosophy that prioritized economic, social, and legal integration across 
classes, Grey’s first administration – for he returns to New Zealand in December 1861 for a 
second term as governor - shifted away from Māori economic autarky and cultural autonomy. In 
its place was a policy that actively pursued amalgamating Maori into the colonial state as a way 
to accelerate indigenous social, political, and economic transformations.7 
The crisis circumstances surrounding Grey’s appointment allowed him a wide degree of 
latitude to accomplish these goals. As the executive of a colony perceived to be in crisis by the 
British public and officials in London, Grey nevertheless had to justify his policies to his 
superiors. To do so, Grey wrote to the Colonial Office explaining his accusations against the 
Protectorate of Aborigines and situating his own policies as interventions that would improve the 
5 Though the term “rule of difference” is useful, its instantiation in early colonial New Zealand was not of the same 
nature as the practice of colonial rule on the Indian subcontinent where administrators used the diversity of local 
communities to justify the negation of rights and customs. There were distinct modes of governance for New 
Zealand’s aboriginal and European populations, and the colonial government determined categories of friendly and 
oppositional Māori groups, but the state perceived “natives” as more as a singular category and did not codify 
distinct rules for different iwi or hapū. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
6 George Grey, “Report Upon the Best Means of Promoting the Civilization of the Aboriginal Inhabitants of 
Australia,” in H. Hanson Turton, An Epitome of Official Documents Relative to Native Affairs and Land Purchases 
in the North Island of New Zealand (Wellington: George Didsbury, 1883), 20. 
7 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 17-19. Humanitarian 
governance in New Zealand during this period shifts from a model more akin to indirect rule to one that that aspired 
to direct rule through tutelary processes of health, education, and legal tutelage. 
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health, education, and economy of Māori.8 That Grey could not simply dismiss the protectorate, 
and the governor’s continued defensiveness in justifying his interventions, suggests that Grey 
was attuned to the importance of identifying his administration as sensitive to the humanitarian 
sentiment that had played a significant role in bringing the islands of New Zealand under British 
control. Continued debate within the networks of the early-Victorian empire about the guiding 
principles and implementation of colonial administration reminds us that the British perspective 
of administration and rule was rarely that of a single collective mind.9 Instead, humanitarian 
governance in New Zealand in the decade following Grey’s arrival adopted methods acceptable 
to imperial administrators and the British public while remaining cognizant of the limited power 
of Britain’s colonial administration in New Zealand. 
Responding to an assemblage of actors and processes engaged in the articulation, 
transmission, and practices of concern for the welfare of distant others, Grey had a central role in 
a trans-imperial process of enacting and justifying colonial policy.10 Grey was able to navigate 
the channels of official communication while building his reputation along the way. He was 
familiar with the power of discourse and the importance of framing decision-making in a manner 
that was sensitive to an audience that conceptualized Britain’s colonial endeavors as steeped with 
emancipatory potential. In New Zealand’s early years of formal colonization (1840 - 1872), the 
balance of military, economic, and demographic power was not monopolized by Europeans. 
Grey’s approach positioned the colonial government as responsible for delivering programs of 
8 GBPP 1847 (837) Papers Relative to New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Lord Edward Stanley, 3 June 1846, 
5-7. 
9 Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006). 
10 Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 10. 
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social and economic development. Interventions into multiple areas of indigenous life cast the 
government in the role of a custodian of a promising, if vulnerable, population.11 
Grey saw Māori as both full of potential and as a possible threat to the settler-colonial 
state. His vision for governance advocated making Māori and European “mutually necessary to 
each other.”12 Government action could aid the “rapid and remarkable progress in the arts of 
civilized life” already achieved by Maori. This progress, Grey thought, might be encouraged by 
employment on public works, instruction in European practices of agriculture and animal 
husbandry, and participation in a system of commodity production and exchange.13  
To achieve these goals Grey proposed Māori martial capacity could be curtailed by 
limiting access to gunpowder and bound to the service of the state through participation in a 
Native Constabulary. Anxiety about the dangers of alcohol would be addressed through 
restrictions on the sale of spirits. Educating Māori children in English, Christian scripture, and 
farming techniques would help constitute a workforce of useful laborers. Developing indigenous 
knowledge of the law and including Maori within colonial judicial institutions would familiarize 
Maori with European legal codes and disciplinary processes. European courts would reinforce 
the colonial state as an arbiter and guarantor of justice, curtail the influence of indigenous 
authority, and reduce the frequency of extra-judicial violence.14  
Humanitarian governance as pursued by Grey was a strategy of rule that adapted to local 
conditions. Adopting integration as a humanitarian undertaking that provided Māori access to 
11 James Belich, ‘Grey, Sir George (1812–1898)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/ article/11534, accessed 10 
September 2016]. 
12 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Correspondence Relative to New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 17 
March 1848, 104. 
13 Ibid., 104. 
14 “Resident Magistrates Courts Ordinance,” 1846, 10 Vict., c16 (New Zealand); “Arms Ordinance,” 1846, 10 Vict., 
c18 (New Zealand); “Native Force Ordinance,” 1847, 11 Vict. c1 (New Zealand); “Sale of Spirits to Natives 
Ordinance,” 1847, 11 Vict. c3 (New Zealand); “Education Ordinance,” 1847, 11 Vict. c10 (New Zealand).  
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British markets, networks, and laws perpetuated established portrayals of New Zealand as a 
space within the British Empire deeply infused with humanitarian sentiment. Indigenous 
autonomy – that is insulating and mediating indigenous New Zealand from European influences 
– was no longer understood by New Zealand’s colonial government as a policy of protection. 
Despite this shift to incorporating Maori on largely European terms, in the decades before the 
British Empire’s crisis year of 1857, New Zealand’s advocates hailed it as an example of what 
liberal empire could look like. 
Understanding how humanitarian governance shifted from one that was comfortable 
coexisting with Māori autonomy, to one that increasingly circumscribed Māori ability to opt-out 
of a colonial system, signifies the growing ambition of humanitarian governance during New 
Zealand’s early colonial period. Practices of humanitarian governance under Grey – establishing 
colonial hospitals, promoting government support of schools, and limiting the geography of legal 
pluralism – were programmatically diverse, spatially expansive, and reformed how the colonial 
state interpreted its obligations to indigenous subjects. 
Interactions between the state and Māori became more intertwined from the mid 1840s. 
Limitations on the ability of the colonial government to compel Māori, however, maintained the 
colonial state’s focus on cultivating the voluntary attachment of indigenous New Zealanders.15 
The government’s collaboration with indigenous elites as an administrative vehicle through 
which to further legal integration was continuous with practices from the early1840s while the 
development of health, education, and economic development efforts reflected interest in the 
entirety of the Maori population rather than being confined to an elite. The limited coercive 
power of the colonial state, however, meant that its interventions could not be as explicitly 
15 James Belich, Making Peoples (Auckland: Penguin Press, 1996), 212. 
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coercive as they were in other colonial settings throughout the empire or during the later 1850s 
and 1860s in New Zealand when the colonial state received substantial military support from 
Britain.16 
Invoking humanitarianism as an ethical framework for colonial rule requires considering 
the ways humanitarian action establishes, conceals, or reinforces structures of power. A reading 
of official documents from the 1840s and 1850s reveals a contemporary awareness of imperial 
weakness and inability to force Māori to become yeoman farmers on individual lots or for all 
Māori children to enroll at English schools. Interventions characterized by “soft power,” like 
establishing hospitals and schools, thus formed one way for the colonial government to pursue its 
programmatic agenda and promote a vision for Māori assimilation into the colonial state without 
resorting to military intervention. 
Examining the opening of hospitals, expansion of primary schooling, curtailment of 
indigenous legal authority, and promotion of commodity production reveals how principles of 
humanitarian governance under Governor Grey became concrete as a slate of administrative 
interventions. During the nineteenth century European governments extended their involvement 
in the health and welfare of their subjects. Health was particularly important during an era when 
declining Māori populations formed a source of continued concern for British contemporaries.17 
Schools and hospitals as sites of state intervention were within the remit of Grey’s instructions 
from Lord Stanley in his instructions to Grey. Revealing a convergence between metropolitan 
and colonial goals, Lord Stanley wanted the new administration to “omit no measure within the 
reach of prudent legislation or a wise administration of the law, for securing to the aborigines … 
16 Richard Hill, Policing the Colonial Frontier (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1986); James Belich, 
Replenishing the Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
17 Alan Moorehead, Fatal Impact: An Account of the Invasion of the South Pacific, 1767-1840 (New York: Harper 
& Rowe, 1966). 
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the most unrestricted access to all the means of religious knowledge and of civilization[.]”18 
Grey’s pursuit of this goal through practices of humanitarian governance worked toward 
assimilationist principles linked to Grey’s hopes for indigenous assimilation rather than the more 
temporally ambivalent processes of earlier years. The remainder of chapter takes four examples – 
hospitals, education, economic development, and the law – to show how the colonial state’s 
humanitarian practices enforced, or aspired to enforce, the horizontal integration of New 
Zealand’s Māori on largely European terms and in a manner that sought to align Māori futures 
with those of settlers. 
 
Hospitals 
 
Hospitals and health care designated for the benefit of Māori developed haphazardly. As 
early as 1837, the Church Missionary Society stationed a doctor at the Bay of Islands to provide 
medical attention to local Māori and missionaries.19 To address the health needs of Māori in its 
Port Nicholson settlement, the New Zealand Company reimbursed local doctors for their 
services.20 In 1843 George Selwyn, the Bishop of New Zealand, planned to open a hospital and 
school for South Island Māori at Nelson. A violent clash at Wairau in June 1843, however, 
caused Selwyn to question whether or not Māori would be willing to place their health and the 
care of their children in the hands of European institutions.21 Nelson would have to wait another 
decade for its first permanent hospital. The establishment of state-funded colonial hospitals in the 
18 GBPP 1846 (337) Further Correspondence Relative to New Zealand, Lord Stanley to Lieutenant Governor Grey, 
13 June 1845, 70. 
19 Catharine Coleborne, “Health and Illness, 1840s-1990s,” in The New Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle 
Byrnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 489. 
20 GBPP 1844 (556) Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand, Bishop George Selwyn to Officer 
Administering the Government Willoughby Shortland, December 19 1842, Appendix 24, 185. The cost of medical 
care for Māori in 1842 amounted to more than £140. 
21 ANZ. Bishop of New Zealand to the Colonial Secretary, 23 September 1846, Internal Affairs (IA) 1 54 46/1415. 
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mid-1840s replaced the decentralized provision of medical care for Māori.22 European 
administrations understood the importance of hospitals as both improving the health and 
wellness of the local population, forming a visible and accessible means through which the 
beneficence of the colonial government could be displayed, and as a form of tutelage that would 
bring Māori health practices into alignment with European traditions of wellness.  
Caring for Māori bodies formed part of the justification for colonial rule in New Zealand. 
No system with a codified purpose and plan emerged until the late 1840s. Testifying in London 
before the 1844 parliamentary committee, George Earp, author of several guidebooks about New 
Zealand and a significant informant to the committee, affirmed that government hospitals and 
schools would be a “judicious and positive intervention for Māori. Earp postulated revenue 
raised from native reserves could provide funding for health infrastructure and poor relief in a 
manner analogous to Britain’s Poor Law.23  
Also in 1844, William Spain, the official responsible for purchasing land from Māori, 
recommended establishing a government hospital at New Plymouth. The cost of establishing the 
facility would be credited against a £200 payment promised to local Māori as part of a 
government land purchase. Māori, however, had not asked for a hospital, instead requesting a 
case of double-barreled guns. Spain did not act on their request and instead calculated that the 
hospital would provide a focal point for “charitable efforts” and, by being situated on a native 
reserve, help to convince local Māori of the usefulness of native reserves and the benefits of 
having European neighbors.24 The substitution of a hospital facility as part of a £200 payment for 
22 GBPP 1846 (772) Correspondence Between the Colonial Office and Mr. Halswell, Edmund Halswell to Lord 
Lytton, 18 June 1846, 9. Halswell complained that there was no funding available for hospitals and he had to 
provide medical expenses out of his private resources. 
23 GBPP 1844 (556) Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand, Testimony of George B. Earp, 149. 
24 GBPP 1846 (203) Despatches from the Governor Regarding Land and the New Zealand Company, Minutes of the 
Commissioner’s Proceedings in the Court at New Plymouth, 12 June 1844, 134. 
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land – even though local Māori had been promised weapons – and the use of native reserves as a 
site for providing public health infrastructure rather than being entrusted to Māori oversight 
suggest a continued government wariness about Māori possessing firearms. As a practice of 
humanitarian governance, the New Plymouth hospital displaced the cost of providing healthcare 
onto Māori recipients. The cost of establishing a hospital was born by Māori through a reduction 
in a payment for land they had sold to the government and yet was presented by the colonial 
administration as an example of government munificence. 
By 1847 Grey could write Lord Stanley with news that four hospitals were in the 
planning stage. Located in the principal North Island settlements of Auckland (opening in 1847), 
Wellington (1847), New Plymouth (1848), and Wanganui (1851) the hospitals provided medical 
assistance to local communities. Equipped with steam baths, inpatient facilities, and staffed by 
trained practitioners, Grey anticipated that the establishment of what he termed “mixed 
hospitals” for Māori and Europeans would be beneficial for Māori by virtue of modeling 
European practices of health and hygiene. In contrast to what he described as the “utterly useless 
establishment” of the Protectorate of Aborigines, Grey painted a favorable picture of the impact 
hospitals had on Māori.25 The systemization of medical care both legitimized Grey’s shift away 
from the native policy practiced by his gubernatorial predecessors and framed his approach to 
humanitarian governance as focused on improving the health and well-being of Māori. 
The Wellington hospital, opened on September 15th 1847, was the first facility 
established and furthered government efforts to “gain the attachment and promote the 
civilization” of Wellington Māori.26 Dr. John Fitzgerald, the hospital’s chief surgeon, remarked 
25 GBPP 1847 (837) Papers Relative to New Zealand, Governor Grey to Earl Grey, 4 February 1847, 92-93. 
26 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 6 
March 1848, 70. 
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that mixed wards of indigenous and European practices was a useful arrangement because by 
seeing Europeans submit to treatment it was thought to inspire Māori to “greater confidence in 
[the doctor’s] art” and provide models of punctuality and regularity in taking medicine.27 The 
hospital’s first surgical procedure removed a neck tumor from Hiangarere, a Te Āti Awa chief 
and signatory of the Treaty of Waitangi. Wiremu Tamihana, a prominent Ngāti Hauā leader, 
subsequently expressed his appreciation to Grey for this procedure and the “humane system” the 
hospitals comprised as representative of the government’s “love for the natives.”28 
At Auckland, where the hospital also opened in 1847, Dr. William Davies expressed his 
confidence that the facility would be a boon to both the health and social acculturation of area 
Māori. Reflecting upon his plan to integrate fifty beds in the Māori and European wards, Davies 
noted that medical care could well “prove one of the most powerful means of civilizing and 
improving the moral habits of the aboriginal population.”29 Diseases, most commonly 
consumption (tuberculosis) and scrofula (tuberculosis of the neck usually resulting from infected 
lymph nodes), were “speedily arrested upon the patient being subjected to the strict regimen of a 
well-regulated hospital” with Māori hygiene “much improved by their intercourse with the 
European patients.”30 Hospitals were, to Grey and government officials, sites of medical and 
hygienic tutelage that improved the health and labor potential of Māori while also enhancing the 
reputation of the government among Māori who sought treatment there. 
Colonial hospitals were well used. Writing three months after the opening of the 
Wellington facility Dr. Fitzgerald noted establishment’s ten beds had been fully occupied and by 
27 Ibid., 72. 
28 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Wiremu Tamihana te Nike to 
Governor George Grey, 11 October 1847, 11-12. 
29 GBPP 1850 (1136) Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, Dr. William Davies to Governor George Grey, 1 
January 1849, 29. 
30 Ibid., 29. 
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1852 treated over 400 Māori patients each year.31 Patients came not just from the Wellington 
area, but also travelled up to fifty miles on rough roads from Otaki, Wainuiomata, Manawatu, 
and Waikanae.32 In 1848 at Auckland, Dr. Davies reported treating 534 Māori and 130 
Europeans and shared his colleague’s appreciation for the facility’s broad geographic 
catchment.33  Dr. Fitzgerald echoed Grey’s conviction that hospitals could function both as a 
place of healing and as models for European health practices. Nevertheless, he also 
recommended Grey recruit local Māori chiefs to serve on the hospital’s committee. By gaining 
the “sanction and concurrence” of local notables, Fitzgerald hoped that more Maori would also 
subscribe to European medicine.34 Involving local indigenous elites speaks to the still-nascent 
power of the colonial state in the late 1840s. The government lacked the power to coerce Māori 
and in this period had to rely on cooperation. 
Visible interventions, in this case through medical procedures that made the sick well 
again, formed one means through which the colonial state practiced humanitarian governance. 
Hospitals formed one way of demonstrating to both Māori and British critics that New Zealand 
was fulfilling its promise as different, humane chapter in Britain’s colonial history. A 
combination of humanitarian rhetoric, involvement of local Māori, and reports of improved 
health outcomes engaged both aspirational ideas of humanitarian action and individual 
31 In the first 18 months of operation, the Wellington Hospital treated 355 patients of whom 291 were Māori. GBPP 
1850 (1280) Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, Return of the Number of Patients Treated at the Colonial 
Hospital - Wellington, 1 April 1848, 166. 
32 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Dr. J. Fitzgerald to Governor 
George Grey, 21 January 1848, 71.  
33 GBPP 1850 (1136) Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, Dr. William Davies to Governor George Grey, 1 
January 1849, 30. 
34 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Dr. J. Fitzgerald to Governor 
George Grey, 21 January 1848, 71; GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, 
Governor Geroge Grey to Earl Grey, 6 March 1848, 72. Dr. Fitzgerald forwarded Governor Grey the names of 
twenty notables from seven Port Nicholson pas (Māori settlements). The localities suggested for recruitment were 
Petmi, Wai Wetu, Ngauranga, Kai Wara Wara, Pipitea, Kumutoto, and Te Aro. 
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testimonials of recovery. Neat statistical tables describing the recovery of Māori patients 
comprised tangible evidence of delivering aid to a group considered vulnerable. The disciplining 
and organization provided by the physical space of the colonial hospitals constituted a space in 
which Māori of all classes could be brought into contact with Europeans in a structured and 
regulated manner that inspired proper behavior by all parties.35  
Public health campaigns funded by the colonial government extended the infrastructure 
of humanitarian governance into Māori communities and thereby extended the geographic reach 
of health care beyond the walls of colonial hospitals. One of the earliest public health initiatives 
was vaccinating Māori against smallpox. This campaign was largely prophylactic since in 
January of 1849 the colony had not experienced any recorded cases of smallpox.  Nevertheless, 
Dr. Davies, working at Auckland, embarked on a vaccination campaign in the interior of the 
North Island. With the help of a colleague from the 58th Regiment in the last few months of 1848 
Davies inoculated 464 patients.36 Taking medicine out into the countryside provided a visible 
benefit to Māori who did not trade with or have robust interactions with Europeans. 
Two years later, Dr. P. Wilson, in charge of the hospital at New Plymouth, noted that a 
1849 Māori-language account of smallpox (including an amateurs’ guide to vaccination) had 
alarmed local Māori. Aware of the government’s vaccination efforts like those undertaken by Dr. 
Davies, and “finding they could produce vesicles, or pustular blebs [themselves] … vaccination 
went on in indiscriminate progress.”37 Wilson’s complaint was that Māori who self-inoculated 
rarely had the results of their procedure checked and confirmed as effectual. The adoption of 
35 Damon Salesa, Racial Crossings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 110. 
36 GBPP 1850 (1136) Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, William Davies to Governor George Grey, January 
1 1849, 30. 
37 GBPP 1850 (1280) Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, Dr. P. Wilson to Governor George Grey, December 
1849, 115-116. 
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vaccination practices by Māori reveals the porousness of European control over health 
interventions and the mobility of medical expertise and techniques beyond settler-colonial 
spaces. The spread of medical expertise outside of institutionalized settings was worrisome for 
European practitioners who were skeptical about the capacity of Māori to administer effective 
vaccinations.  
Governor Grey’s 1849 general report to London emphasized the continued effect 
hospitals had “to bring the natives under the influence of the Government, and to gain their 
confidence and attachment.”38 Through the inculcation of “the comforts and conveniences of a 
civilized life” Grey hoped Māori would become materially and socially invested in the success of  
British colonization.39 The types of health practices that hospitals embodied functioned as a type 
of tutelary humanitarian action designed to accustom Māori to European concepts of health and 
hygiene while enhancing the prestige and positive perception of the colonial government among 
Māori. 
Hospitals continued to figure prominently in Grey’s communications to London as 
evidence of the efforts undertaken by the colonial state to establish humanitarian governance. In 
an 1852 letter to the Colonial Office, the governor asserted that “the maintenance of these 
hospitals is a matter of paramount importance to the native race, whilst, if the question is also 
viewed as a means for the diffusion of civilization, by showing the natives the value of and 
accustoming them to European houses, food, and comforts, and also as a means of gaining their 
attachment to the British Government and British race.”40 Like previous iterations of medical 
38 GBPP 1850 (1136), Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 9 July 1849, 
194-5. 
39 Ibid., 194-5. 
40 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 
13 February 1852, 73. 
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provision in the 1840s, medical interventions provided a visible and generally positive colonial 
intervention. In addition to building confidence in the settler state, by promoting European habits 
of health among Māori, hospitals and medical care also forwarded a policy of cultural 
assimilation. Collecting biomedical information was also important for discovering the causes 
and magnitude of Māori illness and mortality during an era full of concern about the future 
viability of Māori populations. Māori bodies, however, were not the only concern of Governor 
Grey who also advocated schools and practical education as another implementation of 
humanitarian governance. 
Education 
If the care of Maori bodies provided one method of justifying and framing a policy of 
more intensive integration – in that improved health was both a humanitarian goal and a type of 
tutelage for Māori – schools constituted a second thread of humanitarian governance. Education 
had been part of the government’s aspirations since the colony’s 1840 establishment with the 
first governor receiving instructions that the “education of youth among the aborigines” was 
“indispensable to the success of any measures for their ultimate advancement.”41 The 1844 
Select Committee on New Zealand, convened in the aftermath of the Wairau Affray to consider 
the progress of colonization in New Zealand, flagged education as deserving of utmost attention 
and Māori schools figured among the anticipated beneficiaries of grants of land or funding from 
native reserves.42 Teaching also continued to be a point of concern for humanitarian groups like 
41 GBPP 1841 Session 1 (311) Correspondence Relative to New Zealand. Lord Russell to Governor William 
Hobson. 9 December 1840, 28. 
42 GBPP 1844 (556) Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand. Report of the Committee, 23 July 1844, xi. 
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the Aborigines Protection Society.43  Like hospitals, Grey conceptualized Māori education as 
both a humanitarian measure facilitating the progress of Maori in metrics of European 
civilization and one that would work to assimilate Māori into European society, in the process 
becoming disciplined participants in a colonial labor pool. 
Grey, however, was cognizant of the limited resources at his disposal and advocated a 
non-sectarian approach to education that built upon existing educational infrastructure 
established by Anglican, Methodist, and Catholic missionary societies. Grey felt imparting a 
religious education outweighed the perceived dangers of Catholicism. The importance of 
education, he felt, was “the true means of removing barbarism and promoting civilization.”44  
Instead of a state-run system, the Education Ordinance of 1847 provided for government 
financial assistance to missionary schools.45 This model was seen as particularly well-suited to 
New Zealand’s geography and demography due to the colony’s dispersed population, rugged 
interior with poor road connections, and existing missionary school infrastructure that had been 
growing since 1814 with the establishment of a Church Missionary Society outpost at Waimate 
in the Bay of Islands. Grey anticipated that the schools’ first pupils would be mostly native and 
mixed-race children but saw that education could subsequently be extended to include European 
children.46 An appropriation from the general colonial revenue stream was to support educational 
efforts and Grey justified spending up to five percent of the entire colonial revenue on education 
43 Louis Chamerovzow, The New Zealand Question and the Rights of Aborigines (London: T.C. Newby, 1848), 415-
16. Chamerovzow had become Assistant Secretary of the Aborigines’ Protection Society in 1847.
44 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl
Grey, 9 December 1847, 49.
45 “Education Ordinance,” 1847, 11 Vict c10 (New Zealand).
46 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl
Grey, 9 December 1847, 48.
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as necessary since an “efficient system of education” was considered necessary to secure the 
colony’s future.47  
The Education Ordinance stipulated religious education, industrial training, and 
instruction in the English language as grounds for receiving state aid. Grey wrote that these skills 
were important given the necessity of English, the high demand for skilled manual laborers in 
frontier context, and the likely distance of a dispersed population from “all the ordinances of 
religion.”48  Grey considered Māori to be “distinctly an agricultural race,” so favored a practical 
education, or “industrial” model of training. This form of education would introduce Māori to the 
principles of British agricultural techniques, develop the colony’s human capital in the process, 
and defray operational expenses through each establishment producing its own food.49 Grey 
postulated that schools would quickly become self-sustaining and that “all native and half-caste 
children, as well as all destitute European children, would receive an excellent and useful 
education.”50 The provision of education as a humanitarian gesture was designed to benefit the 
colony by instructing both poor whites and Māori in skills that would make them productive 
members of the colonial economy. 
The schools’ pedagogical philosophy was structured on David Stow’s “Glasgow System” 
of intellectual, physical, and moral training.51  Describing a school at New Plymouth run by the 
Wesleyan Missionary Society that had opened in 1846, two Inspectors of Public schools reported 
that the 25 boys resident at the institution had made “remarkable progress in reading, writing, 
47 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl 
Grey, 9 December 1847, 48. 
48 Ibid., 48-49. 
49 1850 (1136) Further Papers Relative to New Zealand. Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 22 March 1849, 69. 
50 Ibid., 69. 
51 Elizabeth J. Morse, “Stow, David (1793–1864),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/article/26609, accessed 17 Oct 2015] 
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arithmetic, geography, and knowledge of the English language.”52 Corollary to their schoolwork, 
scholars helped with preparing land for planting, mowed hay, harvested crops, threshed wheat, 
built fences, carted manure, milked the school’s dairy cows, and fed stock. An orchard was also 
in the planning stage. Mission schools were open to both boys and girls and the limited number 
of places they offered could not always meet demand. At St. Patrick’s, a Catholic school in 
Auckland, Grey estimated there were two or three hundred suitable candidates for the twelve 
spots.53 In addition to educating and training individual students, the inspectors wrote schools 
would “prove a powerful means of civilization, and tend efficiently to make good British 
subjects of those so educated, and likewise extend a similar beneficial bearing over those with 
whom they associate when they return to their homes.”54 School inspectors anticipated that 
graduates would have a positive compounding effect Māori in their communities. This optimism 
echoed hopes for the ripple effects of  hospitals in promoting European patterns of health and 
hygiene among Māori.55  
Administrators hoped Māori graduates of the industrial schools would contribute to the 
success of the colonial state by participating in a colonial economy and disseminating knowledge 
among their own communities.56 By extending the influence of the government beyond New 
52 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Inspector J. Flight and Inspector P. 
Wilson to Governor Grey, 2 August 1852, 157-159. 
53 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 
21 April 1854, 11. 
54 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Inspector J. Flight and Inspector P. 
Wilson to Governor George Grey, 2 August 1852, 156, 1859. 
55 The idea is also analogous the compounding effect of evangelization in the Pacific that relied on thousands of 
Islanders to magnify and extend missionary labors. Dough Munro and Andrew Thornley, “Pacific Islander Pastors 
and Missionaries,” Pacific Studies 23, no. 3 (2000). 
56 ANZ, Blue Book, 1849, IA 12 10, 134-137. Five Church of England schools received £1,225.10.0, two Wesleyan 
schools received £873.10.0, and six Roman Catholic schools received £405.0.0. These institutions enrolled almost 
2,000 pupils. Schools designated as “native schools” in italics. Church of England: St. John’s College (61 males), 
Auckland Native Girls’ School (30 female), Otawhao (22 total), Kaitotehe (27 total), Waikato Heads (22 males, 25 
females); Wesleyan Missionary Society: Three Kings (140 total), New Plymouth (26 males); Roman Catholic 
Schools: Auckland (196 males, 165 females), Howick (67 males and 70 females), Pamanure (42 males and 20 
females), Onehunga (23 males and 21 females), Otahuhu (12 males and 10 females), St. Mary’s. Native School: 
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Zealand’s European settlement, graduates of the institutions were also conceptualized as 
mediators between Māori and European societies and capable of softening points of friction 
between communities. Writing from a Church Missionary Society school in Waikato, Robert 
Maunsell, who along with his wife Beatrice ran several schools in the area in the 1850s, 
characterized the school as not simply “a matter of justice to the aborigines, but as a source of 
benefit to the colonists.”57 Maunsell wrote that education was the best means to promote 
civilization and industrial schools could act as a “cordon” between the settled agricultural 
districts of the colony and the “uncivilized tribes” by virtue of students’ familiarity with both 
European and Māori traditions, thereby diffusing tensions, developing a labor market, and 
investing Māori in the success of European settlement.58 
Māori communities supported missionary schools with in-kind support or donations of 
land. Writing to the governor, Maunsell happily reported local Māori had donated 80 acres as an 
endowment for a school.59  The government rewarded such philanthropy. As compensation for 
giving a block of land for a school, the government rewarded the Waikato chief Ta Kerei with a 
horse as a gesture of thanks.60 Gifts of land and support for mission schools suggests that Māori 
groups for whom the situation of a school was possible saw advantages in having their children 
educated in a European model. 
While the period of Governor Grey’s first administration saw native reserves retreat to 
the background as a direct means of government intervention in Māori lives, a notable exception 
was the financial support reserves provided to a Church of England school on the South Island 
Waimate (6 males, 28 females), New Plymouth Infants (30 males, 20 females), New Plymouth Boarding (7 total), 
Kaipara and Wairoa (20 total), Kawhia (965 total), Aotea (750 total). 
57 PP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Robert Maunsell to Governor Geroge 
Grey, 6 August 1852, 155. 
58 Ibid., 155. 
59 Ibid., 155. 
60 ANZ, Andrew Sinclair to Native Secretary, 1 December 1853, IA 4 267 1853/2675-2676. 
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near Nelson. Established at Motueka in 1851, three Māori girls joined the school later that year. 
Inspectors noted that care was taken to ensure Māori children “were always sent clean and 
decently clothed.”61 Using income from rented native reserves, Nelson’s Board of Native 
Trustees paid three-quarters of the salaries for the school’s master, mistress (who taught two 
hours per day and provided instruction in domestic management to female students), a Māori 
assistant, and the school fees for Māori pupils. The three school inspectors who visited in 1852 
lauded the school’s eighteen Māori students for their good behavior and that “the free intercourse 
between the children of both races, and their instruction in common, should be carefully 
preserved” as it was the only example the inspectors knew of where such an atmosphere 
existed.62 
To expand the school’s facilities, a further £60 grant from the Board supported the 
construction of a second schoolroom allowing for increased access for Māori students. While 
there was no industrial establishment connected with this school, the school inspectors thought 
one could be added with advantage. Generally, the inspectors considered adult Māori students 
less fluent in English than their younger counterparts. While less proficient in English, adult 
students were quite apt in “all that relates to the science of numbers” as indicated through their 
work on calculating interest on loans.63 Even in an educational setting as integrated as the 
Motueka school, one that did not have an explicit component of industrial training, a process of 
acculturation and tutelage aspired to bring Māori into European society as modest, quiet, and 
Anglophone. 
61 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Richmond, Greenwood and Stephens 
to Governor George Grey, 9 October 1852, 168. 
62 Ibid., 169. The school also ran a night school for adults that enrolled two English and 30 Māori men. 
63 Ibid., 169. 
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The Motueka school continued to benefit from contributions from both the state and the 
Church of England. In late 1854, Matthew Richmond, the Superintendent of Nelson and who had 
taken over administration of that district’s reserves in July of 1853, wrote that a considerable 
portion of the £280.3.0 received as rents from native reserves had “been expended in providing 
instructors, books, paper etc. for a school[room] and in purchasing school furniture” for the 
educational establishment at Motueka. Richmond had also authorized the purchase of oxen, 
horses, carts, tools, and the repair of chimneys and windows for “deserving families” and 
“industrious tribe[s].”64 Two years later, in 1854, the Bishop of New Zealand had alienated 418 
acres out of the Native Reserves to provide land and support for such a program.65 The blending 
of resources from both the Church of England and from the state reveals continuing cooperation 
between religious bodies and the civil government in the 1850s. Integrating Māori into colonial 
society was not seen as the province of one group or the other. The often antagonistic 
relationship and disagreement of how best to pursue the humanitarian governance of Māori that 
characterized the early 1840s was, by the early 1850s, set aside in favor of co-operation. 
Rules and regulations structuring the curriculum and enrolment of schools emerged 
gradually. Anglican schools, which educated the majority of students, received a codified 
syllabus in 1853 from the London-based Church of England Education Board. The Board 
outlined a syllabus of scripture, elements of arithmetic, geography, writing a good “running-
hand” in Māori, and accurate pronunciation of simple and compound English sounds.66 
Regulations also allowed for the “destitute children of all classes” to enroll (which included 
64 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Richmond Greenwood and Stephens to 
Governor George Grey, 9 October 1852, 169. 
65 ANZ, Richmond to the Colonial Secretary, 7 December 1854, IA1 146 54/4130. 
66 GBPP 1860 (2719) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Rules and Regulations of the 
Education Board of the Council of the Church of England, 28 October 1853, 23. 
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European, mixed-race, and pupils from the Pacific Islands) but only on the condition that such 
enrollment did not interfere with the interests of the Māori pupils.67 Though most schools were 
co-educational, the course of instruction at one Catholic girls’ school in Wellington reveals that 
education could also be gendered with the “the time of the girls divided between exercises of 
piety, study, [and] manual work of a nature to make them useful servants.”68 While a priority for 
enrolling Māori indicates sensitivity on the part of school administrators to the particular needs 
of New Zealand’s indigenous people, the form and content of that education worked to reinforce 
categories of labor, and also gendered labor practices, deemed appropriate occupations for a 
colonized population. 
Five years after the passage of the Education Ordinance, Grey wrote to the Colonial 
Secretary that the schools were a success. Whereas in 1848 armed conflict in the Bay of Islands 
had threatened to disrupt the colony, the framework of industrial schools had contributed, in 
Grey’s words, to reorienting Māori “attachment to the British government” from a “fear of arms” 
to one that was based on “a sense of duty, of gratitude … and upon a consciousness of 
community of interests and prosperity.”69 The colony’s schools provided boarding facilities for 
702 pupils and funding was pegged to five per-cent of the colonial revenue, fifteen per-cent of 
proceeds from funds raised from the sale of land, and a considerable annual grant from 
Parliament.70 Cooperation between church and state in this period was hailed by Grey who 
attributed the success of the schools in no small measure to the efforts of missionary societies 
who provided each school with a clergyman and a teacher at no cost to the government. 
67 Ibid., 21. 
68 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, C. Clifford and J. Johnston to 
Governor George Grey, 7 December 1852, 174. 
69 PP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to John Pakington, 
8 October 1852, 159. 
70 Ibid., 161. 
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Education provided a means of investing Maori in the success of the colonial state. Alongside 
health, education formed part of a larger efforts to implement humanitarian governance with a 
goal of strengthening a sense of Maori attachment to, and participation in, settler society. 
Grey’s ambitions for the model of industrial education he favored for New Zealand were 
empire wide. The governor interpreted schools as a humanitarian intervention by providing 
pupils with food and shelter and as a method through which to accelerate the adoption of British 
customs. Schools, Grey wrote, were not simply a local matter but rather one that “should be 
administered for the welfare of the entire empire” which in the case of New Zealand included the 
neighboring Pacific Islands. New Zealand’s governor thought that the colony might become “the 
metropolis” for the southwest Pacific and a regional center for education, trade, and the “many 
commodities” of the islands.71 Grey’s vision for an extended official British presence in the 
southwest Pacific was still some decades away, but two years earlier, in 1849, the roll of St. 
John’s College in Auckland included five boys from New Caledonia alongside a roll of 20 
European, 34 Māori, and two mixed-race students.72 Extending his confidence in education as a 
means of promoting attachment to the state, Grey also wrote that industrial schools could be 
productively established in the Cape Colony where they might “prove more efficient for the 
purposes of peace and order than any force” by virtue of “christianizing and civilizing.”73 
Schools, in Grey’s estimation, could gain the confidence of the empire’s indigenous populations 
without the need for military force. Humanitarian governance would not only promote loyalty 
71 GBPP 1851 (1420) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 
29 January 1851, 123. 
72 ANZ, Blue Book, 1849, IA 12 10, 134-135.  
73 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to John 
Pakington, 8 October 1852, 161. 
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and contribute to a colonial labor pool but also eschew the destructive and expensive violence of 
securing stability through military action. 
If missionaries, settlers, and administrators expressed a growing consensus that the 
governance of New Zealand’s Maori should promote assimilation into colonial society, 
disagreement was beginning to rise about which voices should set and maintain government 
policy as it related to indigenous affairs. Established as a crown colony where the governor could 
rule with a large degree of autonomy from resident Europeans, by the early 1850s, settler 
communities were agitating for a degree of responsible government. Metropolitan British voices, 
however, expressed skepticism about the ability of European settler populations to humanely 
interact with aboriginal peoples. Reflecting a lingering anxiety, the 1847 extension of responsible 
government to New Zealand was postponed to 1852.74 
Partly due to his uncertainty about whether or not an elected settler legislature would 
continue funding Māori education, Grey had also supported deferring representative government 
and suggested to the British government that the governor be given power to amend or repeal 
any law affecting Māori.75  Aware that New Zealand’s House of Representatives, as the elected 
body representing settlers, might not be relied upon to continually authorize expenditure for 
native purposes, Grey favored the provision of the Constitution Act of 1852 that provided an 
annual sum of 7,000 pounds for “native purposes,” including Māori schools.76 By being 
mandated by legislation, rather than subject to annual appropriation, this sum was isolated from 
reallocation by the representative government. 
74 “An Act to Suspend for Five Years … Provision for the Government of the New Zealand Islands,” 1847, 11 Vict., 
c5 (Imperial) 
75 The colony’s attorney general during this period shared Grey’s concerns. William Swainson, New Zealand and Its 
Colonization (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1859), 185; GBPP 1850 (1136) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of 
New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 22 June 1849, 171. 
76 “An Act to Grant a Representative Constitution to the Colony of New Zealand,” 1852, 15&16 Vict., c72 
(Imperial), Article 65 and Schedule. 
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Grey’s fears about the settler legislature’s commitment to financially supporting his 
vision of humanitarian governance were realized by his successor as New Zealand’s governor. 
Thomas Gore Browne, who served from September 1855 to October 1861, faced an Executive 
Council vote to remove £5,900 out of the £7,000 budget earmarked for “native purposes.” 
Browne characterized this request as both impolitic and unjust. Like his predecessor, Browne 
thought education formed “the most efficient means of civilizing a people who contribute so 
largely to the revenue, and whose barbarism is so dangerous to our prosperity, and perhaps our 
existence as a colony.”77 These sentiments reveal the continuing precariousness of the colonial 
government in New Zealand 
Nor was anxiety about curtailing expenditure on education restricted to the colonial 
government. Octavius Hadfield, in charge of the Anglican mission at Otaki near Wellington 
since the 1840s and good friend of the Ngāti Toa leader Te Raupraha, advised the government to 
“show its good will towards the natives by encouraging the spread of education.” 78 Hadfield 
reiterated the importance of a multipronged and non-violent form of engaging Maori and that it 
would be the “joint action of religion, law, and civilization that will lead these people to 
happiness, peace, and prosperity.”79 What veteran missionaries like Hadfield understood was the 
capacity of Māori to resist military coercion and that in the 1850s indigenous New Zealand could 
not be compelled to join and participate in the institutions of the European state if they did not 
want to.  
77 GBPP 1860 (2719) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor Browne to Henry 
Labouchere, 31 May 1856, 231. 
78 ANZ, Octavius Hadfield, Remarks on the State of Feeling Between the Natives and the Government, 15 April 
1856, Governor (G) 13 2 13. 
79 Ibid. 
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An 1856 House of Representatives committee tasked with investigating Native Affairs 
sanctioned government sponsorship of religious educational institutions and recommended its 
continuation with financial support distributed in “proportion to the number of scholars who are 
being taught to read, write, and cypher in the English language.”80 The board also endorsed 
Grey’s system of allocating grants of land to institutions like industrial schools as a way of 
providing “endowments for this purpose, to assist in the building of new school houses, and to 
co-operate generally in making the schools self-supporting as far as possible.”81 Referring to 
instruction in English as a metric for funding shows the continued importance of linguistic 
assimilation. Grey conceptualized schools as one component of a larger program designed to 
integrate Māori, one that included employment on public works like roadbuilding, establishing of 
simple courts of judicature, building hospitals at accessible points, and cooperating with the 
missionaries.82 
By 1857, the Church of England schools, of which there were six in the North Island, 
received £1690 to support the education of 286 scholars, the Methodist’s six schools receiving 
£1178 in support.83 The acculturation of Māori through an industrial education advocated by 
Grey and Browne reflected an implementation of humanitarian governance that promoted Māori 
labor and potential financial contributions to the tax base as important to colonial society. The 
colonial government also used printed material to educate Māori about British culture, inform 
them of government policies, and disseminate practical information. In 1852, Grey was pleased 
by the larger than anticipated sales figures of a government-sponsored Māori-language edition of 
80 Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives [AJHR], “Report of a Board … to Enquire into and 
Report Upon the State of Native Affairs,” 1856 Session 1, B-3, 11. 
81 Ibid., 12. 
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Pakington, 8 October, 1852, 162. 
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Robinson Crusoe and wrote to his superiors in London that Henry Kemp, the colony’s Native 
Secretary, was working on a translation of Pilgrim’s Progress that would, in Grey’s mind, add a 
“fresh stimulus to the rapid advances the natives continue to make in the arts of civilized life.”84 
The printed word as a tutelary intervention formed a means of augmenting social change, with 
the portability and reach of texts, like newspapers and books, reaching beyond the relatively 
limited numbers of Māori educated at mission schools. 
A Māori-language newspaper published by the government, The Māori Messenger – Ko 
te Karere Māori, formed another avenue promoting “the diffusion of useful knowledge.”85 A 
committee of the New Zealand House of Representatives recommended free copies should be 
sent to chiefs, native assessors, and natives teachers, two copies to the mission stations, and that 
“for all other copies a small charge should be made, so as to get the natives as soon as possible 
out of the habit of expecting to get things for free.”86  This encapsulation of pedagogy, both in 
terms of useful information and texts considered to be beneficial to moral growth, as well as 
conditioning Māori to become part of a waged laboring economy, situates the humanitarian goals 
of education within a larger program of actions designed to integrate and accustom Māori to 
settler colonization. 
  For Grey, schools and hospitals, were part of a larger plan “to bring the natives under the 
influence of the Government, and to gain their confidence and attachment” with hospitals, 
savings banks, pensions for allied chiefs, and employment in public works.87 In 1846, in the 
aftermath of the Wairau Affray, the Bishop of New Zealand noted that the violence had 
84 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 
15 June 1852, 110-111. 
85 AJHR, “Report of a Board … to Enquire into and Report Upon the State of Native Affairs,” 1856 Session 1, B-3, 
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87 GBPP 1850 (1136) Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 9 July 1849, 
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“destroyed this good understanding and confidence” and establishing provisions for education 
and health care would rebuild confidence in the colonial government.88 The building of mutual 
confidence, according to Grey, had the ultimate aim of making separate European and 
indigenous societies unnecessary. The governor worked to assimilate Māori into European 
society and anticipated assimilation would take place largely on European terms.  
 
Economic Development 
 
 If medical and education policies reveal how government policies implemented a vision 
of humanitarian governance as practice, and sought to integrate Māori into the British settler 
state, a third category of integration focused on economic interests. Like hospitals and schools, 
these programs were tutelary in their effort to instruct and accustom Māori to European 
behaviors with the goal of enabling Māori participation in a settler-colonial political economy. 
Recognizing the limited coercive power of the state, however, and the consequent necessity to 
encourage voluntary attachment by Māori, economic development projects built upon existing 
Māori authority and entrepreneurship. Māori, during Governor Grey’s first administration, 
accessed loans from the colonial state to secure the purchase of coastal trading vessels, received 
grants to build mills, and earned a wage through employment on public works projects. While 
these projects can be considered humanitarian in that they focused on helping or facilitating the 
improvement of a designated group of people, the government’s agenda was also informed by a 
desire to weave Māori labor, productive potential, and knowledge into the colonial economy and 
invest Māori in the financial and material success of the state. 
 Administrators understood Māori participation in New Zealand’s economy as having the 
88 ANZ, Bishop George Selwyn to Colonial Secretary, 22 September 1846, IA1 54 46/1415. 
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two-fold benefit of economic and social advancement. Grey praised the attention Māori paid to 
“the cultivation of wheat, to improved modes of agriculture, and to the rearing of horses in 
cattle.”89 The effect of Māori participation in the economy was to “blend the interests of the two 
races” and also to “induce the natives largely to contribute to that revenue, which will provide 
the means for their own more perfect control and government.”90 The governor anticipated 
indigenous labor opening more land for settler cultivation with resulting employment doing 
much to “promote their civilization.” Acknowledging Māori economic potential recognized the 
value indigenous New Zealanders had for the colony’s economy as producers, consumers, and 
laborers. 
 Māori entrepreneurship and labor potential was thus a resource to be developed as the 
failure of the New Zealand Company unsettled the reputation of large-scale settlement projects, 
at least in populated areas of the North Island with continuing uncertainty about land title.91 
Smaller numbers of Māori on the South Island made it more amenable to planned colonization 
schemes with nearly all indigenous title extinguished by the late 1850s. The security of title 
allowed ambitious settlements of the type pursued by the Free Church of Scotland in Otago from 
1848 and the Church of England in Canterbury from 1850 on much firmer footing than that 
enjoyed by the New Zealand Company when it arrived at Port Nicholson in 1839.  
 Economic development programs invoked a language of material and moral 
improvement. From the beginning of European settlement in New Zealand, Māori had played a 
central role in the production and transport of foodstuffs. Indigenous ownership of coasting 
89 GBPP 1847-48 (1002) Further Correspondence Relative to New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 
17 March 1848, 104. 
90 Ibid., 104. 
91 In 1847, in exchange for its land claims, the New Zealand Company received an emergency loan from the British 
Parliament. Its operations dwindled from there and the Company’s charter was returned in 1858. 
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vessels provided important links in the colonial economy, especially given the poor state of New 
Zealand’s roads into the 1850s.92 In December 1853, to pick one of dozens of examples, a 
government grant of £180 to chief Apiriema of Tauranga enabled him to complete the purchase 
of the schooner Eliza. 93 Apiriema expected to make repayments from the profit on future crops. 
The same month, the colony’s Native Department made a gift of millstones to the Māori living at 
Ohumieuta. The gift was intended “to encourage them in their agricultural pursuits and in their 
recently adopted peaceful habits.”94 Other gifts or loans made by the government to Māori to 
assist economic development took the form of horses, tack, or agricultural implements like 
ploughs. Gifts could incentivize production, reward the loyalty of recipients, and encourage 
future cooperation or service on behalf of the Crown. 
 Financial rewards for explicit military support also formed one strategy of managing 
indigenous affairs. In recognition of their service during the War in the North (May 1845 – 
January 1846), for example, the Resident Magistrate at Russell was authorized to distribute £100 
to loyal chiefs throughout the Bay of Islands.95 Government coffers were not limitless, however, 
as Wiremu Marsh, a prominent Ngāti Rangiwewehi leader , found when his request for a loan of 
£137 to purchase carts, harness, horses, and a plough was turned down by the Colonial Secretary 
due to the sum allotted by the General Assembly having been exhausted for the years.96 
Economic development as a branch of humanitarian governance from 1845-1856 suggests that 
the government sought to reward loyalty and invest Māori in the colonial economy during a 
92 Hazel Petrie, Chiefs of Industry (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006). Through the 1840s and 1850s, 
Māori vessels trading up and down the coast supplied much of Auckland’s food. 
93 ANZ, Colonial Secretary to Native Secretary, 5 December 1853, IA4 267 272 1853/2688. Ships were also 
advertised directly to Māori. “Schooner For Sale,” The Maori Messenger/Ko te Karere Maori (Auckland, New 
Zealand), 20 December 1849; “For Sale: A Schooner, Substantially Built,” The Maori Messenger/Ko te Karere 
Maori (Auckland, New Zealand), 4 December 1851.  
94 ANZ, Colonial Secretary to Native Secretary, 27 December 1853, IA4 267 272 1853/2833. 
95 ANZ, Colonial Secretary to Native Secretary, 12 June 1855, IA4 267 272 1855/1733a. 
96 ANZ, Colonial Secretary to Acting Native Secretary, 4 March 1856, IA4 267 272 1856/638. 
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period where the limited coercive power of the state made the threat of violence a rather tenuous 
proposition. Colonial administrators, however, had to be strategic about how they could advance 
the state’s interests. 
 In addition to direct grants and loans to individual Māori, government economic 
intervention also occurred through expenditure on public works. Direct employment of Māori 
both eased pressure on a scarce supply of European labor and was favored by the colonial 
administration for bringing Māori into contact with the state. In early 1847, Governor Grey had 
proposed the “extensive employment” of Māori on roadworks. Building public infrastructure, 
Grey thought, would familiarize Māori with European tools and accustom Māori “to a better diet, 
to better clothes, to discipline, to regular hours of work.”97 These projects made the country more 
accessible and provided Māori an easy way to transport their produce to market. Sketching the 
virtues of his plan to his superiors in London, Grey noted positive results with Māori “never 
previously fe[eling] such feelings of attachment and respect for the Government as they now 
entertain.”98 Labor’s moral component as a regulating and structuring force was important to the 
governor as a component of indigenous progress. The governor’s promotion of Māori 
employment on public works was a way to continue a process of Māori integration into a waged 
labor economy begun in the colony’s industrial schools. 
  Māori participation in the colonial economy was also important to non-government 
groups like the Aborigines Protection Society. The APS, upon the request of Thomas Brunner, 
then employed as the surveyor of Crown lands in Nelson, sent equipment for a mill designated 
97 GBPP 1847 (837) Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 4 February 
1847, 94. 
98 Ibid., 94. 
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for “the benefit of the natives on the West Coast of the South Island.”99 The mill was to be 
placed in the care of the Wesleyan Missionary Society or with Bishop George Selwyn. Like 
education, the provision and direction of material aid to Māori was undertaken in part with the 
cooperation of missionary societies who were working on the ground. Colonial administrators 
hoped production and labor would be a boon for both Māori and the colonial economy. By 
incentivizing commodity production Māori labor could supplement the settler population in 
fueling the growth of New Zealand. Regular work and discipline, colonial administrators hoped, 
would also familiarize and accustom Māori to working within European modes of production, 
consumption, and exchange. 
 
Legal Integration 
 
 Changes in civil and criminal ordinances establishing how Māori lived under British law 
– and the extent to which they could remain independent from European juridical processes – 
constituted another area of government activity directing Māori assimilation into European 
society. Since the colony’s establishment, the government had conceptualized aspects of the law 
as tutelary. Most Māori communities, however, could largely live outside the law. Between 1845 
and 1856, legal changes consolidated judicial authority as the prerogative of the European 
colonial state while retaining an earlier reticence about the wholesale imposition of British 
jurisprudence. The law, to officials like Grey, was to retain pedagogical elements when applied 
in Māori contexts. 
 Administrators understood judicial structures and institutions as part of humanitarian 
governance by establishing a means of redress, enforcing contracts, and reducing extrajudicial 
99 Rhodes House Library [RHL], Aborigines Protection Society Minutes, 26 October 1853, MSS Brit Emp s.20, 
E5/11, AMB – 27A/281. 
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violence. Anticipating Māori rejection or resistance if new laws were implemented too rashly or 
in a blanket fashion, colonial governors selectively adapted aspects of British law in light of 
Māori capacity to resist coercion. Working within this reality and framing proposed changes as a 
means of facilitating Māori adoption of European social conventions, laws applied to indigenous 
spaces nevertheless curtailed the areas in which Māori could exercise autonomy. 
  This section looks at a repeal, an enactment, and a decision not to act, as representative 
of how colonial law encouraged assimilation as a humanitarian intervention. The repeal, that of 
the Native Exemption Ordinance in November 1846, removed the status of Māori as individually 
excused from following the majority of British laws. The enactment of the Resident Magistrates 
Court Act that same month brought Māori assessors into the court structure as arbitrators for 
Māori making claims against other Māori.100 The decision not to act occurred through the 
government’s failure to create Aboriginal Districts in which Māori law and custom might be 
practiced. Together, efforts to bring Māori more closely into the judicial operations of the 
colonial state alongside the state’s failure to implement separate geographies in which 
indigenous society would be insulated from the colonial state reveals a shift away from the 
policies of the early 1840s that advocated legal autonomy and the gradual adoption of British law 
by Māori as the soundest implementation of humanitarian principles. 
 Like hospitals, schools, and economic development efforts, colonial administrators 
looked to the law as a tutelary intervention that could impact future Māori participation in New 
Zealand society. Laws situated Māori – both as individuals and as a collective –  as part of 
colonial society rather than as adjunct to it. Using language that lauded the benevolent intention, 
opportunities for tutelage, and promotion of security these changes brought about, Grey 
100 “Police Magistrates and Native Exemption Repeal Act,” 1846, 10 Vict., c14 (New Zealand); “Resident 
Magistrates Courts Act,” 1847, 10 Vict., c16 (New Zealand). 
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recognized the importance and potency of the law as a tutelary instrument. The governor, 
however, was impatient that changes to Māori society occur on a faster timetable than the 
gradualist and long-term approach that had inspired the Native Exemption Ordinance.101 Māori 
interactions with the British legal system under Grey underwent a modification that, like schools 
and medical provision, was intended to function as a model for “educating” Māori to become 
subjects of the British Empire. 
 The repeal of the Native Exemption Ordinance in November of 1846 ended one short 
chapter of variable enforcement of colonial law that allowed each community – Pākehā and 
Māori – to live largely under their own laws while nevertheless ensuring that transgressions 
would not go unpunished.102 The Native Exemption Ordinance, passed in 1844, had promoted a 
vision of Māori assimilation that held “obedience to the laws and customs of England” was 
something to be “greatly desired,” but recognized the imposition of an entirely new body of 
jurisprudence could cause significant harm since Māori were not familiar with the principles and 
practices British laws.103 The timeline for this “obedience,” therefore, was vague. Administrators 
hoped Māori would gradually come to understand British laws and would willingly place 
themselves under its authority rather than require coercion.  
 The Native Exemption Ordinance placed judicial power in Māori hands. In the case of 
inter-Māori offenses, two principal chiefs of the involved parties were empowered to resolve the 
dispute. The law prioritized enforcement “with the least possible risk of interrupting the peace of 
the community[.]”104 Except in the case of rape and murder, accused Māori were to be released 
upon payment of a deposit of four times the value of the goods allegedly damaged or stolen. If 
101 GBPP 1847 (837) Papers Relative to New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Lord Stanley, 12 June 1846, 18. 
102 “Police Magistrates and Native Exemption Repeal Ordinance,” 1846, 10 Vict., c16 (New Zealand). 
103 “Native Exemption Ordinance,” 1844, 8 Vict., c18 (New Zealand), Preamble. 
104 Ibid., Paragraph 2. 
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found guilty, the deposit would be used to reimburse the victim for the value of the stolen goods 
with the remaining balance paid to the government as a fine. In civil cases, the ordinance 
established that “no person of the aboriginal race shall be subject to imprisonment” as they 
remained “ignorant of the operation of the law.”105 Māori considered imprisonment repugnant 
and degrading; the explicit exclusion of confinement as a penalty in most cases suggests the 
recognition of this fact by the colonial state. The cautionary stance taken by the law as wanting 
not to upset local communities, and placing responsibility for delivering warrants in the hands of 
Māori, reveals the limited scope of government, the tentativeness with which it could pursue 
prosecution, and a reliance on using indigenous authorities to fulfill the demands of European 
courts. 
  In October of 1846, in an address to the Legislative Council, Governor Grey put forward 
as a policy goal “such modifications of the British law as appear adapted to the present state of 
the Native population, and at the same time calculated to accustom them by degrees to take an 
active part in the administration of the laws of their country.”106 The repeal of the Native 
Exemption Ordinance the following month, however, indicated that Māori participation in 
judicial processes would be as assistants to European jurists and enforcers of British law and not 
as arbiters of whether or not to move forward with a prosecution or to execute a warrant. The 
repeal of the Native Exemption Ordinance made punitive measures more uniform in their 
application across both Māori and Pākehā communities. It also consolidated state control over 
judicial administration. No longer empowered to exercise authority about whether to pursue legal 
105 “Native Exemption Ordinance,” 1844, 8 Vict., c18 (New Zealand), Paragraph 12. 
106 Governor Grey’s Address to the Legislative Council, 5 October 1846, in H. Hanson Turton, An Epitome of 
Official Documents Relative to Native Affairs and Land Purchases (Wellington: George Didsbury, 1883); Richard 
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action, the autonomy of Māori chiefs was consequently reduced. 
  To fill the gap created by the repeal of the Native Exemption Ordinance and bolster the 
colony’s judicial infrastructure, the Legislative Council passed a Resident Magistrates’ Courts 
Act that extended the jurisdiction of colonial courts and limited the ability of individual Māori to 
remain outside of European judicial processes. The preamble of the Act laid out the reasons for 
its passage as enabling “the more simple and speedy administration of justice” and reveals the 
continuing desire for flexibility by allowing “for the adaptation of the law to the circumstances 
of both races.”107 Magistrates could still authorize payments of four times the value of stolen 
goods, but they were not required to and could, in cases where a guilty plea was entered, 
summarily imprison the guilty party for up to two years.108 Establishing resident magistrates’ 
courts was partly due to expedience – in that they extended the number and geographic 
distribution of judicial venues – but nevertheless still implemented principles of humanitarian 
governance by creating a mechanism through which inter-Māori disputes could be resolved. 
Governor Grey had expressed criticism about how the existing judicial processes had negatively 
impacted Māori. Infrequent sittings of courts, a lag time in rendering decisions, and exclusively 
European juries were, Grey thought, injurious to indigenous interests. Increased frequency and 
flexibility of judicial proceedings would open up possibilities for Māori to obtain judgment from 
the state and strengthen their confidence in the government. 
In a description of the law’s intent, Governor Grey wrote to London that the goal was not 
only familiarizing Māori with British laws but also “inducing them, if possible, to assist in the 
107 “Resident Magistrates Courts Act,” 1846, 10 Vict., c16 (New Zealand). Māori made good use of the courts with 
23 out of 40 cases heard before the Auckland court over three months in 1847 made by Māori. Most of these cases 
were for claims of under £5 for wages or work performed. GBPP 1847-48 (892) Papers Relative to the Affairs of 
New Zealand, Claims of Civil Cases Disposed of at the … Court at Auckland July – September 1847, 6 October 
1847, 7. 
108 “Resident Magistrates Courts Act,” 1846, 10 Vict., c16 (New Zealand), Article III: 9-10. 
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administration of them,” thereby framing the legal change as tutelary even if it represented a 
demotion in status for Māori collaborators.109  The act’s fifth article accomplished 
familiarization by brining Māori into the court system as Native Assessors. Assessors were to be 
selected and appointed by the governor as “men of the greatest authority and best repute in their 
respective tribes,” and as compensation for their time would be paid up to five pounds for each 
satisfactory judgment.110 Two assessors, one nominated by the plaintiff and one by the 
defendant, would work with resident magistrates and were authorized to address all cases of a 
civil nature transpiring between Māori. 
Situated in the more densely populated areas and possessed with powers of summary 
jurisdiction, Gover Grey hoped resident magistrates would reduce the “pretext for resorting to 
violence in order to obtain satisfaction.”111 By exposing Māori to processes of British law and 
intensifying the nature of official contact, Grey wanted government institutions, like juries, to be 
pedagogical even if, for Grey, Māori were, yet, “not advanced enough as a race to perform the 
duties of jurymen.”112 Resident magistrates were also to be eyes and ears of the state, “watching 
carefully, and reporting on the disposition of the native population.”113  The humanitarian 
sentiment of the laws’ preamble, however, existed alongside the removal of Māori exemption 
from imprisonment. Furthermore, even though local elites of “greatest authority” and “best 
repute” retained the ability to decide cases, they were shifted into an advisory role alongside a 
European resident magistrate. The repeal of the Native Exemption Ordinance and the passage of 
the Residence Magistrates’ Courts Act allowed punishments traditionally unacceptable to Māori 
109 GBPP 1847 (837) Papers Relative to New Zealand, Governor George Grey to the Right Hon. William Gladstone, 
14 November 1846, 79-80. 
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sensibilities. The two laws also incorporated Māori authoritative structures on terms that situated 
them as participants in the colonial state rather than autonomous practitioners of jurisprudence. 
 If the Native Exemption Ordinance and the Resident Magistrates Act worked to limit the 
ability of individual Māori transgressions to be resolved outside colonial courts, the failure to 
implement Aboriginal Districts shows the curtailment of indigenous autonomy over geographic 
space. Allowed by the 1846 charter granted to New Zealand, but never brought into practice, the 
failure of the colonial state to implement Aboriginal Districts aligns with a wider reorientation of 
humanitarian governance away from a tolerance of Māori autonomy and decision making and 
toward a more state-directed practice. Grey saw the future of legal accommodations for Māori 
within New Zealand society diminishing in proportion to growing familiarity between the 
European and Māori communities. 
 While New Zealand had received an initial charter in 1840, a growing population, 
continuing confusion about the language of the Treaty of Waitangi, uncertainty about legality of 
many land purchases, and the relationship between the settlements of the New Zealand Company 
and the British government, had resulted in a jumble of enactments and resolutions. Earl Grey, 
the Colonial Secretary, perceived New Zealand’s legal environment as in “almost inextricable 
confusion”114 The 1846 Charter restructured the earlier document by “calling the settlers to 
participate much more largely in the business of legislation and local self-government.”115 In 
comments contextualizing the issue of the new charter, Earl Grey restated the importance of the 
1840 charter’s protection of aboriginal peoples. A principle of respecting indigenous practices 
meant that “the laws and customs of the native New Zealanders, even though repugnant to our 
114 PP 1847 (763) Papers Relative to New Zealand, Earl Grey to Governor George Grey, 23 December 1846, 67. 
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own laws, ought, if not at variance with general principles of humanity, to be for the present 
maintained for their government in all their relations to and dealings with each other; and that 
particular districts should be set apart within such customs should be so observed.”116 The 
authority to create these districts fell to the governor.117  
 Chapter XIV of the Royal Sign Manual, a document delineating the parameters of 
governance called for by the charter of 1846, empowered the governor to designate Aboriginal 
Districts. Aboriginal Districts, the operation of non-repugnant “laws, customs, and usages” 
would be allowed and enforcement left to native chiefs. Moreover, non-Māori moving within 
such districts were charged to “respect and observe such native laws” or risk being penalized by 
any [European] court or magistrate within the province.118 Governor Grey announced the 1846 
charter in November of that year and it would come into effect the following January.119 The 
absence of establishing formalized apparatus for the practice of customary law suggests that 
Grey was disinclined to promote sovereignty and sought to integrate Māori on terms favoring the 
colonial state. Extending the reach of law into Māori lives allowed Grey to use legal structures to 
accustom Māori rather than maintain indigenous New Zealanders in a separate space with its 
own legal authority. 
 Like Governor Grey, Earl Grey anticipated the passage of time would see Māori become 
agreeable to and eventually adopt British law. Aboriginal Districts, therefore, were only intended 
116 “Government of New Zealand Act,” 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c103 (Imperial), Section 10; GBPP 1847 (763) Papers 
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to be temporary measures. New Zealand would become a place of English language and English 
law. In the meantime, the Colonial Secretary wrote that “chiefs or others, according to their 
usages, should be allowed to interpret and to administer their own laws” while retaining full 
confidence that the spread of Christianity and knowledge of English would, in time, render any 
“distinctions of law and of legal customs … unnecessary and obsolete.”120 This vision for a 
distinct legal geography in which customary law could be practiced, to the extent that it was not 
“repugnant to humanity” - these crimes generally encompassing infanticide and cannibalism - 
reflected an understanding of humanitarian action of the late 1830s and early 1840s. That the 
idea for Aboriginal Districts, as spaces of Māori legal authority, was never implemented by Grey 
in New Zealand reduced the presence of Māori in setting the parameters of humanitarian 
governance.  
In February of 1847, Grey wrote of further changes in the administration of justice. 
Designed to facilitate Māori access to judicial process, the changes also positioned the 
government as attentive to the needs of Māori. To improve the speed of due process the governor 
directed the Supreme Court to sit more frequently, authorized Resident Magistrates to hear 
claims cases of less than £100 against the government, and appointed a lawyer who would serve 
as counsel for natives at an annual salary of £100 plus a 5% commission on any recovered 
funds.121 Grey framed this last measure as addressing the problem of those accused in civil suits 
who frequently evaded justice. One Māori claimant, for example, lost £120 as a result of a 
promise of payment not being fulfilled.122 Grey also wrote that he had enacted an ordinance 
aimed at the prevention of the abandonment of mixed-race children, “as they were previously in 
120 GBPP 1847 (763) Papers Relative to New Zealand, Earl Grey to Governor George Grey, 23 December 
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the habit of doing – a measure which will produce important future benefits to this country.”123  
Maori military proficiency limited the degree to which the colonial government could 
rely on widespread coercion. This limitation shaped how local colonial administrators 
represented failure and success in Britain.124 Tenuous British power was recognized at the 
beginning of Governor Grey’s administration by Secretary of State for the Colonies. Fragile 
British governance meant presenting interventions in a humanitarian light and gaining the 
“confidence and attachment” of Maori meant colonial policy could be presented as detached 
from military occupation and the loss of sovereignty. British troops, however, were stationed 
throughout the colony and in conjunction with the ability of the Royal Navy to move military 
assets quickly should not be discounted. Despite having these regular, trained military forces 
available that could maintain themselves in the field for extended amounts of time, colonial 
officials were still reticent to threaten military action. If policy was dependent on armed force, 
the necessary military support had to be there or risk rupturing the narrative of the colonial 
state’s monopoly of violence. 
Earl Grey wrote that the “ulterior consequences which must inevitably result from any, 
even apparent, want of power or decision in enforcing obedience to it are so serious” that he 
instructed the governor to not make any agreements that could later prove to be untenable.125 The 
necessity of working within the limited capacity of the colonial state to coerce Maori 
contextualizes the possibilities open to the colonial government. Balancing power with 
persuasion, changes to New Zealand’s legal code under Grey recognized the difficulty of 
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pursuing coercion and highlighting how integrating Maori into colonial legal frameworks would 
not only promote social progress but would also cultivate indigenous loyalty to state institutions. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 Interventions in judicial practices, medicine, the economy, and the law served to 
accelerate assimilative processes on terms favorable to the colonial administration. The 
increasing presence of Christianity, “civilization,” and Māori usage of English would, 
administrators hoped, eventually render distinctions between the two communities unnecessary 
with Māori adopting European models. Unlike in other areas of settler colonization, however, 
British observers and administrators continued to interpret Māori society capable of change. 
Humanitarian governance could, in this period, encourage the social, cultural, and economic 
transformations of New Zealand’s indigenous people. In contrast to assessments of indigenous 
populations as irredeemable, policies pursued by the colonial government during the 1840s and 
1850s assumed that indigenous customs and laws were malleable and, given time, would adapt 
and become amenable to the customs and laws of Europeans.126 
 Cultural assimilation, for Grey, was the desirable end point for the influence of British 
settlement on Māori communities. By 1850, Grey was able to write that a “considerable number 
of their young chiefs and most promising young men were enrolled in an armed police force, and 
thus habituated to act as actual administrators in the lowest offices of the law, and were made 
acquainted with the practical administration of the law [and acted as military allies as well].”127 
 If Grey was confident in the benefits Māori would derive from adopting English social practices 
126 George Grey was also an avid recorder of Māori folklore, songs, and other cultural elements. Among several 
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and patterns of political-economy, he remained skeptical about the capacity of local, settler 
populations to abet that transformation in a way that was humane to Māori. If the colonial 
executive was answerable to London, rather than a settler legislature, Grey felt he could exercise 
a moderating influence on how settlers treated the colony’s indigenous people. 
 In the 1850s, however, agitation for local control over colonial affairs was building in 
New Zealand and the imperial government revisited the question of governance within the 
colony. Grey had successfully persuaded the British government to postpone an 1846 
Constitution Act that would have granted the settler population self-governance. His arguments 
against self-governance echoed his belief that settler control over native affairs would be 
injurious to Māori and because the precarious security position of New Zealand made the 
granting of representative government a dangerous proposition.128 Earl Grey, who had become 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in July of that year, favored of colonial self-government byt 
also believed the British government had an obligation to secure the safety and security of 
colonial peoples, was sympathetic to Governor Grey’s concerns.129 Earl Grey observed that there 
was “serious danger” in the “otherwise inestimable advantages of colonial self-government” 
which was that the powers of franchise could be “perverted into an instrument for the less 
civilized and less powerful races of men” given their exposure to a “temptation from which 
[other legislatures] are exempt.”130 Humanitarian concern in protecting Māori from acquisitive 
settlers who could, with self-government, acquire legal sanction for actions dispossessing the 
Māori, compelled the imperial government to impress upon Grey the significance of 
128 “New Zealand Constitution Act,” 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c103 (Imperial) 
129 Burroughs, Peter. "Grey, Henry George, third Earl Grey (1802–1894), politician." Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. 12 Dec. 2017. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
9780198614128-e-11540. 
130 GBPP 1847 (763) Papers Relative to New Zealand, Earl Grey to Governor George Grey, 23 December 1846, 71. 
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communicating to the legislature “the sacred duty which will be incumbent on them, of watching 
over the interests, protecting the persons, and as far as may be, cultivating the minds of the 
aboriginal race among whom they and their constituents have settled.”131 The paternalism and 
humanitarian impulses underlying these sentiments are clear, in that the government was to be 
responsible for Māori integration and bringing Māori into a European economic order.  
 Grey’s conduct in postponing the introduction of representative government was 
confirmed by Earl Grey. The delay was justified in part “with a view of preparing the colony, 
and especially the Native race, for so important a change in the form of government” and that the 
“extraordinary progress which New Zealand has made … and the progressive civilization of the 
Natives, afford the best proof of” the benefits of Grey’s approach to the administration of New 
Zealand’s indigenous people.132 Grey’s intervention sought to accelerate the speed of Māori 
assimilation. Practices of humanitarian governance proposed and implemented in the late 1830s 
and early 1840s envisioned Maori occupation of Native Reserves and invested Māori with a 
large degree of control of the nature and tempo of social and cultural transformation. In the 
1840s, however, instead of an auto-didactic model of humanitarian governance the practices of 
humanitarian governance advocated by the colonial government shifted control from Maori 
individuals and institutions to ones directed by the colonial government. 
  Schools, hospitals, and tutelary forms of law were all aspects of an overall ambition to 
bring indigenous New Zealand under the control of the colonial state by gaining Māori 
“confidence and attachment.”133 Social programs joined subsidies for flour mills and other 
131 GBPP 1847 (763) Papers Relative to New Zealand, Earl Grey to Governor George Grey, 23 December 1846, 71. 
132 Earl Grey to Governor George Grey, 5 December 1849, in H. Hanson Turton, An Epitome of Official Documents 
Relative to Native Affairs and Land Purchases (Wellington: George Didsbury, 1883), 51. 
133 GBPP 1850 (1136), Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Earl Grey, 9 July 
1849,194-5. 
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farming equipment, savings schemes, and employment on public works as part of a methodology 
of rule. The spaces and forms of humanitarian governance, however, increasingly aspired to 
remove options from Māori hands even if Native Assessors, government grants, and the 
provision of health and educational programs allowed Māori a means of deriving some benefit 
from, or participating in, governance. The type of humanitarian governance advocated by Grey, 
the “building of mutual confidence,” however, ultimately aimed to make legal pluralism 
unnecessary. The assumption was that Māori would become part of European society and that 
assimilation would take place largely on European terms. 
  The shift in how the colonial government interfaced with New Zealand’s indigenous 
people, one that moved from an accommodation of difference in the early 1840s to Grey’s vision 
of a horizontally integrated society, used a discourse of humanitarian action to accomplish its 
goals. If the political circumstances of FitzRoy’s departure made Grey’s program of horizontal 
integration possible then a humanitarian framing of actions undertaken in New Zealand – 
changes that recast humanitarian action as much more strongly proto-developmental – reflects 
the particular situation of New Zealand’s colonial space, one that was different from other sites 
of empire by virtue of its history as a site of humane governance and relative power of 
indigenous peoples.  
  In 1856 the colonial legislature turned its attention to native reserves, but did not 
reestablish them as a system that supported Māori autonomy. Instead, rents from reserved land 
would be directed toward supporting institutions like hospitals and schools established by Grey. 
Grey’s approach to humanitarian governance worked to ally interventions more closely to the 
programs of the colonial government and limited the ability of Māori to articulate the terms and 
means through which humanitarian governance might be exercised. By not reestablishing the 
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native reserve system as a system that supported Māori autonomy and instead focusing on 
making individual grants and financial supports to institutions like hospitals and schools, Grey 
brought the humanitarian resources of the state more closely under the control of the 
government. Grey left New Zealand in 1854 to take up the governorship of the Cape Colony but 
returned later, in 1861 to an environment that enabled another type of force to be applied to 
horizontal integration. The outbreak of more sustained violence with the invasion of the Waikato 
in 1863. There, with the support of 10,000 British troops, Grey pursued integration by other, 
more forceful, means. The impact of representative government will be taken up in the next 
chapter, where an 1856 committee turned their attention to the overlooked Native Reserves. 
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Chapter 4: English in Spirit if not Absolutely in Form 
Trusteeship, Humanitarian Institutions, and Individualizing Native Space (1854-1865) 
The inaugural session of New Zealand’s House of Representatives on May 24, 1854, 
formed a milestone in transferring legislative authority from the British Parliament and Colonial 
Office in London to politicians in New Zealand. Local administration, authorized by the 1852 
Constitution Act, reshaped the colony’s government.1 Instead of a governor consulting 
nominated advisers about legislation that would be ultimately sent to the United Kingdom for 
approval, policy now drew its mandate from a colonial electorate. Structurally, New Zealand’s 
administration adopted a bicameral General Assembly with a Legislative Council appointed by 
the governor and an elected House of Representatives.2 A “responsible ministry,” drawn from 
both chambers with an analogous role to that of the British cabinet, joined the governor as 
principal contributors to public policy. 
Following this shift to local government, a process referred to at the time as a grant of 
“responsible government,” the sixteen members of the Legislative Council and forty members of 
the House of Representatives who met in Auckland for the Assembly’s opening session held a 
large degree of responsibility for charting the legislative future of the colony and shaping the 
position of Māori within it.3 The governor, however, retained authority over purchasing land 
1 “An Act to Grant a Representative Constitution to the Colony of New Zealand,” 30 June 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c72 
(Imperial). 
2 Section 7 of the Constitution Act stipulated that franchise was not delineated based on race but required electors to 
be over the age of 21, have an estate worth at least £50 or a lease valid for longer than three years. 
3 New Zealand. 1854-1855. Parliamentary Debates. Roll of the Legislative Councillors and List of Members of the 
House of Representatives. vii-viii. 
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from Māori and reserved the prerogative to send selected bills to London for further consultation 
or approval.4 After two years of instability, by 1856 representative government had found solid 
footing under the colony’s first premier Henry Sewell. Empowered to draft laws, levy taxes, and 
regulate the disposal of land, New Zealand’s assumption of local government formed part of a 
wider devolution of legislative responsibility - and consequent increase in political power - to 
white settler colonies that occurred throughout the British Empire following 1840.5 
Though the constitution granted significant powers to the colonial legislature it did not 
leave local hands entirely unfettered. Reflecting lingering skepticism within the Britain about the 
ability of a settler government to sufficiently care for the welfare of its indigenous subjects, in 
granting a constitution to New Zealand the British parliament had included a clause mandating 
£7,000 in annual expenditure for “Native Purposes.” Furthermore, the governor was authorized 
to designate spaces in which Māori could live under customary law so long as their “laws, 
customs or useages” were not “repugnant to the general principles of humanity.”6 The governor 
was also permitted to designate districts in which those same “laws, customs, and usages” might 
be followed instead of English law. By earmarking financial benefits for Māori and providing a 
framework for native New Zealanders to remain under, and be held accountable to, indigenous 
law, the constitution expressed a commitment to settler legislative control and the maintenance 
4 “An Act to Grant a Representative Constitution to the Colony of New Zealand,” 30 June 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c72 
(Imperial), Section 56, 72, 73. Only the Crown, though in practice this power was delegated to the governor, could 
“purchase or in anywise acquire or accept from the aboriginal Natives” land held by them in common. The 
legislature’s administrative reach was confined to the remit of regulating the sale of lands already been alienated 
from native title. 
5 Lord Durham’s influential 1839 Report on the Affairs of British North America recommended the granting of 
responsible government to Upper and Lower Canada. The trend toward colonial self-governance was not 
unmitigated as demonstrated by debate over responsible government in Jamaica during the 1840s and 1850s. James 
Belich, Replenishing the Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial 
Experience from 1765 to the Present (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 52; Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 240-249. 
6 Parliamentary Papers of Great Britain [GBPP] 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, 
Right Hon. Sir John Pakington to Governor George Grey, 16 July 1852, 304. 
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of structures protecting Māori. The future of humanitarian governance in New Zealand under the 
new constitution entailed a balance of power between the legislature and the executive. Policy 
decisions hinged on defining, developing, and defending visions of how the state should regulate 
Māori people and lands. 
Despite limiting the colonial legislature’s authority to alienate and regulate Māori space, 
imperial administrators expressed confidence that New Zealand’s colonial government would 
follow a progressive interpretation of liberalism characterized by a commitment to the rule of 
law as a force for positive social change.7  In forwarding the Constitution Act to Governor Grey 
in 1852, John Pakington, Britain’s Secretary of State for the Colonies, had commented on Grey’s 
“strong commitment to liberal institutions” and hoped that in time the “blessings of religion and 
social culture” would allow Māori to “avail themselves largely of the Constitutional privileges” 
made available to those “who have made progress in civilization in common with their fellow 
subjects of the British race.”8  
In the period of relative calm throughout New Zealand that followed military conflict in 
the Hutt Valley and at Wanganui in 1847, yet before the outbreak of large-scale violence in 
Taranaki in 1860, the imperial and local governments envisioned a colonial future where Māori 
followed in the footsteps of settler populations in acquiring political rights. Legislation drafted in 
the years immediately following New Zealand’s grant of responsible self-governance opened 
possibilities for developing judicial and administrative structures within Māori communities. 
Humanitarian governance during these years promoted institutions that would assimilate Māori 
7 Pitts and Mehta point to the tensions between an empire justified with a language of liberation from oppression and 
the contrasting experience of coercion. Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005); Uday Mehta, Liberalism and Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).  
8 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Sir John Pakington to Governor George 
Grey, 16 July 1852, 304. 
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into English legal processes and patterns of land tenure. Local administration, therefore, created 
new institutions that allowed the settler-colonial state to direct the degree and nature of Māori 
engagement with the state toward adopting English laws. Reflecting the continued martial 
capacity of Māori in the late 1850s, the governments approach to integration relied upon the 
voluntary attachment of Māori through a gradual amalgamation of Māori space and bodies as 
individuals rather than on a tribal scale. 
This chapter considers how colonial policies – laws regulating behaviors, patterns of land 
use, and Māori interactions with the justice system – formed a practice of humanitarian 
governance within a political structure that granted local settler-colonial authorities significant 
power. In debates about Māori policy, a large majority of voices both inside and outside the 
government favored “improvement” rather than elimination. The more contentious debates, 
therefore, concerned establishing metrics and methods for what constituted progress and 
improvement.9 Indigenous New Zealand in the mid-1850s still comprised a large portion of the 
North Island, and administrators acknowledged the limits of the government’s power to compel 
Māori.   
Linking interventions in land tenure, administrative authority, and the justice system were 
efforts to individualize communal structures. Ranging from population-wide interventions 
structuring how Māori encountered the justice system to facilitating the individualization of land 
in a single South Island reserve, colonial policy continued earlier efforts to assimilate and 
incorporate Māori land and labor at both individual and societal scales. In continuity with the 
approach taken by earlier administrations, New Zealand’s responsible government remained 
invested in a pedagogy of assimilation, one that saw Māori as abetting their own colonization by 
9 Tony Ballantyne, “Genesis 1:28 and the Languages of Colonial Improvement in Victorian New Zealand,” 
Victorian Review 37, no. 2 (2011): 11. 
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contributing to the administration of laws and from their potential as a source of agricultural 
labor and production.  
The question Edward Stafford, who led the local government as New Zealand’s premier 
from June of 1856 to July of 1861, faced was how to frame a new set of policies regarding Māori 
that acknowledged the limitations of colonial power while facilitating the liberal aim of 
“improving” Māori to where they could exercise constitutional rights. To do this, in the words of 
Thomas Gore Browne, the colony’s governor from 1855 to 1861, social change would have “to 
operate from native centres, by means of institutions, English in their spirit, if not absolutely in 
their form, devised to supply the peculiar necessities of the native tribes, and to secure their 
confidence and support.”10 Implementing this program shifted practices of humanitarian 
governance toward a model of administration that promoted European trusteeship of indigenous 
lands and peoples at the expense of the dispersed and autonomous native policy of earlier years. 
Instead of policies that allowed for Māori influence in practices of humanitarian government, the 
colonial state pursued programs characterized by a paternalist implementation of trusteeship that 
reoriented official indigenous participation in the administration of justice, management of land, 
and regulation of space as one that was tutelary rather than an approach that recognized the 
accommodation of indigenous practices. 
Support for further integration of Māori also came from the missionary community. 
Octavius Hadfield, a prominent Anglican missionary living near Wellington, endorsed a vision 
for involving local Māori with the administration of justice. Writing in 1856, he argued that the 
main object of government was the equal administration of, and collective respect for, the law. 
10 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Memorandum by Responsible 
Advisers Native Affairs: 29 September 1858, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to Right Honorable Sir E. Bulwer 
Lytton, 14 October 1858, 22. 
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Involving Maori in colonial institutions like courts, he wrote, would help all “ranks become 
familiarized with law and accustomed to submit to it,” a development that would do more, in 
Hadfield’s mind, to maintain tranquility in the colony than any amount of armed force. Hadfield 
saw benefits of colonial courts as educating “inferior men through the legal action of law,” as a 
counterbalance to the customary authority of Māori notables, and as a way to encourage loyalty 
to the colonial state.11  
Interventions made by the government between 1854 and 1865 reorganized the 
administrative map and institutions of Māori New Zealand. In particular, five pieces of 
legislation embodied how the colonial government reframed the relationship between Māori and 
the colonial state. One law, the Native Reserves Act of 1856, was the first legislative regulation 
of Māori affairs passed after the colony received self-government. As the title suggests the 
legislation directly engaged with the question of reserved land, the longest-standing type of 
humanitarian governance designated for the benefit of Māori.12 Its purview was consolidating 
and reorganizing reserve lands under an efficient system of management.  
Two years later, in 1858, the Stafford ministry proposed a package of four bills as a suite 
of measures reformulating the New Zealand’s native administration. Frederick Whitaker, a 
legislative councilor who served as the colony’s Attorney-General for most of the period 
between 1856 to 1861, said the purpose of the legislation could “be summed in one word – [the 
government] wanted to civilise [the Māori].”13 All four acts were passed by the General 
Assembly within two weeks of each other in August 1858. The Native Districts Regulation Act 
11 Archives New Zealand [ANZ], Octavius Hadfield - Remarks on the State of Feeling Between Natives and 
Settlers. 15 April 1856, Governor [G] 13 2 13. 
12 “New Zealand Native Reserves Act,” 6 August 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c10 (New Zealand). 
13 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Report of Debate in the Legislative 
Council on Native Bills: July 1858, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, 14 September 1858, 8. 
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authorized government intervention in designated Māori districts; the Native Circuit Courts Act 
formalized the judicial power of Māori in an advisory rather than in an autonomous capacity; the 
Native Territorial Rights Act allowed for the individualization of land titles previously held 
collectively; and the Bay of Islands Settlement Act designated a special zone authorizing an 
intentionally mixed Māori-European settlement.14  The chapter concludes by returning to an 
examination of native reserves, in this case at Kaiapoi on the east coast of the South Island, to 
see how the ownership of a large reserve shifted from a collective to an individual basis and what 
this shift reveals about the limits, capacities, and visions of a reformulated approach to 
humanitarian governance. 
Control of indigenous space constitutes a central tenet of settler colonialism. Together 
these policy changes reformulated indigenous authority in a range of territorial spaces and 
administrative contexts and structured the exercise of humanitarian governance as one 
undertaken on behalf of Māori rather than as one that included Māori voices in establishing 
future policy directions. Legislative and administrative changes demonstrate how a newly 
empowered settler legislature could shift policy regarding indigenous land from what had been, 
under previous governors, a more general and collective concept of humanitarian governance in 
favor of one, under responsible government, that was more intensive and individual. 
Dialogue about colonial self-government and the management of indigenous populations 
brought assertions about the value of settlers’ site-specific knowledge into conversation with 
expressions of imperial humanitarian obligation. The latter perspective voiced skepticism about 
the degree to which a population engaged in territorially-expansive economic practices could 
14 “Native Districts Regulation Act,” 4 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c41 (New Zealand); “Native Circuit Courts 
Act,” 4 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c42 (New Zealand); “Native Territorial Rights Act,” 21 August 1858, 21 & 22 
Vict., c80 (New Zealand); “Bay of Islands Settlement Act,” 19 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c79 (New Zealand). 
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effectively administer to the needs of aboriginal groups who claimed ownership of, occupied, 
and used the land.15 The difficulty faced by New Zealand’s responsible ministers was to figure 
out how to promulgate an agenda that facilitated their vision of Māori colonial future without 
their proposals being overturned by the governor for being antagonistic toward Māori interests. 
While ministers wanted a vertically integrated and expanded colonial state with Māori 
participation directed toward supplying labor, Governors Browne (1855-61) and Grey (1861-68) 
cautioned against the rapid and unplanned expansion of settler territory as a source of 
unwelcome friction between Māori and European populations. 
Like Grey’s humanitarian program from the 1840s, Stafford’s ministry framed changes to 
native administration in the late-1850s as pedagogical interventions facilitating Māori integration 
into the colonial state. Though legislators were far from unified in their approach to Māori 
issues, progress was generally measured by social, political, and economic metrics with success 
characterized by individualized landholding, Christianity, and European domestic habits and 
customs. What changed with the shift to representative government was a desire, articulated by 
the responsible ministry, of gathering and organizing the various pieces of New Zealand’s 
colonial society into a form that was conducive to the assimilation and integration of Māori 
people as a source of labor and production and Māori land as a source of colonial wealth. 
Legislative interventions passed by the local government featured direct pressure to incorporate 
Māori into European practices of judicial administration and the promotion of a relationship with 
the state on individual terms. Policies designed to facilitate social change also aspired to bring 
15 Debates about the productivity of land and people were, of course, not limited to antipodean spaces but build on 
conversations within the United Kingdom about land use and “productivity” in England, Ireland and Scotland. E. P. 
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975); T. M Devine, 
The Transformation of Rural Scotland: Social Change and the Agrarian Economy, 1600-1815 (Edinburgh: John 
Donald, 1994). 
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aspects of indigenous society within the European-controlled economic and judicial systems in 
ways that were tutelary and integrative. Humanitarian governance shifted registers from 
conceptualizing Maori as a people in peril to one that advocated and endorsed European 
civilization as a way to redeem Maori and save them from collapse. 
A British government reticent to let a settler population unchecked control over its 
indigenous or non-European peoples was not unique to New Zealand.16 Aboriginal peoples, 
when conceptualized as a “problem” to solve, constituted an aspect of colonial self-governance 
that caused the British Colonial Office considerable anxiety. In case of insurrection, costly 
border wars, or the depopulation of local labor supplies, conflict with indigenous populations 
could destabilize local societies. The increasing establishment and institutionalizing of difference 
was characteristic of 19th-century European empires. Colonial structures throughout the British 
Empire, especially in the aftermath of the 1857 Indian Rebellion, increasingly pushed to conform 
to a stricter regime of hierarchies and vertical relationships.17 The process of differentiation in 
the administration of New Zealand’s native spaces and peoples was tied to both a long history of 
humanitarian governance and its context as a settler colony with a newly-empowered legislature 
implementing its authority. By 1865, a vision of liberal empire was being tested by outbreaks of 
armed violence and the assertion of Māori sovereignty that pushed the colonial government to 
consider consolidating the colonial state more firmly under explicitly European control and, by 
rendering collective land ownership difficult to practice, disrupting the collective land tenure of 
Māori society. 
16 Julie Evans et al., Equal Subjects Unequal Rights: Indigenous Peoples in British Settler Colonies, 1830–1910, 
(Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2003). 
17 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Catherine Hall, 
Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002). 
184
The Native Reserves Act, 1856 
The 1856 Native Reserves Act formed the responsible government’s first attempt at 
regulating Māori land. Two years earlier, during its inaugural session, the House of 
Representatives motioned that the local government should legislate “for the more efficient 
administration of the Native Reserves of this colony” through “encouragement to their profitable 
occupation and permanent improvement” by Europeans along with “obtain[ing] such information 
on the subject as may enable the General Assembly to legislate on the subject at their next 
session.”18 That, in 1854, the General Assembly still lacked a significant evidentiary corpus on 
which to make informed decisions speaks to the indifferent level of administrative attention paid 
to the reserves since their 1840 establishment.  If, under Grey, concepts of indigenous 
management were more territorially diffused, this act marked the beginning of more intentional 
involvement by the government in regulating reserves. A heightened attention to Maori land 
ownership and authority meant humanitarian governance became more granular and intensive 
and brought the purpose of reserves more directly into line with the priorities of the settler 
colonial state.19 
Between mid-June and late July of 1856, eleven years after the first statues regulating the 
administration of native reserves, the House of Representatives and Legislative Council debated 
and approved the Native Reserve Act.20 This was a moment of pause to reconsider and reframe 
the structure, purpose, and role of Māori lands following the acquisition of nearly all remaining 
18 ANZ. Charles Clifford to His Excellency the Officer Administering the Government [Robert Wynard], 12 
September 1854, Internal Affairs [IA]1 146 1854/3000. 
19 ANZ. Commissioner of Crown Lands to Colonial Secretary, 27 December 1853, IA1 146 1854/4130. Within the 
Province of Auckland no title to reserves had been granted instead Māori being left with untitled portions within the 
blocks they sold to the colonial government. ANZ. Surveyor General [Charles Ligar] to Colonial Secretary, 10 
November 1854, IA1 154 1855/2662. 
20 “New Zealand Native Reserves Act,” 6 August 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c10 (New Zealand). 
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Māori land on the South Island.21 The legislation systematized the purpose, defined the 
beneficiaries, and laid out the regulation of native reserves formed out of future land purchases 
through the colony. By incorporating features of humanitarian governance characteristic of the 
relationship between the colonial state and Māori since the abolition of the Protectorate of 
Aborigines in 1845, the legislation was not a total break from the past. Frederick Whitaker, the 
attorney-general, prefaced the second reading of the bill with the comment that the proposed 
changes would be an “instrument of practical good to the Native race.”22 Whitaker thought the 
new law employed to “best advantage” the legacy of the New Zealand Company’s economic 
support of reserves, the tradition of using reserves to support religious and secular education, and 
their legacy promoting moral and economic aspects of cultural transformation. 
 The act placed lands “set apart for the benefit of the aboriginal inhabitants” under “an 
effective system of management” with money earned from rents or sales expended to benefit 
Māori.23 Commissioners nominated by the governor were empowered to lease, sell, or exchange 
land to benefit the indigenous inhabitants. Unlike the Native Trust Ordinance of 1844, the role of 
native reserve commissioner was not automatically attached to a particular government or 
ecclesiastical office. Like earlier concepts of reserve use, ownership of land remained out of 
Māori hands with property held in trust. Trustees could lease land for terms of less than 21 years 
and gubernatorial approval was required for leases exceeding that term or for any sale or 
exchange of reserve land. Restrictions on the sale of land perpetuated an understanding of Maori 
as vulnerable. Proponents justified legislation based on the assumption that Māori were likely to 
21 Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives [AJHR], 1858, “Reports Relative to Land Purchases and 
the Condition of the Natives in the Middle Island,” Session I, C-3. 
22 New Zealand. Legislative Council. 1856. Parliamentary Debates. 30 June 1856, 237. Frederick Whitaker, 
Attorney-General. 
23 “New Zealand Native Reserves Act 1856,” 6 August 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c10 (New Zealand), Preamble, Section 
9. 
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be persuaded or duped into selling their land and consequently be left without a means of 
financial support.  
 Reserves as a source of financial and material support for schools and hospitals formed 
another point of continuity with the earlier practices of humanitarian governance under non-
representative administration. With the approval of the governor, reserved land could be set apart 
for churches, chapels, and cemeteries as well as “schools, hospitals, or other eleemosynary 
institutions” under the direct or indirect control of native reserve commissioners.24 This clause 
allowed commissioners to direct rental income toward supporting institutions previously reliant 
on direct government grants. By legislating that such intervention fell under the category of 
beneficiaries of funds raised from the reserves, the act allowed the redistribution of funds 
putatively for the exclusive benefit of Māori to be directed to more general programs of 
government capacity-building. Schools, for example, were required to teach English and 
hospitals funded by rental income were open to both races. Furthermore, mixed-race children 
were specifically included within the category of “Aboriginal Inhabitants” as eligible 
beneficiaries under the legislation.25 Reserve income, therefore, was not exclusively expended on 
Māori but rather contributed to government programs for which Māori were not sole 
beneficiaries. 
 Suggested by the governor’s ability to approve or veto long leases and recognize grants 
of land for the likes of schools and hospitals, the colonial executive retained its role as arbiter of 
indigenous welfare. As the bill progressed through its first, second, and final readings, the most 
contentious clause was one that concerned requiring, rather than recommending, the governor to 
consult with his responsible advisers on native policy. The final version of the bill stipulated that 
24 “New Zealand Native Reserves Act,” 6 August 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c10 (New Zealand), Section 8. 
25 “New Zealand Native Reserves Act,” 6 August 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c10 (New Zealand), Section 19. 
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the governor could only act with the “advice and consent of the Executive Council” of the colony 
when formulating policies impacting indigenous affairs.26 Mandated consultation with advisers 
limited the ability of the governor to singlehandedly control, limit, or guide the impact of settler-
colonial policy on Maori.  
 During debate concerning the governor’s obligation to consult with his advisors, Henry 
Seymour, a member of the Legislative Council from Nelson, argued the effect of the clause 
requiring (instead of suggesting) consultation would be to deprive the Governor of his 
constitutionally-derived authority to administer native affairs. Seymour favored giving the 
governor more control since the office was “so intimately connected with peace and war” that 
“he who was responsible to the British Government should be altogether unfettered in his 
operations with the Natives.”27 The Legislative Council, however, was split by arguments 
regarding the connection between native reserves as a category of land designated for the benefit 
of New Zealand’s indigenous peoples, and the administration of “the Natives” more generally. 
The vote on whether or not to limit the governor’s power by having him consult with the 
executive council was tied, and in casting the deciding vote in favor of requiring consultation, 
the chair noted that “the bill, however, involved no Native question … the reserved lands were to 
be placed under a trusteeship, and in his opinion the Governor, as a trustee, should not be 
uncontrolled.”28 By framing reserves as an issue relating to the trusteeship of a vulnerable 
population rather than part of native policy as an aspect of securing the state’s monopoly of 
violence, requiring the governor to meet with his responsible ministry, the law gave settler 
representatives a stronger voice in administrative policies directed toward Māori. 
26 “New Zealand Native Reserves Act,” 6 August 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c10. (New Zealand), Section 18. 
27 New Zealand. Legislative Council. 1856. Parliamentary Debates. 3 July 1856, 250. Henry Seymour. 
28 New Zealand. Legislative Council. 1856. Parliamentary Debates. 3 July 1856, 251. Thomas Bartley, Speaker. 
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 In discussing the bill, the Speaker of the Legislative Council noted that the Native 
Reserves Act had spurred the most debate of any bill ever before the General Assembly. The 
source of such protracted debate was the degree of power that the governor could exercise 
regarding native affairs, a source of continuing tension between ministry leading the government 
and the governor.29 The administration of Māori space, therefore, remained a significant question 
for New Zealand’s responsible government. After years of indifferent administration under a 
non-representative system, the settler legislature understood reserves as a valuable asset and 
important aspect of colonial governance. 
 A distinction between administering reserve land as an asset of the state instead of as a 
resource under Māori control and for Maori purposes illustrates a shift in humanitarian 
governance to a model that saw the state as operating to collectively support humanitarian 
initiatives with the resources at its disposal as a trustee, rather than a model that allowed a direct 
benefit to accrue to Māori from the use of their reserves. That voices like that of the Attorney 
General could consider native reserves as not belonging to Māori, and therefore not a native 
question, reveals a growing distinction between an understanding of reserves as a foundation 
protecting Māori from settler society and an understanding that advocated the integration and 
assimilation of Māori into colonial society.  By considering reserves as another resource 
available to advance state policies, the colonial government discarded isolation as a part of its 
practices of humanitarian governance toward Māori.30 
 Thomas Gore Browne, who had previously served as Governor of St. Helena and 
succeeded Grey as New Zealand’s governor in September 1855, agreed to forward the Native 
29 New Zealand. Legislative Council. 1856. Parliamentary Debates. 3 July 1856, 251. Thomas Bartley, Speaker. 
30 New Zealand. Legislative Council. 1856. Parliamentary Debates. 3 July 1856, 250. Frederick Whitaker, 
Attorney-General. 
189
Reserve Act to London for final approval. He informed the responsible ministry that the British 
government’s endorsement was not guaranteed due to the law’s possible infringement on the 
constitutionally-guaranteed authority of the governor to administer indigenous affairs.31 Despite 
Browne’s concerns, the British government permitted the bill to become law. The following 
month, Browne lamented to Henry Labouchere, Britain’s Secretary of State for the Colonies, that 
the vicissitudes of party politics made addressing the question of New Zealand’s native affairs a 
very difficult one.32 Divergent opinions about how to administer the reserves and uncertainty 
about the forms humanitarian government would take now that the colony had achieved 
responsible government remained points of contention between the local government, the 
governor, and the Colonial Office. 
 As with the previous iterations of Native Reserve trusteeship, the structure of the budgets 
makes it difficult to make a direct connection between income from rented reserve land and 
government financial support of Māori. The language of the act provided no schedule or 
guidance about how funds should be expended, and rents received from reserves seem to have 
been lumped in with general income rather than earmarked specifically for Māori purposes.33 
The colony’s expenditures for 1857 note that the entirety of the £7,000 guaranteed for Native 
Purposes under the Constitution Act was allocated to schools while in that year a further £1,227 
appropriated by the General Assembly was directed toward funding hospitals, pensions for loyal 
Māori, and entertaining official Māori guests of the government.34 
 For the purposes of implementing humanitarian governance as practice, however, the 
31 ANZ. Memorandum for Responsible Ministers, 25 July and 29 July 1856, G36 3. 
32 GBPP 1860 (2719) Further Papers Relative to New Zealand, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to Henry 
Labouchere, 21 September 1856, 360. 
33 AJHR, 1858, “Statement of the Public Accounts of the Colony,” Session 1, B-3, 10-12.  
34 AJHR, 1858, “Statement of the Public Accounts of the Colony,” Session 1, B-3, 10-12.  
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principle remained of holding land in trusteeship for Māori rather than distributing the territory 
as individual lots. By leasing reserves to Europeans, the government was able to bring the 
reserves into economic circulation rather than establishing them as a means through which Māori 
could develop their own properties. Though reserves were a category designated for the 
improvement of Māori, the administration of that space meant that Māori were only indirect 
beneficiaries.  
 
The 1858 Acts 
 Empowered with legislative authority to regulate the scale, quality, and purpose of Māori 
space within New Zealand, in 1858 the General Assembly passed a set of five bills framing the 
designation, administration, and adjudication of native space. A large amount of land beyond the 
authority of the settler state meant that legislators sought out ways of projecting governance 
beyond the boundaries of established European jurisdictions. The laws discussed during the 1858 
session proposed a system of regulating Māori space that was operative on a wide scale and 
included elements of humanitarian governance. Together, these four acts sought to bind Māori 
more closely with the operations and administration of the colonial state. The law established a 
vision of the future that was premised on Maori adoption of “English institutions,” among them 
individualized land tenure, but also an understanding and practice of legal and political 
administration developed with the intention to make Māori resilient to what contemporaries 
believed was the ultimate ascendance of European colonialism. 
 If the ideal of promoting Māori social change in a “humane” fashion remained consistent 
with earlier iterations of humanitarian governance, official practice proposed by the bills set 
them apart from previous practices. This legislation was designed to work together as a package 
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with the overall goal of locating and situating Māori within a fixed territory that could, in time, 
become the object of state intervention. Debate within the General Assembly about the efficacy 
of this vision was split. One side, championed by the opposition, argued for the importance of 
stability and continuity that would be embodied by a permanent minister for native affairs who 
would not be subject to changes of political party. Insulated from the vicissitudes of sectional 
politics, this minister would buttress the executive branch’s oversight of native affairs. This 
perspective promoted a laissez-faire perspective citing robust Māori economic activity at the Bay 
of Islands as testament to their industry.35 This perspective interpreted contact between Māori 
and European as generally deleterious and that the future of incorporating Māori within the 
colony was through slow integration.  
The opposing perspective, advocated by the responsible ministry, prioritized local 
expertise, the need to assimilate Māori quickly, and followed the premise that native issues were 
best addressed by local representatives rather than the transitory figure of the governor.36 As 
evidence of the successful means of economic integration, in the eyes of Attorney-General 
Whitaker, were examples of individual grants of land being issued to Māori.37 The opinion of the 
responsible ministry, therefore, advocated extending grants of land to individual Māori as the 
best means to secure a policy of economic inclusion. This stance was predicated on a positive 
assessment of Māori as adaptable and amenable to the structures proposed by the responsible 
ministry. Though disagreeing about policy, questions remained concerning the extent to which 
35 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Forwarding a Report of Debate in the 
Legislative Council on Native Bills July 1858, Governor T. Gore Browne to Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, 14 September 
1858, 14. 
36 Ibid., 8-9. 
37 Ibid., 15. 
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Maori customs and practices were elastic enough to adopt and adapt to a vision of governance 
held by local settler representatives.  
 As the suite of bills advanced through the General Assembly, local legislators referred to 
other examples of settler colonization to inform their own approach. Whitaker noted that the 
local government had looked to “Arkansas, Caffraria [part of the Cape Colony], and Natal” in a 
search for best practices of the probable working of legislation. Whitaker proposed the example 
of the United States, in this case the management of the Indian Territory [Oklahoma] to the west 
of Arkansas, as exemplary of success and progress in “Indian civilization.”38 It was Whitaker’s 
hope that the American president James Buchanan would allow the Indian Territory to be 
“incorporated into one of the sovereign states” following the progress of Native Americans in 
social and economic metrics. The association of particular peoples with particular arrangements 
of urban and rural space formed part of a wider effort to understand what type of people lived 
where. The overlap between geographic and demographic knowledge in the eyes of a colonial 
state focused on bringing land and people into a conception of productive political economy.39 
 
The Native Districts Regulation Act 
The colony’s 1852 constitution had empowered the governor to designate “Native 
Districts” in which indigenous customs and usages would remain in force as customary law.40 
38 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Forwarding a Report of Debate in the 
Legislative Council on Native Bills July 1858, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, 14 
September 1858, 8. 
39 Giselle Byrnes, Boundary Markers: Land Surveying and the Colonisation of New Zealand (Wellington: Bridget 
Williams Books, 2001); Christopher Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social 
Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Helena Michie and Ronald 
Thomas, Nineteenth-Century Geographies: The Transformation of Space from the Victorian Age to the American 
Century (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003). 
40 New Zealand’s first Constitution, passed by the British Parliament but never implemented, made provision for 
“particular districts” in which Māori “laws, customs, or usages should be so observed.” “An Act to Make Further 
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Though the power was granted to the governor, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies 
John Pakington wrote to Governor Grey advising caution in exercising that authority. Pakington 
thought exempting Māori from the common law was not “a power not to be exercised without 
strong ground, and which, it is rather to be hoped, you may not find it necessary at present to 
exercise.”41 Though resident magistrates had administered to legal transgressions within Māori 
space from the mid-1840s, in 1858 the local government approved more robust regulations. The 
Legislative Assembly passed the Native Districts Regulation Act that both affirmed the 
governor’s prerogative to designate such districts and proposed administrative guidelines.42 
In defining the types of regulation that could be introduced within Native Districts, the 
policies sought to structure Māori society and social habits as well as punish criminal actions. In 
so doing, the local government saw an opportunity to extend control into otherwise remote areas 
beyond the current extent of political control. This effort to extend the reach of state regulation 
outside of reserves suggests the ambition of the settler legislature to regulate Māori space on a 
systemic level and extend the means of social control into spaces not yet territorially alienated by 
the colonial state. The reach of humanitarian governance, therefore, became more capacious and 
proscriptive. 
In contrast to the enthusiasm of his responsible ministry, Governor Browne agreed with 
Pakington’s earlier assessment and was not confident about the capacity of settler governments 
to effectively administer to aboriginal concerns. In a report to Herman Merivale, the Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies and former Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, 
Provision for the Government of the New Zealand Islands,” 28 August 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c103 (Imperial), Section 
10. 
41 GBPP 1854 (1779) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Sir John Pakington to Governor 
George Grey, July 16 1852, 304. 
42 “Native Districts Regulation Act,” 14 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c41. (New Zealand). 
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Browne wrote that though it might be “politically inexpedient” to exercise his authority to create 
native districts, it might be the only way to withdraw the natives “from the control of the 
assembly and its ministers and [he] cannot but think they should be so.”43 Browne’s concern 
reflected the balance he had to strike between fulfilling his constitutional obligation to support 
Māori interests while not impinging upon the exercise of responsible governance. Both the 
governor and the responsible ministry saw potential in establishing native districts. Whereas the 
governor thought Native Districts could be a potential form of protection for Māori, the colonial 
legislature saw them as a way to gain control. 
The programmatic scope of the Native Districts Regulation Act rested upon promoting 
“the Social Economy of the Native Race” and established the local government’s authority to 
intervene in a wide variety of arenas. Economic aspects included the ability to regulate boundary 
fences, prevent the spread of sheep and cattle diseases, and promote fire prevention. Its reach 
also authorized regulating the sale of spirituous and fermented liquors, the cleaning of houses 
and buildings deemed in a “dirty and unwholesome state,” and ordinances protecting public and 
common property. The law also authorized the governor to suppress “injurious Native Customs” 
and permitted incarceration as a sentence instead of what had been conventional practice of 
paying monetary compensation for injuries. This proposal was a dramatic shift from earlier 
conceptions of administering European law within Māori communities that had vacillated 
between autonomy, exemplified by the 1844 Native Exemption Ordinance that treated Maori 
crimes as outside European judicial processes, and integration. Native Districts created a 
geographically expansive zone in which the government could attempt to influence and promote 
the development of “English institutions” from afar through Māori intermediaries. 
43 The National Archives [TNA], Governor Thomas Gore Browne to Herman Merivale, 29 April 1856, CO 209/135, 
fol. 392. 
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The designation of such a broad program suggests a turning point in how the settler 
government sought to promote Māori assimilation. Though any regulations were to be “made as 
far as possible with the general assent of the Native population affected,” enforcement was left 
up to Justices of the Peace who could impose up to a £50 fine for violations. The geographic 
reach of the act was comprehensive and stipulated that lands transferred to “any person of the 
native race, or to any persons or bodily politics in trust for Religious, Education, or Charitable 
purposes” be considered as within the Native District. Demographically, this categorized as 
“native” all Māori, those “half-castes living as members of any Native Tribe,” and any aboriginal 
people of the Pacific Islands.44 Native Districts could only be created in areas over which native 
title had not already been extinguished, so the programmatic intent seems directed toward 
extending the reach of the state into those zones beyond its direct authority.  
The Native District Regulation Act was announced in the government-published bilingual 
Maori Messenger - Te Karere Maori in September 1858.45 By way of explanation, the editor 
took pains to reassure readers that “such Districts would not be appointed by the Governor 
except where he has good reason to believe that the inhabitants are sincere and unanimous in 
desiring it [and that]His Excellency wishes to shew the Maori people the right path and to 
remove obstacles; but having done this he leaves it to themselves to choose whether or not they 
will walk in it.”46 To facilitate governance, a district runanga [council] composed of Māori 
notables was to advise the governor and local resident magistrates about the types of regulation 
they wanted to see implemented. The Maori Messenger noted that the purpose of the Native 
Districts Regulation Act and the Native Circuit Courts Act, the latter discussed below but passed 
44 “Native Districts Regulation Act,” 14 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c41 (New Zealand). 
45 “An Act to Regulate the Local Affairs of Native Districts,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 15 September 
1858, 2. 
46 “Parliament,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 15 September 1858, 1. 
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on the same day as the Native Districts Act, was to “aid the Maori people living apart from the 
Europeans in their efforts to raise themselves, and to become like their Pakeha brethren by the 
substitution of English laws for the old native customs.”47 Under responsible government, 
assimilative pressure on Māori communities grew even as the government continued to frame 
those pressures as beneficial for facilitating the growth of Maori participation in governance, as a 
way to reduce the possibility for conflict, and as a possibility to use the power of indigenous 
authorities to legitimize intervention. 
Authority to propose regulations for Native Districts was also held by the Governor-in-
Council. One particular regulation the governor put into place in the Upper Waikato District, an 
area of dense Māori settlement, prohibited the selling, removing or disposing of liquors. Unless 
granted a license by a Resident Magistrate with the concurrence of at least one Native Assessor, 
moving spirituous or fermented liquors within the district could result in a £50 penalty with the 
fine put toward “the purposes of Government within said District, or otherwise for the common 
benefit of the inhabitants thereof.”48 An attention to the manufacture and supply of alcohol 
continued a longstanding effort by both the colonial government and indigenous authorities to 
curtail access to alcohol by Māori. Between 1853 and 1862, convictions for drunkenness 
constituted half of the total number of convictions for all crimes passed down in New Zealand.49 
Cases brought against Māori in 1862, however, show that only 51 of 120 total convictions 
handed down to Māori were for drunkenness.50 While early accounts praised Māori for their 
47 “Untitled,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 28 February 1859, 1. 
48 “Order in Council,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 16 December 1861, 1. 
49 Out of a total number of convictions of 28,489 passed down by New Zealand’s colonial courts between 1853 and 
1862, 14,405 were convictions for drunkenness. “Statistics of New Zealand for 1862,” Statistics New 
Zealand/Tatauranga Aotearoa, https://www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1862-statistics-nz/1862-statistics-
nz.html. 
50 In 1862, out of 120 Māori convictions, 51 were for drunkenness. “Statistics of New Zealand for 1862,” Statistics 
New Zealand/Tatauranga Aotearoa, https://www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1 862-statistics-nz/1862-
statistics-nz.html. 
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abstemiousness, access to alcohol and the potential for its abuse constituted a growing thread of 
anxiety among both Māori and European commentators. 
In its assessment of the Native Districts Act, the Colonial Office was largely favorable. 
Lord Carnavon, writing on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, however, expressed 
that circumstances did not yet “justify the Imperial Government in abdicating the responsibilities 
which at present rest on it with regard to that remarkable race[.]”51 What concerned the Colonial 
Office most was the absence of a clause allowing the Crown (through the governor) to veto 
regulations the executive branch considered deleterious to Māori interests. Carnavon, in this 
instance, trusted that the governor would be able to impose conditions on granting assent to what 
was otherwise largely a “wise and useful legislation.” 52 Carnavon’s worries suggest that while 
the British government was sensitive to the difficulties of adjusting legislation remotely and 
retrospectively when letters took months to travel from Auckland to London, the imperial 
government was still actively interested in how New Zealand managed its native affairs. 
Between 1858 and 1862, Governors Browne and Grey (who returned to New Zealand in 
1861 after a term as governor of the Cape Colony) established fifteen Native Districts. Reflecting 
the general extinction of Maori title to land on the South Island by the late 1850s, all fifteen 
districts were located on the North Island.53 The first two, at the Bay of Islands and the Upper 
Waikato, were located in areas of dense Māori population. Others, like the Ahuriri District 
declared in March of 1862, were territorially expansive if sparsely populated and, in the case of 
Ahuriri, was coterminous with the province of Hawke’s Bay on the east coast of the North 
51 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Lord Carnavon [writing on behalf of 
the Colonial Secretary] to Governor Thomas Gore Browne, 18 May 1859, 172. 
52 Ibid., 172. 
53 AJHR, 1858, “Reports Relative to Land Purchases and the Condition of the Natives in the Middle Island,” Session 
I, C-3.  
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Island.54 In the early 1860s, Hawke’s Bay had a relatively small European population. The 
boundaries of the native district excluded those pockets of land around the port city of Napier 
that had already been sold to the government.  
Dense Māori populations on the North Island, especially in the rugged and forested 
eastern and central areas, meant that the government was unable to exert a unilateral monopoly 
of force until the 1870s. Native Districts, by directing administration through Māori authority 
instead of attempting to govern the space, allowed a government that expressed anxiety about its 
lack of coercive force to nevertheless assert a degree of institutional control.55 The act of 
designating a space as a Native District established a veneer of government authority and the 
development of runangas developed a framework for indirect rule. Local Māori, who derived 
prestige through serving on such a body, as did Native Assessors whom the local government 
hoped would learn elements of administration and judicial practice, could become part of English 
institutions. Native Districts worked to obviate the responsibility of local government for an area 
while laying the groundwork for the institutions of government. 
The administration of Native Districts aspired to assimilate Māori leadership into settler 
institutions of government. The density of administrators designated to oversee Native Districts, 
however, was uneven. In 1862, European officials in the Bay of Islands Native District 
comprised a staff of nine including a civil commissioner, resident magistrates, interpreters, and 
medical attendants at three locations throughout the district. European staff worked alongside 
thirteen Māori assessors who were also part of the district runanga, three Māori wardens, and 
54 “Order In Council Appointing District of ‘Ahuriri,’” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 13 March 1862, 19. 
55 There were 5,575 officers and men stationed in New Zealand by December 1862. “Table Showing the Increase 
and Decrease of the Population of European Descence in New Zealand,” Statistics New Zealand/Tatauranga 
Aotearoa, https://www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1862-statistics-nz/1862-statistics-
nz.html#idtable_1_2039. 
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twenty Māori constables. Some familiar names appear on the register of administrators including 
George Clarke, the dismissed Protector of Aborigines who served Civil Commissioner in the Bay 
of Islands.56 The Bay of Plenty was similarly staffed by both European and Māori while other 
spaces, especially those like Taupo, further from European centers of population, only had a 
handful of administrators and nearly no Māori employees.57 Creating Native Districts established 
a framework of guiding development along lines designed to foster the development of English 
institutions. Tension between the governor and representatives of the settler population meant 
indirect rule that blended Maori and settler elements was never brought to full fruition. Debate 
about the extent to which Native Districts might administer Māori space was also redirected by 
the outbreak of warfare in areas of the North Island from 1860. 
The Native Circuit Courts Act 
Alongside Native Districts, Native Circuit Courts constituted a limited geographic area in 
which indigenous authorities were vested with administrative power. Operating under the 
regulatory supervision of the colonial state, courts featured elements of indirect rule. Staffed 
through local runanga and overseen by a European agent, the Native Circuit Courts Act 
established jurisdictions coterminous with analogous roles to the regulations proposed for Native 
Districts. Courts and districts were often established together; announcements creating a Native 
Circuit Court usually accompanied the creation of the Native District to which it was joined, 
often on the same page of the Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori. Native Circuit Courts 
formalized the structure through which crimes, misdemeanors, and other offenses that would 
otherwise be heard by a Resident Magistrate or Justice of the Peace could be tried. 
56 “Tabular Return … of Officers” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 20 August 1862, 3. 
57 Ibid., 5. 
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The act proposed amalgamated court establishments in which a European resident 
magistrate assisted by at least one Māori Native Assessor could pass judgment on a range of 
criminal and civil cases. The governor appointed assessors from those men holding “the greatest 
authority and best repute in their respective tribes.”58 Among their duties, assessors took charge 
of selecting jurymen to serve at trials. The jurisdiction of Native Circuit Courts extended to all 
cases committed amongst Māori or between Māori and European as long as the complaint 
stemmed from within the geographical boundaries of its associated Native District. The juridical 
and administrative spaces of Native Courts and Native Districts, therefore, worked in tandem. 
The government approached the role of assessors as a pedagogical opportunity. Native 
Assessors acting on Native Circuit Courts were expected to develop their understanding of 
European legal practice under the guidance of a European jurist. Nominated assessors received a 
letter from the governor outlining the scope of their work, the duties of juries, and reminding 
them that the majority of their powers were given only when associated with a resident 
magistrate.59 The letter stressed that the Governor did not want to interfere in disputes brought 
before assessors, who were usually local notables, in their capacities as arbiters of customary 
law. A distinction between authority to hear and rule on customary law and passing judgement 
under English law, separated the judicial legitimacy derived from chiefly authority within an 
indigenous framework from the circumscribed role he enjoyed as an assessor to colonial courts. 
The government’s instructions also underscored the importance of assessors maintaining 
a distinction between their two jurisdictions as “no proceedings for which authority cannot be 
found in these Acts will have any legal sanction” and that outside of the Native Circuit Court “no 
authority is given to you by law to demand fees.” Navigating a bifurcated judicial authority, 
58 “Native Circuit Courts Act,” 4 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c42 (New Zealand) Section 31. 
59 “Circular Letter Addressed to the Native Assessors,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 13 March 1862, 13.  
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assessors were also expected to be agents of the state as they fostered an appreciation of legal 
codes amongst Māori in their jurisdiction.60 Native Circuit Courts represent an ambition of the 
state to incorporate existing Māori authority while aspiring to culturally assimilate and accustom 
Māori to the operation of English law. 
In areas where the government was unable to address claims for criminal grievances due 
to a lack of infrastructure or absence of monopoly of force, the institution of native assessors 
provided a way to both facilitate Māori elite becoming part of the state apparatus as well as 
diffuse familiarity with the procedure and rationale of English law. Referring to the first declared 
Native District and Native Circuit Court in the Bay of Islands, as an opportunity to prove “a 
desire to be united with the Pakehas as one people, acknowledging one sovereign and obeying 
one law” in a manner that could be “worthy of imitation by other tribes in New Zealand.” 
Assessors were also encouraged to use the published Māori-language translation of English laws 
and consult with visiting magistrates so as to form “worthy an example of order and respect for 
law as we believe they now do of loyalty, enterprise, and industry.”61 Courts followed an 
educational, peace-building, and acculturating role.   
The Native Circuit Courts Act also authorized assessors forming a special Assessors 
Court in which two or more Native Assessors could exercise the same jurisdiction as a Native 
Circuit Court. Cases heard in these courts, however, were limited to adjudicating civil cases 
where damages were under five pounds, were prohibited from ordering punishment greater than 
a fine of twenty shillings, and were exclusively limited to conflicts between persons classified as 
being of the native race.62  Establishing what was “native,” the law echoed the classifications of 
60 “Circular Letter Addressed to the Native Assessors” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 13 March 1862, 13-19.  
61 “Untitled,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 28 February 1859, 3. 
62 “Native Circuit Courts Act,” 4 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict,, c42 (New Zealand) Section 33. 
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the Native District Regulations Act by stipulating that “half-castes,” other persons of mixed race 
who were “living as members of any Native Tribe,” and any Pacific Islanders were considered 
“native.”63 Unlike the decisions of Native Circuit Courts which had little right of appeal, 
plaintiffs in Assessors Courts could appeal their cases to a regular Native Circuit Court chaired 
by a European magistrate. Though invested with judicial responsibilities, Māori participation in 
colonial legal processes was thus carefully circumscribed. In judgments that were not the result 
of jury trials, for example, their role as advisory to resident magistrates meant that a majority of 
native assessors needed to dissent in order for the resident magistrate’s decision to not stand. 
Provisional authority and curtailed responsibility suggests the colonial state envisioned the 
participation of Māori in Native Circuit Courts as accessory to the administration of justice, and 
therefore service as assessors was a tutelary position, rather than as a source of final authority.  
Restrictions placed on being only able to try intra-Māori cases, the limitation of judicial 
authority to relatively minor matters, and the ability of claimants to ask for redress from a higher 
(and thus not exclusively Māori court), indicate that the responsible ministry considered Native 
Circuit Courts and Assessors Courts to be, for Māori, a space in which they would learn the 
mechanisms of European law and become functionaries thereof. Limitations on the severity and 
form of sanction meant circumscribed judicial power and insulated Europeans and non-Native 
Districts from indigenous practitioners of English law. Despite the limited scope of Māori 
involvement, imperial officials in London did not consider the legislation deleterious to Māori 
interest and approved of the bill becoming law in 1859.64  
63 “Circular Letter Addressed to the Native Assessors,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 13 March 1862, 13.  
64 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Lord Carnavon [writing on behalf of 
the Colonial Secretary] to Governor Thomas Gore Browne, 18 May 1859, 172. 
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Despite limited authority, Māori expressed their confidence and agency over the law. 
Matutaera Potatu and Wiremu Tamihana te Waharoa, two notable Waikato chiefs, along with 
“all the chiefs of Ngatihaua and Waikato,” wrote to Governor Browne in December of 1860 
requesting that “our native districts be left with us” and that they would not let regulations be 
violated, affirming an indigenous capability to enforce and uphold the law.65 In their letter, the 
Waikato chiefs were comfortable in asserting their legal autonomy and knowledge of judicial 
process. The chiefs went so far as to express a willingness to execute sentences of capital 
punishment on both Māori and Pākehā transgressors following the conventions of English law.66 
Māori engagement with the courts could also be used to bolster claim to administrative 
autonomy, establish areas of chiefly authority as well-run component of the larger colonial state, 
and remove pretexts for intervention due to accusations of poor administration. 
Native assessors actively developed their knowledge of European jurisprudence. 
Published letters in the Māori Messenger and appeals to the colonial government about 
regulations proposed for the Native Districts reveal Māori efforts to develop indigenous 
administration within the newly designated spaces. These efforts helped to shape their authority 
as judicially-informed and responsible custodians of the law. To promote this goal, the 
government printed a Māori-language compendium of English laws, referred to by Māori as Ngā 
Ture (constitution), with the intention of “directing [Māori] efforts to legitimate objects inducing 
results beneficial alike to both races.”67 Educating assessors about the principles and practices of 
English law worked to allay concerns about Māori knowledge of jurisprudence. By becoming 
65 “Waikato,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 31 December 1860, 5. 
66 “Waikato,” Maori Messenger/Te Karere Maori, 31 December 1860, 6. 
67 Francis Dart Fenton, Ko nga ture o Ingarani; he mea whakahau iho na [A summary of parts of English law, in 
Maori and English] (Auckland: W. C. Wilson for the New Zealand Government, 1858); AJHR, 1858, “Correspondence Explanatory of the Relations between His Excellency and His Responsible Advisers in Reference to Native Affairs,” Session I, E-5, 7. 
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part of a settler-colonial institution, the colonial government hoped assessors would adopt the 
role of translators and mediators and thereby smooth out and explain the operation of English 
courts. 
Both the Native District Regulation Act and the Native Circuit Courts Act featured a 
pedagogical component and an aspiration to indirect administration in which the parameters of 
Māori authority could be channeled and directed. What the acts endeavored to accomplish 
reflected limitations on the degree of intervention that the settler government could have on 
Māori. Native Districts and Native Circuit Courts formed a compromise between cultural 
assimilation established through efforts at systemic social change favored by Grey and the 
instructional potential allowed by spatial isolation – a characteristic of initial proposals for native 
reserves.68 The defined legal space of the Native Circuit Courts adopted pedagogical elements 
and, like the Native Districts, were to forward a program of assimilation directed through tutelary 
aspects of the law that were from the perspective of the settler-colonial state safely delineated.  
Humanitarian governance worked to reframe Māori practices and engagement with the 
state as an individual process, conducted in terms of a single citizen interfacing with state 
apparatus rather than making a claim for resources a as part of a collective authority. The law as 
a guarantor of individual rights could be slowly adopted and diffused through indigenous 
intermediaries. Instead of allowing the continuation of customary law as the preserve of an 
ancient past, the Native Circuit Courts were to act as a buffer and slowly accustom Māori to the 
widespread adoption of British legal institutions. 
 
The Native Territorial Rights Act 
68 This view, that of promoting Māori cultural assimilation through new and integrative institutions, was opposed by 
the Native Secretary, Donald McLean. 
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 A perennial difficulty faced by New Zealand’s colonial government was managing 
uncertainty about land ownership.69 Decades of irregular purchases, overlapping claims, and 
poor record keeping made determining tenure according to English concepts of landholding both 
protracted and expensive.70 Māori practices of landholding were more communal and 
communities could range in size from a single extended family to large groupings of families - 
hapu – a subdivision of an iwi that could number over 500 individuals.71  The hapu also 
functioned as the main unit of territorial authority.72  Māori established claims on resources 
through occupation, use, or conquest. Geographically, the whole country was divided into units - 
rohe - that were associated with a particular hapu or iwi.73 The presence of contested ownership 
meant the rate at which the government brought land into public circulation was frustratingly 
slow to some settlers.  
The Native Territorial Rights Act, passed in 1858, emerged from this perennial question 
about land in New Zealand. The law referred to the expedience of Māori land being “ascertained 
and defined” in contrast to existing practice where land was only surveyed and titled at the 
moment of its sale to the colonial state.74 The Native Territorial Rights Act allowed the 
Governor, upon application of any “tribe, community, or individual” to issue a Certificate of 
Title delineating the boundaries and scope of that individual’s or community’s land. Applications 
69 The “pre-emption” era of Crown land purchases lasted from the signing of the treaty in 1840 to the establishment 
of the Native Land Court in 1865. Under the provisions of pre-emption the Crown, as the sole entity allowed to 
purchase land from Māori, could pay (artificially) low prices for land then sell the alienated tracts to colonists with 
the difference in purchase and sale price ostensibly funding the colonial bureaucracy and infrastructure. Particularly 
in the 1840s, government policy fluctuated about the capacity and authority of Māori to sell or lease their land with 
the central questions engaging the Crown’s monopoly on land purchase against calls from both Māori and settler 
groups desiring an expedited means to alienate land. 
70 AJHR, 1858, “Sale and Transfer of Land,” Session 1, D-1, 5-7. 
71 Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003), 84. 
72 Atholl Anderson, “Origins, Settlement and Society of Pre-European South Polynesia,” in The New Oxford History 
of New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44. 
73King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, 80; Anderson, “Origins, Settlement and Society of Pre-European 
South Polynesia,” 43; Ian Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 38. 
74 “Native Territorial Rights Act,” 21 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c80 (New Zealand), Preamble. 
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had to be surveyed, certified with the names of Māori who possessed useage and occupational 
rights, and recorded as a means of fixing indigenous title.75 There was an annual limit of 50,000 
acres per year alienable under this type of grant, a total set by a legislature anxious to prevent the 
governor from legitimating (to European eyes) and confirming vast swathes of land as under 
Māori ownership. The capacity of the governor to issue grants under the act was also temporally 
limited with authorization expiring on December 31, 1861. Some Māori, seeing an opportunity to 
receive secure title to land, requested a certificate of title as a way to recognize and establish 
their own rights to particular territories at the expense of other Māori claimants.76 
A Māori movement advocating restricting the sale of land to Europeans, referred to as the 
Land League, emerged in the 1840s and became more widespread – especially in Waikato and 
Taranaki – by the 1850s. Robust agricultural prices in the mid 19th century caused an increase in 
European and Australian immigration to New Zealand. A convergence of a surging settler 
population and increasing reticence by some Māori to alienate land meant a high demand for 
agricultural properties encountered a relatively decreased supply of land.77 Tabulating 
indigenous ownership, therefore, served as a mechanism through which the government might 
render visible networks of Māori land tenure and provide a useful record for expediting the 
transfer of land into settler hands. 
In addition to regulating the parameters and scope of Māori land-holding, the Native 
Territorial Rights Act proposed government intervention originally conceptualized as part of the 
humanitarian mission of the Reserves Act by authorizing the governor to make a crown grant – 
75 “Native Territorial Rights Act,” 21 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c80 (New Zealand), Sections 7 and 8 reserved 
cognizance on requisitions of Native Title for the exclusive consideration of the Governor in Council in questions of 
land and concentration of this important component of indigenous policy in the hands of the executive. 
76 The Waitara case marked a moment when Waikato Māori used the European court system to recognize and edge 
out a rival Taranaki iwi. 
77 Keith. Sinclair, The Origins of the Maori Wars (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1974). 
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giving ownership and recognized title to the land – to individual Māori. The act empowered the 
governor to make the grant inalienable by whomever received it. The inalienability was enforced 
with a fine of up to £100 that could be levied against Europeans tenanting or occupying land 
granted to Māori and, if Māori sold the land to Europeans, they were to pay ten shillings per acre 
to the government. 
Arguing before the Legislative Council during debate about the law, the colony’s 
attorney-general argued that “nothing interfered so much with the advance of civilization as 
these tribal rights.”78 By equipping Māori with individual title, the responsible ministry argued 
that indigenous landowners would devote more energy and attention to developing agricultural 
production than they otherwise would under continued collective ownership. The goal of the 
Native Territorial Rights Act was breaking up tribal tenure and providing individual Māori with 
land so that they could become active participants in a colonial economy or sell their excess land. 
Māori made eager application for recognized individual title as a way to enter the land market.  
 The Native Territorial Rights Act developed a process through which native title, 
previously held collectively, could begin to be broken up into individual parcels. The insertion of 
restrictive clauses about prioritizing Māori ownership and possession, however, reflected a 
continuity with a sense of trusteeship. The responsible ministry endeavored to characterize 
alienated and individualized land as part of a larger set of programs for “improving” New 
Zealand’s indigenous populations. Officials in London, however, disagreed. Unlike colonial 
legislation establishing Native Courts and Native Districts, the Native Territorial Rights Act was 
disallowed by the imperial government and never became law. While Governor Gore Browne 
“earnestly desired the means of individualizing native title,” he wrote to his superiors in London 
78 New Zealand. Legislative Council. 1858. Parliamentary Debates. 12 July 1858, 5. Frederick Whitaker. 
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that he could not recommend its approval because of limitations regarding the limited scale of 
land that could be alienated.79 
Browne’s objections were also made on a practical level contrasting the 150,000 acres 
alienable over three years under the Territorial Rights Act with the 771,673 acres purchased by 
the Native Land Purchase department over the preceding eighteen months. Furthermore, the 
governor worried that a ten-shilling per-acre tax on transferring land from indigenous to 
European tenure would not be welcomed by Māori who already felt aggrieved by receiving a 
sub-market price from the government – the only entity authorized to purchase land from Māori 
– for their land.80 Browne was also attuned to the possible dangers of a future governor enabling 
Europeans to establish farms and settlements within exclusively Māori spaces. These settlements 
formed potential zones of friction. 
Holding to the constitutional principle that placed responsibility for Māori within the 
executive, Browne wrote that he had “always considered the representative of the Crown in the 
light of a trustee for the native race” and that the provisions of the Native Territorial Rights Act 
ran the risk of causing greater injury to the colony’s future success.81 The principle of trusteeship 
trumped confidence in indigenous decision-making. Disallowing the law reveals that British 
opinion about governance in New Zealand retained an interest in balancing humanitarian 
principles with the consolidation of colonial control and devolution of representative governance. 
The Colonial Office agreed with objections raised by the governor and expressed 
concerns that shifting the general process of land purchases from one conducted by the 
79 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to 
the Right Honorable Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, 15 October 1858, 61. One of the provisions in Section 9 of the bill 
stipulated grants being made by the Governor in Council. Browne objected to this provision based on it obliging the 
executive to consult with his responsible advisers instead of acting on his own assessment.  
80 Ibid., 61. 
81 Ibid., 63. 
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government to one pursued by individuals would be injurious to relationships between settler and 
Māori who might be swindled out of their land. In the opinion of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, disagreeable land sales could inspire Māori to resist the local government’s decisions 
and result in armed violence. Since it would fall to the imperial government to supply the 
military force required to quell an uprising, decisions risking a violent consequence were not be 
undertaken by the local legislature. Instead, the Secretary of State for the Colonies advocated that 
collective and individual title be pursued as a regulation operative as part of the Native Districts 
Act. Insulating Māori landowners from the acquisitive impulses of European settlers by placing 
control over the location and scale of land transfer in the hands of the governor and concentrating 
the location of settler communities would reduce the possibility of confrontation or deceit. 
There were also moral considerations at stake. In addition to the “revolution” in patterns 
of land sales that would accompany the ability of individual colonists to purchase land from 
Māori, the proposed act could not guarantee fairness of the terms of contract or the purchase 
price if the process of alienating land transpired between individual settlers and Māori, rather 
than through the local government as a mediating force.82 Unregulated speculation in land that 
had caused so much difficulty for local government in the 1840s, the Colonial Office presumed, 
would return to haunt New Zealand if individuals were empowered with the authority to 
purchase directly. In not recommending the proposed act, the Colonial Office restated the desire 
of the imperial administration to “give the fullest effect to the system of responsible 
Government” and the priority of settlers acquiring land while continuing to “pav[e] the way 
towards that complete civilization and colonization of the native race with the English colonists” 
82 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Lord Carnavon [on behalf of the 
Colonial Secretary] to Governor Thomas Gore Browne, 18 May 1859, 172-173. 
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which had been a “a very remarkable success[.]”83 The prospect of significant military 
expenditure in the event of war, a preference for the geographic concentration of settler 
populations, and a confidence in the capability of the local government to mediate land sales 
meant that the imperial government could not condone the Native Territorial Rights Act. 
The Bay of Islands Settlement Act 
If the previous three acts created a regulatory environment fostering the development of 
English legal institutions and patterns landholding, the Bay of Islands Settlement Act continued 
an assimilationst policy that had characterized humanitarian governance in the years before 
responsible government. Passed in August of 1858, this act recalled the purposeful interspersing 
of Māori and European land proposed during New Zealand’s earliest years of colonization. 
Located 120 miles north of the colonial capital in Auckland, the Bay of Islands was the site of 
first sustained contact between Māori and European, had been a provisioning station for whalers 
and traders in the years following Cook’s 1769 visit, and remained the seat of the powerful 
Ngāpuhi iwi. Rev. Samuel Marsden’s arrival in 1814 and subsequent establishment of a Church 
Missionary Society station meant the area was the oldest site of permanent European settlement 
in New Zealand. The first colonial capital had also been situated at Russel in the Bay of Islands 
until a disastrous fire in 1842 and the disruptions of the Northern War (1845-46) shifted the 
government’s focus south to Auckland. By the mid-1850s the Bay of Islands was perceived as 
economically backward.84 
83 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Lord Carnavon [on behalf of the 
Colonial Secretary] to Governor Thomas Gore Browne, 18 May 1859, 173. 
84 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1858. Parliamentary Debates, 11 June 1858, 515-16. Christopher 
William Richmond. The Bay of Islands district only exported goods worth £43 in 1855. 
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Blending elements of social and economic improvement, the Bay of Islands Settlement 
Act featured a spatial approach to Māori assimilation, in that a particular area of New Zealand 
would be equipped with the apparatus of a tutelary state with instruction coming from European 
settlers. The intentional intermingling of Pākehā and Māori, officials hoped, could aid in the 
diffusion of British forms of socialization, economic organization, and other institutions among 
Māori with a desire to jumpstart the area’s once robust economy. The legislation empowered the 
governor to designate up to 250,00 acres in the northwest of the Bay of Islands to “advance the 
prosperity and welfare of the inhabitants generally, and especially to promote the civilization of 
the Aborigines.”85 Also authorized was the appropriation of land for the settlement from its 
owners who would be compensated with a grant of waste land (land acquired from Māori by the 
government but yet unsold) of equivalent value elsewhere in the Province of Auckland.86 Funds 
raised from the sale of land within the special settlement would provide compensation to 
previous owners, improve roads and other public works of the settlements, endow public schools 
and institutions, and promote the “efficient colonization” of the settlement.87 
Debate about the provisions of the bill reveals how legislators conceptualized the 
continued presence of Māori populations within colonial New Zealand. Christopher William 
Richmond, a representative from the main Taranaki settlement of New Plymouth and also 
Colonial Treasurer, argued in the House of Representatives that New Zealand was comprised of 
four different types of districts differentiated by the degree to which they had adopted British 
institutions. Ranging from “Old Maori” districts characterized by limited engagement with the 
85 “Bay of Islands Settlement Act,” 19 August 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c79 (New Zealand), Preamble. 
86 There is perhaps an additional motivation for this district to be declared in that it would allow the government, 
through acting with the type of eminent domain authority, to consolidate European landholding. 
87 The failure of the New Zealand Company did not mean the end of planned settlements in New Zealand. The Free 
Church of Scotland’s Otago settlement established in 1848 and the Anglican-backed Canterbury Association’s 
settlement in Christchurch established in 1850 were undertaken without the explicit financial involvement of the 
colonial government. 
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state, to “progressive” districts in which Māori “were striving to advance themselves in 
civilization by the adoption [of] English practice,” and “mixed” districts of European and Māori, 
and then purely “European” districts, Richmond’s concept of space and  race was measured 
against a metric of progress characterized by the adoption of European social and economic 
practices.88 In Richmond’s view, the most difficult category of governance were mixed districts. 
Including both the Bay of Islands and his home district of Taranaki, since these spaces were in 
limbo since they lacked the authority of the “old chiefs” while not fully following the authority 
of European law. A goal of the Bay of Islands Act was to move places of “mixed” habitation and 
land ownership toward a “progressive” adoption of European institutions.  
Conversation about the Bay of Islands bill focused on Māori social and economic 
development as a mechanism to ensure the security and authority of the settler state. By 
designating the Bay of Islands as a special area open for settlement, with the government 
empowered with the authority to take land, the state could sweep away existing uncertainty over 
land claims.89 Equipped with the power to resurvey and sell land, a new economic future for the 
Bay of Islands might begin. Richmond thought that the settlement would also benefit from a 
large amount of Māori labor. He was also of the opinion that it was equally important to tend to 
the temporal welfare of the Māori as part of a comprehensive native policy as well as moral and 
social questions.90 With the European population largely situated on to the district’s coastline, 
the responsible ministry anticipated that the Bay of Islands Act would be mutually beneficial 
88 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1858. Parliamentary Debates, 11 June 1858, 515-16. Christopher 
William Richmond. 
89 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1858. Parliamentary Debates, 11 June 1858, 516. John Williamson. 
Legislators noted that the Auckland provincial government sometimes had difficulty carrying out improvements “on 
account of the objections sometimes offered by those Natives who possessed lands in the districts where those 
improvements were necessary” and that an act of the General Assembly could facilitate the appropriation of land 
that was being prevented from being developed by virtue of uncertain ownership. 
90 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1858. Parliamentary Debates, 11 June 1858, 525. Christopher William 
Richmond. 
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through allowing Māori to settle among Europeans and have access to the coast while the latter 
would “be enabled to advance further into the interior for the purposes of settlement.”91 Though 
the Bay of Islands Act recalled earlier efforts to encourage the economic development of Māori, 
its function asserted the ability of the settler colonial state to intervene through appropriating 
land from both settler and Māori and direct the growth of the region in a way that made non-
productive land and Māori labor more accessible to local farmers and entrepreneurs. 
In addition to economic and social development, part of the bill’s appeal was the prospect 
of concentrating loyal Māori, like the Nga Puhi leader Tamati Waka Nene, as a bulwark 
supporting the settler-colonial state. Alongside  European settlers, Māori in the Bay of Islands 
settlement could be relied on to help defend Auckland from attack.92 The presence of significant 
Māori groups to the south and north of the capital meant that the city, in the words of one 
parliamentarian, lay “between two fires.” 93 The concentration of European colonists in a newly 
designated district, rather than scattered around a broad area “to be only at the mercy of the 
natives” meant that the proposed settlement could also develop the security and safety of the 
state. Sufficiently well-planned, a mixed European and Māori presence would help “to carry out 
a system of indoctrinating the Native race in those social institutions to which Europeans 
attached so much importance” and by teaching Māori the meaning of English law and required 
“consistent course of action to teach them to value and appreciate the English social system.”94 A 
concern for security and efforts to “indoctrinate” Maori into settler-colonial society reveals the 
tenuous position of the government in the northern North Island. Efforts of the colonial 
91 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1858. Parliamentary Debates, 11 June 1858, 524. Christopher William 
Richmond. 
92 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1858. Parliamentary Debates, 11 June 1858, 517. John Williamson. 
93 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1858. Parliamentary Debates, 11 June 1858, 519. Hugh Carleton. 
94 Ibid., 11 June 1858, 519. 
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government to promote European institutions drew from a continuing interest in Maori education 
and integration while recognizing the balance of power in the Bay of Islands remained in 
indigenous hands.   
In forwarding the legislation to the Colonial Office for approval, Governor Browne 
thought that the legislation “would tend materially to elevate the [Māori] into a condition of 
complete civilization, always provided that means were taken to preserve morality and good 
order therein.”95  Browne’s expression of concern reveals the continuing aspiration for directing 
the vector and intensity of social change and the Colonial Office concurred in the governor’s 
positive assessment.96 Browne conceptualized Maori as capable of achieving European metrics 
for what constituted a civilized population. 
Social questions as much as economic ones framed the possibilities legislators and the 
governor saw in the district. From a place that was both a birthplace of European authority in 
New Zealand as well as a source of strong Māori resistance - most symbolically through Hone 
Heke’s repeated cutting down of the British flag at Russell in 1844 and 1845 - the desire to 
enhance the settler presence and provide a mixed social context to assimilate Māori stands as a 
continuation of an assimilationist thread of humanitarian governance. The implementation of 
humanitarian governance in the Bay of Islands presented the spatial intermixing of populations 
as a mechanism by which to incorporate and acculturate indigenous into settler New Zealand 
while at the same time promoting the demographic and economic growth of the region. The Bay 
of Islands Act suggests spatial organization as a central tool of promoting social change and 
95 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to 
Sir E. Bulwer Lytton Forwarding a Report of Debate in the Legislative Council on Native Bills, July 1858, 14 
September 1858, 15. 
96 GBPP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Lord Carnavon [on behalf of the 
Colonial Secretary] to Governor Thomas Gore Browne, 18 May 1859, 172. 
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furthering or encouraging a quality of engagement with the colonial state that was geared toward 
developing a vision of Māori relevance to a colonial economy and contribution to the security of 
the settler-colonial state. 
Kaiapoi: Individualization and Native Reserves 
Reframing the nature of Maori engagement with the colonial state on an individual basis 
also impacted native reserves. The Kaiapoi Reserve, on the east coast of the South Island, 
comprised a 2,640-acre parcel on the alluvial Canterbury Plain. Situated thirteen miles north of 
the province’s main European settlement at Christchurch, the reserve was designated by the 
government in 1848 and was one of the province’s oldest.97 In the first third of the 1800s, 
Kaiapoi had been a significant center of Ngāi Tahu, the largest South Island iwi. An 1831 attack 
by the rival Ngāti Toa and their allies drove most Ngāi Tahu further south but in the late 1850s 
Kaiapoi was still home to the Ngāi Tuahuriri and the Ngāi Teraki - two of the ten principal Ngāi 
Tahu hapu. An 1859 report written before individualization identified nearly 200 Ngāi Tahu 
individuals with claims on Kaiapoi of which roughly 100 were absentee claimants.  
In December of 1859, the colonial government sent Walter Lawry Buller, a 19-year old 
son of missionary parents who was then serving as an interpreter in the Wellington magistrate’s 
court, to the South Island to begin negotiations for a new arrangement at Kaiapoi. Buller was to 
undertake an experiment in disaggregating land from the collective control of resident hapu in 
favor of individual titles assigned through surveyed, measured, and mapped lots.98 Kaiapoi was 
97 The total amount of reserve land in Canterbury was 7,001 acres distributed across fifteen reserves. AJHR, 1862, 
“Report on the Partition and Individualization of the Kaiapoi Reserve,” Session I, E-05, 4. 
98 Ross Galbreath. 'Buller, Walter Lawry', from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. Te Ara - the 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 5-Jun-2013, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/1b46/buller-walter-
lawry. 
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chosen because, unlike much the North Island, there was a low density of claimants, the colonial 
government enjoyed a monopoly of force, and a significant European population lived nearby.99 
Kaiapoi was a safe place to pilot a policy of individualizing Maori tenure. 
Arriving at Kaiapoi, Buller noted the quality of the land, its location along the main road 
connecting Christchurch with the northern South Island, and the reserve’s close proximity to 
European settlement established the site as an exceedingly “eligible place in which to try the 
experiment of individualization.”100 Convening a runanga, a meeting of adult males favored as a 
type of consultation for its reliance upon consensus decision-making, Buller anticipated that 
involving local Māori in the process of allotment would legitimize any findings. 
Following a few days of debate, the runanga reached a decision to divide the open land 
(constituting 80 percent of the total reserve) into 122 lots of roughly fourteen acres each.  Each 
man over the age of fifteen was to receive a lot without reference to chiefly status or family size. 
Nine non-Ngāi Tahu, mostly from other South Island iwi who had married Ngāi Tahu women 
and who were permanently resident at Kaiapoi, received a share as did five individuals identified 
as of mixed Māori-European parentage. Four widows, Kakahi, Heni Hinewahia, Rina Te 
Wainapunahau, and Kotiohio also received sections, though only of three or five acres. The 
runanga also set apart land for public purposes. Awards benefitted the Church of England for a 
church and school, the Wesleyans for a chapel, and the runanga retained five acres around the 
old pa as a burial ground.101 The scheme, Buller noted, aspired to be “fair and equitable division 
of the land with a view to immediate occupation and industrial improvement.”102 Instead of 
99 AJHR, 1858, “Reports Relative to Land Purchases and the Condition of the Natives in the Middle Island,” Session 
I, C-3. 
100 AJHR, 1862, “Report on the Partition and Individualization of the Kaiapoi Reserve,” Session I, E-05, 4. 
101 AJHR, 1862, “Report on the Partition and Individualization of the Kaiapoi Reserve,” Session I, E-05, 6-9. 
102 AJHR, 1862, “Report on the Partition and Individualization of the Kaiapoi Reserve,” Session I, E-05, 9. 
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being hampered by the slow deliberations of collective decision-making, Buller hoped, 
individual title would promote efficient and industrious habits among its residents and facilitate 
their economic and social progress. 
The importance of individual ownership derived from a concern held by colonial officials 
about how to best bring land, and the produce of that land, onto the market. That the occupiers 
and future improvers, in this case, were Māori and not European did not seem to trouble Buller. 
His concern, one shared by the ministry in power at the time, was how to encourage Māori 
participation in the colonial economy in light of what they perceived as persistent communalism 
at reserves like Kaiapoi. Despite calling a perceived resistance to individual tenure as a “low 
Maori habit,” Buller still subscribed to a vision of Maori assimilation into European colonial 
society.103 Māori were capable of becoming like Europeans. The mechanism of a Crown grant, 
Buller thought, would cement the association between a single individual and an identifiable plot 
of arable land within a larger context of a reserve. Ownership would promote the productive use 
of that land and encourage Kaiapoi Maori to adopt the culture of their European neighbors.  
Ngāi Tahu voices also spoke in favor of individual tenure. A delegation of Kaiapoi 
Maori, welcoming the Governor Browne to Canterbury in early 1860, petitioned that in addition 
to designating a place at Christchurch’s port at which they could land their canoes and sell 
supplies of firewood, potatoes, wheat, pigs, and fish, they also requested “our land reserves in 
various places be subdivided, so that each may have his own portion. We ask you to give to each 
man a title in writing … our reason for urging the subdivision of our lands is, that our difficulties 
103 Ibid., 10. 
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and quarrels may cease.”104 Encouraged by both the colonial state and Ngāi Tahu, Buller’s plan 
for subdividing Kaiapoi went ahead with survey work beginning in May of 1860.105 
The ostensible precision and egalitarian allocation of resources proposed by the runanga, 
however, did not come to fruition in quite the manner that the government might have expected. 
The survey called for in initial plans recommended a series of individual blocks, divided by a 
central avenue connecting the main trunk road to the site reserved for a school, access to the 
Rangiora River, and the forested area called the Tuahini Bush. Given the scarcity of timber and 
firewood on the Canterbury Plain, the forest resources of this 400-acre parcel was worth nearly 
half of the reserve’s overall assessed value of £45,000.106 The abstract rationality of the 
Kaiapoi’s twelve neat orthogonal blocks, however, concealed lingering affinities between 
landholders. Instead of individuals being assigned lots distributed randomly, Buller allocated lots 
to individuals while paying consideration of their hapu. He justified this decision with the 
argument that the “willingness of near relatives to meet each other in a spirit of mutual 
accommodation” would be useful for bringing land into cultivation.107 Thus, the individual 
allotments so desired by the colonial government were mediated through the type of local, 
contextualized, extended-family network that were, to official eyes, a lamentable a manifestation 
of collectivism. It was not a triumph of liberal individualism that allowed the breakup of 
collective tenure at Kaiapoi. Land was simply reorganized around the hapu and not, as the 
central government might have hoped, the individual. 
104 AJHR, 1862, “Despatches from the Secretary of State and the Governors of New Zealand: Address of Canterbury 
Natives to Governor Gore Browne 6 January 1860” Session I, E-01, 4. Later that year, at a large meeting of Maori 
notables in July 1860, only one, Hori Te Whetuki, opposed proposals to facilitate individualization of land title. 
AJHR, 1862, “Report on the Partition and Individualization of the Kaiapoi Reserve,” Session I, E-05, 12. 
105 AJHR, 1862, “Report on the Partition and Individualization of the Kaiapoi Reserve,” Session I, E-05, 12. 
106 Alexander Mackay, A Compendium of Official Documents Relative to Native Affairs in the South Island, vol. 2 
(Wellington: Government Printer, 1872), 96. 
107 AJHR, 1862, “Report on the Partition and Individualization of the Kaiapoi Reserve,” Session I, E-05, 5. 
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In describing a process of individualization, Buller’s report promoted a vision of native 
reserve administration imbued with ideals of industrious small-scale yeoman production. 
Without individual tenure, he argued, the Māori would have “little encouragement to industry or 
incentive to ambition” and that the schools, hospitals, and other eleemosynary institutions that 
had characterized an earlier mode of humanitarian government would not bring “any real 
progress in civilization, or any improvement in their worldly circumstances, without the previous 
individualization of their lands.”108 His commitment to conceptualizing Māori society as 
adopting a capitalist model can be seen through his analogizing the runganga that initially 
divided the reserve to “a General Meeting of Shareholders” with the “younger and more 
intelligent men … virtually ruling the decisions of the meeting” at the expense of the established 
chiefs. Progress, therefore, might be found in overturning the old social order alongside sowing 
the fields and cutting the timber of Kaiapoi. Though Buller expressed regret about the lengthy 
deliberations constituting the central format of runanga decision-making, in a report submitted 
the year following his survey he expressed hope that the runanga would “be able to induce the 
Natives to adopt a plan of systematic settlement, with other improvements in their social and 
domestic economy” and be able to cultivate local expertise in judicial practices and other 
elements of governance.109 
Like previous efforts at reforming administration of the colony’s reserves, progress in 
drafting, approving, and conveying change – in this case individual Crown Grants – was slow. In 
August of 1862, Walter Mantell, a veteran of many land deals in the South Island, noted that the 
government had failed to live up to its promise of continued support in the form of education, 
108 AJHR, 1862, “Report on the Partition and Individualization of the Kaiapoi Reserve,” Session I, E-05, 11. 
109 AJHR, 1862, “Report on the State of the Natives: Walter Buller, Canterbury, September 19 1861,” Session I, E-
10, 33-34. 
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medical facilities, and “general hospitable care” with the consequence that the Maori inhabitants 
of Kaiapoi “were going to the bad as fast as possible, simply for the want of fulfillment of those 
pledges made [at the time of the reserve’s establishment] on behalf of the Government.”110 Three 
years later, grants were still not finalized with 120 14-acre sections still classified as being in 
preparation.111 Part of this delay resulted from disputes and claims from Ngai Tahu who had 
been absent, excluded or overlooked in the initial runanga with intra-iwi debate about access to 
land involving overlapping claims made based on kinship, purchase, and occupation. 
A perceived lack of progress by Kaiapoi’s residents continued to vex the central 
government who in 1865 encouraged a newly appointed Commissioner of Native Reserves to try 
and convince European settlers to lease land at Kaiapoi as a way to break through what officials 
saw as the insularity of the Kaiapoi Māori and “to do away with the communism which pervades 
their other relations in life, and which forms the chief barrier between the two races.”112 The 
stubborn persistence of Māori community was an obstacle to establishing a vision of indigenous 
New Zealanders as industrious farmers happily integrated into the community through networks 
of production and exchange. 
Finally, in April 1868, the government issued grants to the last forty-nine Kaiapoi Māori. 
Continuing a longer tradition of restriction, one which lasted until the early 20th century, while 
individual lots could be leased by their owners for periods of up to 21 years, a condition of the 
grants noted that the land could not be sold without special approval from the governor.113 The 
continuity of trusteeship and a reticence to fully invest Māori with rights to the reserves suggests 
110 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1862. Parliamentary Debates. 30 August 1862, 357, Walter Mantell. 
111 AHJR, 1865, “Return of All Grants of Land and Other Endowments Made for the Benefit of the Native Race,” 
Session I, E-07, 4-6. 
112 W. Rolleston (Under-Secretary of the Native Department) to H. J. Tancred. October 26 1865 in Mackay, A 
Compendium of Official Documents Relative to Native Affairs in the South Island, 2:109. 
113 AJHR, 1870, “Schedule of Native Reserves in the Province of Canterbury,” Session I, D-16, 20. 
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a lingering discomfort with treating Māori as autonomous agents trusted to oversee their own 
economic future. 
In 1873 James Stack, an Anglican missionary and occasional correspondent to the Native 
Department who ministered to congregations at Kaiapoi, wrote to the Native Department about 
life at the reserve.114 In contrast to the optimistic future Buller had seen in 1859, Stack’s letter 
relayed a story of economic hardship that was now a feature of life at the reserve. The 400 acres 
of timber at Tuahini Bush had all been sold or consumed, half the population was incapable of 
manual labor due to age or infirmity, and the small size of individual allotments made them 
uneconomic to farm and precluded any significant rental income. These reduced circumstances 
had, in Stack’s view, badly disrupted Māori social hierarchies with former chiefs now reduced to 
the level of their former slaves with result “that the character of the people is decreasing” though 
the population were pressing for stronger attention to be paid to the management of native 
reserves.115 The Kaiapoi Māori would have to wait a long time for this stronger attention. 
The larger process of conceptualizing, instantiating, and ultimately dismantling Native 
Reserves as emblematic of what appear to be deeply contradictory and mutually incompatible 
processes at the confluence of New Zealand experience of imperial expansion - blending a self-
consciously humanitarian inheritance with the frequently violent dispossession of indigenous 
people. Through Kaiapoi we can see the shift toward reframing the nature of Maori engagement 
from one based on a collective level to one that recast indigenous New Zealanders as 
autonomous subjects of the colonial state. 
114 Janet E. Murray. 'Stack, James West', Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, first published in 1990. Te Ara - the 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand, https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/1s21/stack-james-west (accessed 13 January 
2018). 
115 AJHR, 1873, “Reports from Officers in Native Districts,” Session I, G-01, 20. 
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Reserves are particularly emblematic of the contradictions inherent to practices of  
“humanitarian empire” in a settler colony by virtue of their attachment of a vision of political, 
economic, and cultural ideas to a particular, platted, and mapped space. The British government 
and public alike had lauded the idea of reserves intended to maintain an indigenous presence 
even as the larger settler project sought to erase that presence from the colonial landscape or 
strictly limit the boundaries in which indigenous elements could remain preeminent. The 
countervailing, though not entirely contradictory, forces of preservation and elimination, explain 
the general confusion that characterized the native reserves administration in the first decades of 
colonization. As a whole, instead of fulfilling their initial purpose in support of Māori autonomy, 
a lack of bureaucratic attention and dearth of administrative resources meant that the various 
programmatic goals established for reserves never fully gained traction. 
Instead, colonial governments turned to Native Reserves as a vector for spreading British 
legal culture, ways of organizing production, and social forms among Māori communities. 
Reserves also served as spaces in which to experiment with techniques of indirect rule, as 
mutable bargaining chips to satisfy rival claimants, or in the case of being used as a site for a 
school or hospital that was open to Europeans, to benefit a generic notion of the public good. 
Politicians and lobbyists within New Zealand portrayed Native Reserves as emblematic of the 
government’s commitment to the humane treatment of Māori even as de jure policy and de facto 
governance increasingly curtailed indigenous autonomy. 
 
Conclusion 
The suite of laws proposed by Governor Browne’s responsible advisers confirmed that 
the newly-empowered settler government would pursue what they characterized as a “policy of 
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fusion.”116 Instead of preserving Māori autonomy, the goal of government sought to “bring the 
aborigines as speedily as may be under British institutions.”117 Efforts to govern Māori bodies 
and lands in regulatory, judicial, and economic forms therefore became increasingly paternalistic 
and tutelary during the late 1850s. Retaining a humanitarian commitment to social improvement 
and trusteeship, legislation and the individualization of reserves constrained the ability of Māori 
to opt out of laws designed to incorporate Māori authority into English administrative institutions 
New Zealand’s settler politicians adopted the premise that because the European 
population in New Zealand was dispersed through the islands, the very nature of colonization 
would make it exceptionally difficult to maintain distinct territorial divisions between native and 
European space in the long-term. The creation of Native Districts and Native Circuit Courts 
applied a layer of colonial government on top of what was exclusively Māori space. The 
designation of Native Districts and the extension of English law into Māori lands took one step 
toward the formal erasure of indigenous lands. Developing, though still nascent, institutions 
employed Native Assessors and Native District runangas that drew Māori into closer contact 
with British authority. The Bay of Islands Act accomplished a parallel goa with the intentional 
intermingling of Māori and European populations. This contact would be the mechanism, in the 
eyes of the governor’s advisers, through which social change might transpire. Civilization and 
settlement became “ultimately inseparable.”118 
The process of incorporating Māori through the regulation of Māori space was to be a 
mixture of both reactive and prescriptive forces. The government was able to outline a set of 
116 PP 1860 (492) Despatches Relative to the Management of Native Affairs, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to 
Right Honorable Sir E. Bulwer Lytton: Memorandum by Responsible Advisers on Native Affairs (September 29 
1858), 14 October 1858, 21. 
117 Ibid., 21. 
118 Ibid., 21. 
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requirements ostensibly guiding the incorporation of indigenous lands into the colonial system. 
Grey’s re-assertion of Crown operated to control and regulate in a settler frontier that was in 
danger of coming into open conflict with local Māori. Nevertheless, the control that the 
government was able to exercise only grew slowly with the long process of surveying grants, 
establishing reserves, and building infrastructure delayed by limited resources, Māori resistance, 
and confusion over who owned what land.  Despite finding that Māori were entitled to their 
lands, the appropriative potential of stronger government control accompanied expressions of 
land hunger characteristic of other colonial economies dependent upon pastoralism. 
Anxiety about control and authority over resources was tied-up with response to the 
activities of ambitious settler populations on the matter of land confiscation.  As it evolved, the 
government’s approach to Māori land tenure refused to acknowledge full individual or 
customary rights to the land. A bifurcated logic that utilized protectionist rhetoric positing the 
protective aspects Crown-controlled land sales and made claims to legal justification was 
subverted by the ability of the Māori to keep and use the lands that the Treaty had guaranteed to 
them. The issue of contested access rights to lands thus underpins the story of colonial New 
Zealand and situates it as a settler colonial space.  
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Chapter 5: A Shadow of Responsibility 
Humanitarian Governance at War (1860 - 1872) 
The outbreak of widespread, sustained, and intense armed conflict in the early 1860s 
transformed the relationship between Māori and the colonial state. While preceding decades had 
witnessed episodic violence, an atmosphere of imminent, erupting, or continuing crisis 
characteristic of the years following 1860 caused the colonial and British governments to 
reconsider practices of humanitarian governance. The period of warfare between 1860 and 1872, 
called the New Zealand Wars or the Maori Wars, underscored the centrality of land to colonial 
policy. Rebellion against the settler state, and the consequences of the military response to that 
challenge, shaped discussions about how humanitarian governance should be part of both 
punitive measures and reconciliatory strategies. 
A shift from pursuing policy goals through negotiation towards a slate of more directive 
administrative practices during 1860s allowed the government to set the terms and priorities of 
humanitarian governance with a degree of authority it had not before invoked. The combination 
of a significant imperial military presence in the colony and the effects of legislation passed by 
an increasingly authoritative representative government made conditions difficult for many 
Māori to maintain authority outside of the colonial government. In the aftermath of rebellion, 
officials and settlers saw large swathes of Māori as an unknowable threat, as a hindrance to 
colonial progress, or as latent menace. Once legitimized through the actions of a new judicial 
apparatus, land seizures in the aftermath of rebellion also impacted humanitarian governance by 
reframing native reserves as a paternalist trusteeship of Māori resources by the state. 
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Adding coercion or the threat of coercion to existing practices of negotiating for land 
allowed a sweeping scope of interventions focused on land ownership - a central concern of 
settler colonial societies. The acquisition of Māori land during these years went hand in hand 
with individualizing collective tenure and formed central features of colonial native policy 
between 1860 and 1872.1 Individualization was contingent upon the use of military force 
supporting a series of mass confiscations of land held by those Māori who took up arms against 
the colonial state. Following the end of hostilities, the colonial state was able to channel 
confiscated lands into a marketplace eager for land. 
Confiscation, in this context, intensified existing pressure to shift land ownership away 
from collective control and toward a contractual connection between a single person or small 
group of people and a designated plot. Rather than simply an effort to circumscribe Māori 
autonomy, limiting the ability of communal holding incentivized and at times compelled Māori 
to bring their land into circulation. With language promoting the agricultural potential of Māori, 
while underscoring the need to punish rebellious hapu and iwi, the colonial state argued 
increased availability of land would also be good for the colony’s economy and political 
stability. If the two decades following 1840 and the Treaty of Waitangi can be characterized by 
Europeans acquiring Māori land in a piecemeal fashion largely predicated on purchase 
agreements, then confiscations of the 1860s dramatically accelerated the pace at which Māori 
land came under control of the colonial state. 
On the North Island in particular, appeals from newspapers and municipal representatives 
to preserve the safety of settler and kūpapa2 communities, a desire to limit resources available to 
1 Richard Boast and Richard Hill, Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 
2009). 
2 Māori allied to the Crown 
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future rebels, and continuing pressure to provide land for European farmers and pastoralists 
combined to inform government practices targeting the ownership and stewardship of Māori 
land. Legislation regulating Māori land continued earlier government policies expressing 
amalgamation as a policy goal. Laws facilitating the disruption of collective tenure had the effect 
of disaggregating Māori communities.3 The restructuring of Māori patterns of land holding 
would, in the eyes of the colonial government, be justified by increased wealth and the adoption 
of European social and cultural forms stemming from implementing European modes of 
agriculture. Collective tenure had long frustrated both the government and settlers due to its 
perceived hindering of social and economic change. Confiscation and individualization created a 
means for the colonial government to accomplish that end. 
Individualization took legal form through decisions of the Native Land Court. Formed in 
1862 and further empowered in 1865, the court’s mandate was determining ownership and 
documenting possession of Māori land. The government intended individualization as a means to 
integrate Māori land, rather than labor, into a wider colonial economy through registering Māori 
claimants. Confirmed ownership would facilitate the ability of Māori to sell, lease, or transfer 
land. Another argument for individual tenure postulated that linking the prosperity of Māori 
proprietors closely to the success of the colonial state would secure the political loyalty of those 
landowners. Individualized landholding, therefore, became a cure for multiple ills by 
incorporating previously indigenous land and furthering a political goal of linking Māori success 
(or at least the success of individual proprietors) closely with the colonial state 
Enabling a wider degree of local government action in New Zealand was the 1863 
devolution of control over native affairs from the “home” government in London to the “local” 
3 “Native Reserves Amendment Act,” 9 September 1862, 26 Vict., c14 (New Zealand); “Native Lands Act,” 15 
September 1862, 26 Vict., c42 (New Zealand); “Native Lands Act,” 30 October 1864, 29 Vict., c71 (New Zealand). 
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government in New Zealand. As part of the 1856 Constitution Act, London had retained veto 
power over the colony’s indigenous policy. When London waived this right, the local 
government could adopt a more forceful line if it chose to do so. Shaping native policy in the 
1860s emerged from a feeling of insecurity toward continuing Māori resistance to the colonial 
government’s goal of individualized landholding, an enhanced capacity to exert military 
superiority, and an unhindered authority to legislate on native affairs. Consequently, the need to 
frame governance as humanitarian or conducted in the best interest of Māori was no longer an 
external requirement. Though outside obligations to practice humanitarian governance towards 
its indigenous subjects lapsed, the colonial government nevertheless continued to use 
humanitarian rhetoric to maintain the colony’s standing as a site of humane empire and to 
mollify defeated Māori who were still capable of disturbing New Zealand’s fragile peace. 
Though 1872 did not mark the end of Māori resistance to colonial rule, the assertion of 
military supremacy by the colonial government meant the state developed practices of 
humanitarian governance that aligned with its own goals of individualized tenure. An increased 
exposure of Māori to market forces, however, carried with it a heightened risk of dispossession. 
Land with an alienable title confirmed by the Native Land Court could be sold or mortgaged 
much easier than property held in common. An apprehension of possible penury motivated an 
increasingly paternalist gloss to humanitarianism. Paternalism, a form of humanitarian action 
based on the presumption of an incapacity or inability to act in their own best interest, shaped the 
development of a reinvigorated system of native reserves. Paternalist humanitarianism deployed 
a concept of care and precarity, an ethic of consequences, and handling of power to direct 
action.4  
4 Michael Barnett, Paternalism Beyond Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 12–18. 
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Through transferring reserved land into a trust, paternalism characterized a new system of 
native reserve administration that evolved in the 1870s. Invoking humanitarian language by 
articulating trusts as protecting Māori from the loss of land, the government’s reserve system 
prioritized the conveyance of Māori reserves into trusts overseen by the Native Reserve 
Commissioner. The seeming contradiction of needing to protect Māori from the forces that were 
putatively to bring about their prosperity suggests the government recognized the contradictions 
of their policy even as legislation pursued individual tenure as a policy goal. Visions of an easily 
integrated population did not align with Māori realities of refusing to sell land or wholeheartedly 
adopt European “civilization.”  The government’s approach to reserves, therefore, echoed larger 
policies of confiscation and individualization but unlike land brought before the Native Land 
Court reserves they did not have to be individualized. In contrast to the administrative techniques 
applied to native reserves developed in the 1840s that held out the possibility for Māori to largely 
control the uses thereof, by the 1870s native reserve policy derived from an ethos of a paternalist 
administration based on European trusteeship – and therefore control – of remaining reserve 
land. 
This chapter traces humanitarian governance through the tumultuous decade following 
military action at Waitara, a coastal settlement in Taranaki, and examines how changes in the 
structures of New Zealand’s native policy, the colonial legislature’s reaction to widespread 
armed conflict, and a shift in the relationship between New Zealand and Great Britain worked to 
accelerate a process of individualizing native title to land. Part of this process also shifted 
justifications of the administration of reserve land away from supporting Māori communities and 
toward individual responsibility for their economic and political futures. Two pieces of 
legislation in particular, the Settlements Act of 1863 authorizing confiscation and the Native 
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Lands Act of 1865 that established the Native Lands Court, were significant not only for their 
role in consolidating the political economic consequences of the “settler boom,” but also for their 
inclusion of humanitarian elements. The chapter concludes with the establishment of a new form 
of reserve administration in the late 1860s and early 1870s. This chapter shows how military 
conflict, colonial laws, and shifts in the nature of the relationship between an imperial center and 
a colonial periphery brought about the transformation of humanitarian governance to be a 
program tied closely to the priorities and position of the colonial state. 
Waitara and the Beginning of the New Zealand Wars 
Waitara, meaning “mountain stream,” sits on the west coast of the North Island where a 
river of the same name joins the Tasman Sea. With the volcanic cone of Mt. Egmont/Taranaki 
visible on a clear day and the province of Taranaki’s main European settlement at New Plymouth 
located ten miles to the south and west, Waitara was strategically located, contained rich soil, 
and possessed one of Taranaki’s few viable harbor sites. Historically home to the Te Āti Awa, to 
the north of Waitara lay the lands of the Ngāti Tama and beyond them the iwi of the Waikato. 
During the Musket Wars in the 1830s, these neighbors had invaded Taranaki and displaced many 
Te Āti Awa including those residing at Waitara. Consequently, many Te Āti Awa migrated to the 
southern end of the North Island in search of refuge. 
Between 1843 and 1845, the New Zealand Company, eager to acquire arable land near its 
settlement at New Plymouth, looked to purchase Waitara from the Waikato iwi who now 
claimed control of the land. The Company’s efforts were ultimately unsuccessful when George 
Clarke, the Protector of Aborigines, revealed to the governor that the Company had neglected to 
negotiate with Waitara’s Te Āti Awa claimants. Not wishing to disturb the peace, Governor 
231
FitzRoy forbade the sale. Three years later, in 1848, several hundred Te Āti Awa under Wiremu 
Kīngi Te Rangitāke returned to Waitara and established themselves on the north bank of the 
river. Soon thereafter, worried about a possible attack from Waikato Māori to the north, Te 
Rangitāke and his followers crossed over to the south side of the river and there joined other Te 
Āti Awa under Te Teira Mānuka. The displacements of the Musket Wars had created a situation 
in which competing claims to land had to be negotiated between different iwi. The resulting web 
of claims and counterclaims provided a means for iwi and hapu to gain government recognition 
of territory. Recognition of conquest or occupation could result in a legitimate claim to the land 
which entitled claimants to part of the purchase price. 
Waitara’s significance as a turning point in New Zealand history derives from its being 
the spark that began a decade-long period of warfare. Though Waitara was particular in that it 
marked a shift from largely peaceful to largely violent disagreement, the causes of the outbreak 
were decades in the making. Conflict that emerged from divergent and unresolved perspectives 
about land contested by iwi and hapu, argued about by European governors and settlers, and 
debated between Māori and European constituencies about who had the right to sell land and 
what entities were empowered to buy. Conflict at Waitara also stemmed from Māori frustration 
with what they saw as the failure of the colonial government to adhere to a program of 
humanitarian governance. By being unresponsive in the face of continued requests to intervene 
in episodes of inter-iwi violence and doing little to promote a program of intervention in areas of 
health and welfare, Taranaki Māori had little reason to believe the colonial government would 
pursue beneficial policies in the future. If the settler state only intervened in matters connected to 
the acquisition of land, claims by the government to pursue policies of humanitarian governance 
rang hollow in many Māori ears.  
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In March 1859, after twelve years living at Waitara, Te Teira met with Governor Thomas 
Gore Browne to discuss selling 600 acres to the government.5 Land transactions of this sort were 
common during the 1850s as growing settler demand for arable land pushed the colonial 
government to negotiate with Māori for blocks throughout the North Island. Compounding 
settlers’ frustration and heightening their demand was Taranaki’s relative paucity of land under 
European tenure. An 1861 survey of ownership in the North Island found Europeans controlling 
just under a quarter of the total landmass, but in Taranaki that figure was barely 2.5 percent, 
roughly 60,000 of the province’s 2.4 million acres.6 The speed of acquiring Māori land 
compared unfavorably, in settler eyes, with nearly universal European ownership of the South 
Island and upwards of sixty-percent possession in the North Island province of Hawke’s Bay. 
Aware of the growing clamor for land voiced by Taranaki settlers, Governor Browne 
welcomed Te Teira’s offer as an opportunity to acquire a fertile coastal tract that could easily be 
surveyed for settlement. Browne, however, declared his determination to only go through with 
the purchase if all parties holding an interest in the proposed sale gave their consent.7 The 
governor believed he occupied the ethical and legal high ground and that Te Teira had authority 
to sell the land. Browne decided to go ahead with the purchase despite objections made by Te 
Rangitāke about Te Teira’s lack of adequate standing to alienate the land.8 
Inconsistent protocols governing the purchase of Māori land, drawn-out processes of 
establishing title, and lingering contention about which groups had claims to what territory 
5 Parliamentary Papers of Great Britain [GBPP] 1861 (2798) Papers Relating to the Recent Disturbances in New 
Zealand, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, 29 March 1859, 1. 
6 GBPP 1862 (3040) Further Papers Relative to the Recent Disturbances in New Zealand, Map Showing … Ceded 
Lands, 5 April 1861, 40-43. 
7 GBPP 1861 (2798) Papers Relating to the Recent Disturbances in New Zealand, Governor Thomas Gore Browne 
to Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, 29 March 1859, 2. 
8 Kenton Storey, “Colonial Humanitarian? Thomas Gore Browne and the Taranaki War, 1860–61,” Journal of 
British Studies 53, no. 1 (2014): 129. GBPP 1861 (2798) Papers Relating to the Recent Disturbances in New 
Zealand, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, 29 March 1859, 2. 
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contributed to confusion about who had the authority to sell Waitara. This opacity made 
Governor Browne’s efforts more difficult and he wrote to London lamenting the variability of 
Māori practices pertaining to land transfer. Browne was frustrated that “the exception is wider 
than the rule” and the locus of authority was too variable since in “some tribes, the different 
hapus must be consulted, in others, the Chiefs.”9 Overlapping claims to land that evaded easy 
determination was a concern that had vexed hopeful purchasers since Europeans first sought to 
acquire land in New Zealand. 
Browne’s frustration, a recurring one for colonial administrators, was not only caused by 
debates internal to Māori communities about the scale and nature of selling land but also derived 
from a vacillating set of purchase policies undertaken by individual European purchasers, 
officials of entities like the New Zealand Company, and the colonial government. The 
government’s focus on pursuing a plan of consensual purchase changed dramatically following 
Waitara when compelled acquisition through confiscation became a keystone of government 
land policy. Browne, who stood strong in his conviction that the purchase offer was legitimate 
and based on precedent, was prepared to pursue a more forward policy that encountered an 
equally principled resistance by Māori. Waitara was the spark that brought the longstanding 
question of government authority to purchase land to a crisis moment and by incorporating overt 
violence required the colonial state to reconsider its commitment to and practices of 
humanitarian governance. 
On the other side of European frustration with a slow rate of land sale was mounting 
concern expressed by many North Island iwi about the rate at which land was passing from 
indigenous into European hands. By 1860, considering growing settler demand for land, Māori in 
9 Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives [AJHR] 1861, “Further Papers Relative to the Native 
Insurrection,” Session 1, E-01, Governor Thomas Gore Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 4 December 1860, 6. 
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the Waikato formed a coalition – the Land League - to try and stem the speed and scope of land 
sales and consolidate the locations in which Māori would sell land to Europeans. Though never 
as widespread in practice as colonial officials feared, the prospect of an active and organized 
effort to limit the supply of land concerned the government. The Land League also inspired 
Māori decrying the sale of Waitara. Further complicating matters was the overlap between the 
land league and a political movement, the Kīngitanga (the King Movement), favoring the 
establishment of a Māori monarch who could provide a rallying point for iwi who had otherwise 
antagonistic relationships with each other. 
In 1858, Kīngitanga supporters proclaimed the Waikato chief Pōtatau Te Wherowhero as 
the first Māori king. Though many Māori did not see Te Wherowhero’s position as incompatible 
with British sovereignty, the existence of a locus of sovereignty apart from the Crown caused 
alarm within the colonial government who saw Kīngitanga as a threat. Another source of distrust 
emerged in the early 1860s in the form of Pai Mārire, a spiritual movement that began in 
Taranaki.10 Pai Mārire espoused a fusion of Christian and Māori spirituality and promised 
deliverance from European colonization. Though the Land League, Kīngitanga, and Pai Mārire 
were not an organized and unified indigenous threat to the settler state, the specter of the 
potential fusion of a messianic threat to European sovereignty and economy in the colony 
concerned officials in the early 1860s. Anxiety about the colony’s future contributed to a 
heightened sense of concern and alarm about Waitara.11 
In justifying his approach to the “Taranaki Question,” referring to Waitara, Browne wrote 
to his London superiors that every land purchase in Taranaki for the previous fifteen years had 
10 Also called Hauhau 
11 Ann Parsonson, “The Pursuit of Mana,” in The Oxford History of New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 1981), 
140–67. 
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been based on the principle of negotiating with relevant hapus rather than larger iwi. He 
supported the right of hapu to sell land and in negotiating with Te Teira the governor had also 
consulted representatives from other Taranaki Māori - the Ngāti Tuaho, Ngāti Hinga, and the 
Puketapu branch of Ngāti Awa.12 During a second effort at purchasing Waitara in 1847, 
Governor Grey had balked at recognizing exclusive Ngāti Awa title over the district. Instead, 
Browne looked to designate native reserves as a way of allowing competing claims to be 
resolved within Māori communities rather than have the colonial state take a leading role. By 
paying for land and ensuring that “ample reserves [were] made for the resident and absentee 
Native claimants[,]” the state might avoid having to make a final decision regarding ownership 
and instead diffuse rival claims through granting a shared interest in the land.13 Politically, 
Browne was aligning his response with gubernatorial precedent. Referring to similar policies 
followed by Grey, Brown justified his creation of reserves as part of purchasing land as part of a 
longer tradition of land purchase. 
After paying a deposit of £100 pounds to Te Teira in February of 1860, the government 
went ahead with a survey of Waitara. Ngāti Awa loyal to Te Rangitake disrupted surveying work 
and later that month Governor Browne declared martial law throughout Taranaki.14 Tensions 
remained high and an armed skirmish in March marked a shift to overt violence. In 1860, the 
land at Waitara impacted by the sale was occupied by about 200 men, women, and children loyal 
to Te Rangitake who were forcibly removed by soldiers of the 65th Regiment. The soldiers then 
razed three of the four pās within the purchase area.15 Through a year of fighting, surveyors had 
12 AJHR 1861, “Further Papers Relative to the Native Insurrection,” Session 1, E-01, Governor Thomas Gore 
Browne to Duke of Newcastle, 4 December 1860, 6. 
13 Ibid., 24. 
14 GBPP 1861 (2798) Papers Relating to the Recent Disturbances in New Zealand, Proclamation of Martial Law, 22 
February 1860, 7. 
15 AJHR 1863, “Papers Relative to the Waitara,” Session 1, E-02, Memorandum from Governor Grey to the Native 
Minister, 17 April 1863, 6. 
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been able to complete their work under close military protection and by March 1861 the two 
sides had established an uneasy ceasefire. No European occupation of Waitara, however, could 
go forward in light of continued assertion by Te Rangitake that the sale of land was invalid. 
Arguments deployed in favor of the government pointed to the payment of a deposit and promise 
of further payment as allowing the legitimate occupation by settlers. Opposing voices claimed 
that the government had not completed its due diligence in resolving claims. Furthermore, by 
resorting to military force, Māori argued, the government deprived claimants of any possible 
means of redress and applied a blanket policy to all Māori even those who had been amenable to 
the sale. 
The destruction of Māori settlements constituted an un-nuanced response to resolving 
complicated networks of local land tenure. Removing whole communities, even if not large ones, 
from an area required categorical assertions of the entire group as “loyal” or “disloyal.” Warfare 
marked a change in how the government conceptualized Māori political participation toward 
more binary assessments of loyal or disloyal rather than remaining attuned to the diverse and 
frequently competing strains of opinion within the various scales of indigenous social 
organization. By forgoing a more graded policy in favor of a clear demonstration of power, the 
decision to deploy soldiers at Waitara frustrated many Taranaki iwi who saw the decision as rash 
and preemptory. In addition to characterizing the use of military force as disproportionate, 
Taranaki Māori made clear their frustration that after years of neglecting indigenous welfare and 
incidences of inter-iwi conflict, the government was only belatedly addressing Māori concerns. 
Māori were cognizant of the irony that it was only at the moment of trying to purchase land that 
the government showed an interest in the area.16 
16 GBPP 1864 (3277) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Minute by Governor George Grey, 22 
April 1863, 7. 
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Confusion persisted before and during the conflict about whether or not reserves were to 
be included within the planned sale. In an interview following the war with Francis Dillon Bell, 
the colony’s Native Minister, Te Teira mentioned that he had anticipated a 200-acre reserve 
would be established within the land offered for sale. Additionally, Te Teira mentioned that he 
had intended to exclude from the sale the four villages – Te Whanga, Te Kuikui, Hurirapa, and 
Herohia – cleared by British soldiers.17 Governor Grey, who had returned from the Cape Colony 
to succeed Browne and serve a second term as New Zealand’s governor, only came to know 
about the reserves in April 1863, years after the purchase was to have taken place and was 
surprised at the continued ambiguity about the purchase parameters. 
On further investigation, Bell could find no reference to a reserve within the deed of sale 
which struck him as odd since it was “almost invariable practice to name reserves in any deeds 
of sale.” 18 Robert Parris, the Assistant Native Secretary who had been active in negotiations to 
purchase Waitara since 1857, stated Te Teira had said nothing at the time of the original offer to 
show his intention of excepting the pās from it, and that Parris had never heard of an intended 
reserve of 200 acres.19 What the Government had promised, Parris wrote, was that Māori 
reserves would be made on the water frontage at a planned harbor development and the sites of 
the pās exchanged for town allotments that were anticipated to rise in value and receive some 
other land in lieu. The war, however, “had prevented any plan for the benefit of the Natives 
17 Ibid., 8; GBPP 1864 (3277) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Native Minister Francis Dillon 
Bell to Governor George Grey, 17 April 1863, 5. 
18 AJHR 1863, “Papers Relative to the Waitara,” Session 1, E-02, Memorandum from Governor George Grey to 
Native Minister Francis Dillon Bell, 17 April 1863, 6. 
19 GBPP 1864 (3277) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Minute by Governor George Grey, 22 
April 1863, 7. 
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being carried out.”20 Warfare complicated the development and implementation of humanitarian 
governance. 
That the colonial government did not seem to make more robust efforts to publicize or 
point to reserves during negotiations about Waitara is puzzling. If an unintentional oversight, the 
omission even for an important a bloc of land as Waitara speaks to the administrative neglect that 
the reserve system experienced during the 1850s. If it was an intentional omission the absence of 
reserves could speak to a shift in government policy away from reserves within land purchases 
and moving toward confiscation, a policy that would became codified as law in the mid 1860s. 
Confusion about the extent and placement of reserves thus contributed to the reticence of Māori 
to vacate the land. 
A turn to overtly coercive power by the colonial government reflected a hostility between 
European and Māori that was mapped onto grievances between particular iwi or hapu and 
colonial administrators. In an effort to soothe lingering tensions at Waitara, George Grey visited 
Taranaki in early 1863. There, he inquired into the possibility of going through with the sale and 
reported the high level of frustration still present in the province. Despite the violence of the 
previous year, the language of humanitarian governance and a perception of British 
administration as having to maintain a higher moral calling remained on the mind of the 
governor.  
In a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Grey wrote that many had “taken up 
[Waitara] as a question of race” with opinions favoring or disapproving the occupation largely 
20 AJHR 1863, “Papers Relative to the Waitara,” Session 1, E-02, Memorandum from Governor George Grey to 
Native Minister Francis Dillon Bell, 17 April 1863, 6. 
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falling along racial lines.21 Grey was also aware of the importance of his legacy and perceived 
the colonial governance of New Zealand as standing “at the bar of history” and that it was the 
colony’s “duty to set a good example for all time in such a most important affair.”22 The 
importance of governing from a principled stance, of being able to present a “good example” 
suggests the continued perception of New Zealand as a site of settler empire and that even in 
moments of crisis the importance of humanitarianism – or at least the rhetorical significance and 
power of humanitarian discourses – endured. 
While Grey personally thought Māori skepticism regarding Waitara was well justified, 
his observations about how Europeans and Māori reacted to Waitara reflect a growing 
atmosphere of hostility more symptomatically along racial lines rather than as an isolated 
grievance stemming from the colonial state’s effort to purchase Waitara from the Ngāti Awa. 
Grey’s suggestion that Māori were correct in their understanding about Waitara – that the 
colonial state had indeed not fulfilled its obligations - couched the government’s actions not as a 
retreat from a point of potential conflict but instead as s policy that cast the recognition of Māori 
authority as reflecting a heightened moral plane. In an act the governor hoped Māori would see 
as magnanimous and as a “good example,” by April 1863 the governor decided not to pursue the 
Waitara purchase and instead set aside the long-overdue reserves. 
The promised reserves for Waitara Māori, evidently unknown to the colonial executive 
until that month, were to contain 200 acres and land around the native villages. Additionally the 
government “publicly and clearly renounce[d] all right and title” to the land.23 In light of the 
21 AJHR 1863, “Papers Relative to the Waitara,” Session 1, E-02, Governor George Grey to the Duke of Newcastle, 
24 April 1863, 2. Though this was Grey’s evaluation of the situation at Waitara many Anglican clergy in New 
Zealand vocally opposed the Waitara purchase. 
22 Ibid., 2. 
23 GBPP 1864 (3277) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Memorandum by Governor George 
Grey, 19 April 1863, 6. 
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government’s failure to establish reserves, Grey recommended that the government forfeit the 
hundred pound deposit it had paid as compensation for destroying the Māori settlements.24 The 
commitment to admitting wrong and giving up title to the land worked to resolve a crisis the 
governor felt was both morally dubious and a conflict that the local administration could not win 
without alienating significant numbers of Māori. 
Confirming reserved land at Waitara as under the ownership of Taranaki Māori formed a 
concrete gesture of relinquishing the government’s claim to land. In addition to presenting his 
administration as one informed by higher principles, Grey was also of the position that the 
pursuit of a military solution would receive a cold welcome even from Māori loyal to the 
government. At Waitara, the colonial state’s reliance upon loyal Māori to supplement local 
colonial militia and professional soldiers would be impossible as “leading native after leading 
native had told the Governor that they will under no circumstances aid the Government in any 
attempt to hold the land at the Waitara[.]”25 Māori who stayed loyal, kūpapa, did so for strategic, 
economic, or political reasons and were central to the plans of the colonial government.26 
Waitara marked a turning point toward the use of a more coercive register of government 
strategies. Disputes between Māori and the government, within government and representative 
circles, and between Māori voices highlight that though Waitara marked the beginning of a new 
chapter in New Zealand history, it did not reduce New Zealand politics to a binary of European 
versus Māori. Nor did it mark the emergence of a robust and omnipotent colonial government. 
Ongoing negotiations between the regions and between the colonial and imperial governments 
24 GBPP 1864 (3277) Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of New Zealand, Minute by Governor Grey, 22 April 
1863, 9. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
26 James. Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict. (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 1986).  
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about expenditure and the goal of colonial governance meant that European voices were far from 
united.  
Even as settlers and officials of the settler state pushed strongly for a show of force and 
the pursuit of the Waitara purchase, the relative weakness of the colonial government and the 
importance of interpretation – a need to put on a show of principled governance rather than 
simply relying on armed violence – reveals continuities with earlier decades. Creating a reserve 
at Waitara, two-hundred acres set aside for Māori use, was one way of establishing the good faith 
of government and a commitment to maintain a form of Māori presence in New Zealand. That 
commitment would come under increasing pressure during the remainder of the decade as 
continued military conflict became a justification for the settler colonial government to pursue a 
policy of alienating Māori land. 
 
Māori Attitudes After Waitara 
Though lasting less than a year, armed conflict in Taranaki caused anxiety for colonial 
administrators. In addition to questions of land ownership, Māori also critiqued the inadequacy 
of their representation within the colonial legislature. To determine the impact conflict at 
Taranaki had caused among Māori and to gather information for the consideration of the 
government, the colonial government requested reports from local officers around the country 
about the state of Māori feeling at this time. 
Henry Halse, resident magistrate in the Waikato, wrote that “New Zealand for the New 
Zealanders” was a common refrain in light of what Waikato Māori perceived as the unmitigated 
influx of Europeans.27 H.T. Kemp, the District Commissioner in the Bay of Islands, noted Māori 
27 AJHR 1862, “Reports on the State of the Natives,” Session 1, E-07, Waikato: Henry Halse, 16 October 1861, 10. 
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in the north of the North Island were generally amenable to the government and that the Ngāpuhi 
would have helped put down any Waikato tribes that took up arms against the government.28 At 
Mongonui, near the far northern tip of New Zealand, the Resident Magistrate W. B. White 
characterized the local Rawa as loyal. White reported that the Rawa looked to the government 
not only as a source of protection from other Māori but also as a source of financial largess.29 
Herbert Wardell, writing from the Wairarapa, relayed that the Ngāti Kahungunu had consistently 
refused to alienate any land and were divided in their loyalties calling themselves “Queen’s” and 
“King’s” natives with the latter composing “violent nationalists” who “repudiate the obligations 
contracted by the Treaty of Waitangi.”30 Replies sent in from around New Zealand by 
interpreters, resident magistrates, and district revealed that Māori held range of grievances and 
range of reactions to events in Taranaki. 
Māori were not uniformly opposed to the structures of the settler state and made known 
their concerns about the uneven application of its power. While Māori attitudes toward the 
government represented a range of loyalties and positions, assessments of strengths, and 
histories, a near universal concern among North Island Māori was the imprecise, deferred, and 
confused capacity to secure title to land. Wairarapa Māori, for instance, shared a grievance with 
residents of Taranaki that expressed frustration with the government for not enforcing the law in 
their respective districts. Both loyal, “Queen’s” Māori, and those supporting the Kīngitanga 
movement in the Waikato, “King’s” Māori, complained to the local resident agent “that great 
delay takes place in surveying their Reserves, and in the completion of the purchase of lands 
28 Ibid., Bay of Islands: H. T. Kemp, 28 September 1861, 20. 
29 Ibid., Mongonui: W. B. White, 21 August 1861, 24. 
30 Ibid., Wairarapa to Turanga: H. S. Wardell, 23 August 1861, 31. 
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sold, by which they are kept in debt.”31 Secure title could establish Māori as landowners with the 
consequent broadening of their economic horizons. The deferral of that prospect caused 
widespread frustration. It was not necessarily the alienation of land per se that bothered 
Wairarapa Māori but rather the inability of the colonial state to determine and maintain property 
rights made use of their land (through rental, improvement or sale) difficult. 
Officials heard analogous set of grievances among nineteen hapu in the Wellington 
District who expressed concern about rental income from reserves assigned to their respective 
hapus. Instead of accumulating in nineteen separate accounts, the government was directing 
income sourced from the leases of reserves granted to particular tribes into a single account. 
Wellington hapu took exception to this conglomeration of resources since they did not 
conceptualize themselves as singular and unified. While wanting to preserve their own revenues 
the hapu were also troubled that “several years been paid into the account of the Commissioners 
of Native Reserves should be unaccounted for to them.”32 Māori inquired about how funds 
purported to be collected for their benefit were actually being distributed and advocated their 
perspective with the colonial government as active critics of the government’s capacity to 
effectively administer humanitarian governance. 
In contrast to the state of affairs characterized by lingering uncertainty on the North 
Island, reports from the South Island noted the relative success of native reserves there. In 
Canterbury, the 600 Ngāi Tahu resident in the province cultivated about 200 acres and raised 
cattle. Their reserves comprised nearly 7000 acres of “excellent quality” land of which a third 
31 AJHR 1862, “Reports on the State of the Natives,” Session 1, E-07, Wairarapa to Turanga: H. S. Wardell, 23 
August 1861, 32. 
32 Ibid., Wellington: E. Baker, 21 August 1861, 24. 
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was well-forested, a valuable asset given the scarcity of timber on the Canterbury Plains, with 
the total being valued at over £67,000.33 
Further south, in Otago, the Assistant Native Secretary Alfred Strode was happy to report 
the “satisfactory state of the Natives” who had not been impacted by events at Waitara “or any of 
the various questions which have of late years agitated the Native mind in the Northern Island” 
despite being visited by an emissary from the Kīngitanga seeking their support.34 Even after this 
representative had encouraged Otago Ngāi Tahu to join anti-government forces in the Waikato, 
Strode reported that ‘they steadily refused to do, declaring their loyal sentiments, and attachment 
to British authority.” 35 Strode also mentioned the participation of Otago’s civil society in 
promoting Māori education with work conducted by the Society for Elevating the Condition of 
the Natives.36 This organization supported a missionary teacher named Charles Baker who 
resided on the Native Reserve at the head of the Otago Harbor. His work included instructing 
Ngāi Tahu at the head of the harbor as well as travelling to other coastal districts.37 Collaboration 
with religious and civil bodies – especially in education – continued to be part of the colonial 
humanitarian governance. 
Several district officers pointed to the inclusion of Māori elites within the government as 
a measure that would promote loyalty to the state. In the Bay of Islands, Resident Magistrate H. 
T. Kemp thought a system of appointing members of the chiefly strata to local offices with a
stipend would invest Ngāpuhi elites in the project of administration. He noted that through these 
33 AJHR 1862, “Reports on the State of the Natives,” Session 1, E-07, Canterbury: Walter Buller, 19 September 
1861, 33. 
34 Ibid., Otago: A. C. Strode, 20 December 1861, 37. 
35 Ibid., Otago: A. C. Strode, 20 December 1861, 37. 
36 Angela Wanhalla has shown how native reserves in Otago were often sights of transgression and hardly formed 
hermetically sealed spaces. Angela Wanhalla, “My Piece of Land at Taieri.,” New Zealand Journal of History 41, 
no. 1 (2007): 45–61; Richard Hill, “Maori and State Policy,” in The New Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle 
Byrnes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 513–36. 
37 AJHR 1862, “Reports on the State of the Natives,” Session 1, E-07, Otago: A. C. Strode, 20 December 1861, 37. 
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means “their influence might be in a beneficial way kept up” with the added benefit that chiefs 
would be “personally interested in its continuance and success” and act to secure peace and 
portray the government in the role of a benefactor.38 A multifaceted approach to securing loyalty 
saw the government pursue land, education, and support traditional Māori social structures as a 
way of moving the government and Māori on friendly footings. 
Divergent experiences among North and South Island iwi reveals the divergent 
experience of Māori interactions with the colonial state. In contrast to Taranaki where settler 
demand for land brought about a violent conflict, in Otago where Europeans had already 
alienated land and demographic changes meant that the British population outnumbered local 
Ngai Tāhu, the efforts of humanitarian governance did not need to adopt a coercive approach. 
South Island Māori – though perhaps cognizant of the difficulties they would encounter if 
adopting armed resistance – found ways to work within the system.  
An example of pursuing legal claims through European courts came in the 1860s and 
concerned a lawsuit about ownership of a valuable plot of land, the Prince’s Street Reserve, in 
central Dunedin. John Topi Patuki, a Ngāi Tahu leader, petitioned the colonial government for 
£6,000 in lost rental income derived from the provincial government’s occupation of the 
reserve.39 Despite the concern of central government about a growing and consolidating negative 
attitude toward the government, attitudes among Māori were not uniformly hostile to the Crown 
in the aftermath of Waitara. Iwi and hapu in many regions of the country were frustrated by the 
absence of European governance, expressed of a desire to clear up discrepancies regarding land 
titles, and voiced a wish for a more developed system of education. 
38 AJHR 1862, “Reports on the State of the Natives,” Session 1, E-07, Bay of Islands: H. T. Kemp, 28 September 
1861, 20. 
39 AJHR 1868, “Further Despatches from the Governor of New Zealand,” Session 1, A-01, Petition of John Topi 
Patuki, 17 August 1867, 4. 
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Devolved Authority 
Preserving control over native affairs composed a critical feature of Britain’s grant of 
responsible government to New Zealand in the 1856 Constitution. A decision to maintain veto 
power stemmed from the British government’s assessment that the personal, economic, and 
political proximity of settler politicians to indigenous questions made it difficult for the latter to 
administer to the whole population rather than prioritizing the interests of European settlers. 
Following Waitara and considering persistent armed conflict over the rest of the decade, imperial 
bureaucrats grew increasingly skeptical of the colonial state’s ability to effectively administer 
New Zealand’s native affairs. 
The onset of military conflict and the consequent expense of sustaining troops in New 
Zealand entailed revisiting the relationship between the Colonial Office in London and the local 
administration. In 1862 and 1863, the home government granted further powers to the New 
Zealand government. The high costs of ongoing warfare, however, allowed London leverage 
over a colony still trying to find financial stability. Nevertheless, the devolution of authority 
represents an acknowledgement of the metropolis’s failure to secure the rights of New Zealand’s 
native peoples, a failure that military conflict brought into strong relief. 
During 1861 and 1862, as Governor Grey gathered information on the state of native 
affairs in the colony, he penned a series of dispatches expressing his wishes about the course the 
imperial government might pursue in terms of New Zealand’s indigenous peoples. Overall, Grey 
felt that the British government had not “fully realized the truly anomalous position of affairs” in 
New Zealand.40 Downplaying a perception of rampant chaos, the governor also expressed 
skepticism about the real power of the Māori king movement and instead identified a vacuum of 
40 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to Duke of Newcastle, 
October 15 1861, 14. 
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local control and absence of government institutions as the main source of trouble in the colony. 
What was “really wanted” in the Waikato, according to Grey, was the “establishment of law and 
order.”41 Fortunately for the British government, Grey also proposed himself as having the best 
solution. 
Continuing his focus on the formation and consolidation of institutions, Grey advocated 
dividing remaining Māori land in the North Island into twenty native districts overseen by a 
European commissioner, a clerk, an interpreter, and a surgeon. These officials would be assisted 
in their work by twelve local Māori also paid from colonial coffers. These councils, called 
district runangas, would have authority to pass regulations relating to local affairs including 
managing livestock, weed control, preventing cattle disease, and regulating the sale of alcohol.42 
Runangas were also to be invested with authority to inspect schools, maintain jails and hospitals, 
oversee road construction and be vested with “providing for the adjustment of disputed land 
boundaries of tribes, of hapus, or of individuals, and for deciding who may be the true owners of 
any native’s lands” and of recommending the terms on which grants of land might be issued.43 
Each runanga could also sell one farm to a pre-approved European settler as a way to “promote 
the welfare of the two races inhabiting this country, and to lead to a community of interests, and 
the frequent interchange of friendly officers, as well as with the view of fostering the 
development of the interior.”44 Through direct Māori involvement, district runangas had the 
potential to develop Māori loyalty to the colonial state while establishing or reinforcing 
41 Ibid., 14. 
42 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Enclosure in George Grey to Duke of Newcastle, 2 
November 1861, 16. 
43 Ibid., 17. 
44 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Enclosure in Governor George Grey to Duke of 
Newcastle, 2 November 1861, 16. The Purchaser would have to be resident and have a three-year probationary 
period after which they would receive a Crown grant for the land and ten years of conditions of not being absence 
for more than six weeks in the whole year. 
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government institutions. By including health and education, the development of Māori 
administrative capacity formed part of humanitarian governance’s interest in reducing precarity 
and establishing stability. 
These institutions would not come cheap. To fund the initial £49,000 required to build 
council houses and establish the infrastructure, Grey asked the imperial government to foot the 
bill. To address growing Māori skepticism about the forms and implementation of humanitarian 
governance, Grey advocated further devolution of powers from British to colonial governments. 
Local clerics supported the idea in principle, but advocated a more gradual integration of 
Europeans into Māori life rather than imposing an administrative structure from the top.45  
Grey argued that distributing the administration of native affairs accomplished two goals. 
First, recognizing the fractured nature of Māori politics, twenty runangas would allow 
regulations to be adapted to suit local contexts. Second, encouraging a pedagogical approach to 
governance would encourage Māori to actively adopt and generate ideas of constitution and 
administration within an indigenous framework based on English forms. Recognizing the 
difficulty of governing Māori as a single unit, and the strategic advantages provided by multiple 
sources of indigenous authority, Grey thought his system would “break the native population up 
into small portions, instead of teaching them to look to one powerful native Parliament as a 
means of legislating for the whole native population of this island.”46 He also thought runangas 
could accomplish the goal of amalgamating Māori land and labor into the colonial state without 
resorting to violence.47 By delegating power to local councils, the governor thought, Māori 
45 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Statement from the Responsible Ministry (William 
Fox), 1 November 1861, 21. 
46 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to the Duke of Newcastle, 
30 November 1861, 26. 
47 Ibid., 26. 
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communities would be less focused on the potential of a Māori king as a counterbalance to the 
colonial legislature. 
Given that there was no “paramount authority” among Māori, Grey thought any 
systematic attempt to end hostilities would be useless and instead advocated for negotiations 
with a range of Māori representatives. The governor observed that since large numbers of Māori 
who had never joined the Kīngitanga were interspersed with those who had it would be difficult 
to “separate them, or to attack one party without injuring the other.”48 Grey’s proposal echoes 
many of the themes he had put forward during his first term as governor that focused on using 
“English institutions” to bring Māori into European society. A dispersed mode of governance 
that divided Māori populations and shifted the locus of indigenous loyalties to the state would 
preclude violence and facilitate the peaceful, humanitarian administration of Māori and settler. 
If runangas addressed some of the governor’s concerns about how the local government 
administered Māori affairs, Grey also advocated structural shifts in the distribution of power 
between the imperial and the local governments. The position of native affairs as the exclusive 
purview of the governor and native minister meant policies affecting Māori were insulated from 
the responsible government. This separation, Grey argued, ran the risk of creating two sources of 
authority – a colonial one controlled by settlers and an imperial one controlled by the governor 
and the British government – that could potentially act at cross purposes with each other. Since 
the 1852 Constitution Act, gubernatorial convention had been to consult the responsible 
ministers in all decision making. Any attempt to set up either the governor or a special body as a 
“protective power” mediating between Māori concerns and the General Assembly, the governor 
feared, would prejudice Māori against the General Assembly. 
48 Ibid., 25. 
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Grey saw another disadvantage of making the governor chiefly responsible for native 
affairs because the arrangement connected the imperial government, instead of colonial 
representatives, with any decision to declare war. If ultimate responsibility for conflict lay with 
the governor and the Colonial Office, the governor thought it would be difficult to compel the 
General Assembly to pay for the costs of that war. Grey wrote that his proposal to empower the 
governor and General Assembly with authority over native affairs would make the latter more 
sensitive to any war which their acts would cause, a restraining force that might “indirectly prove 
a protection for native interests.”49 By making native policy a matter for public inquiry that 
would be publically censured or supported by the British government, Grey hoped granting the 
local government control over native affairs might advance policies or protections that were 
beneficial to Māori. 
Devolved power, organized through a model of local government institutions, framed 
humanitarian governance as pedagogical though in an increasingly paternalist light. The simple 
provision of land was not sufficient to ensure Māori loyalty to the colonial state. Māori, in 
Grey’s eyes, had to be invested in the success of the state and derive some share of “the dignity 
and emoluments which arise from holding office.”50 Though his second term as governor 
spanned the fiercest fighting of the New Zealand Wars, Grey did not wholeheartedly argue in 
favor of military conflict. He saw the power of investing and engaging Māori in a process of 
governance that included them but was still predicated on their integration into a system of 
administration from which they could derive some benefit. Practices of humanitarian governance 
in the 1860s became more strongly integrative and at the expense of previous strains of 
49 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to the Duke of Newcastle, 
30 November 1861, 27-28. 
50 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to the Duke of Newcastle, 
6 December 1861, 32. 
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humanitarian governance and isolation as avenues of protection. Grey, for instance, could have 
easily designated interior tracts as off limits to European settlement but his proposals to establish 
district runanga throughout remaining indigenous territory formed a model of gradual 
assimilation metered out in a structured fashion. 
Kīngitanga, to Grey, represented an effort to set up a focus of loyalty for Māori outside of 
the settler state. The governor thought Kīngitanga had about thirty-thousand adherents 
concentrated in the Waikato. Supporters of a Māori king would, in Grey’s vision, be happy to 
administer local laws if those laws were drafted and administered in consultation with 
indigenous authority. Though it threatened the stability of the colonial government the governor 
also thought the movement represented Māori “capacity for self-government, and their desire to 
see law and order established[.]”51 Grey also underscored the importance of carefully 
considering future land purchase and observed military incursions by the colonial state would be 
forcefully resisted.52  If institutions of local government could direct that energy into channels 
characterized by local administration, the power of the king movement, the governor hoped, 
would be superseded by the colonial state. Grey’s proposals echo attempts during his first term 
as governor to establish native districts in which customary law would apply. In this case, 
however success was measured by policies that integrated Māori into European institutions 
rather than let them develop autonomously. 
As Grey waited for a reply from the Colonial Office about his proposals, he addressed the 
Legislative Council in July of 1862. His speech highlighted the difficulty that Māori encountered 
in their land deals with the Crown, particularly when it came to “the administration of Native 
51 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Governor George Grey to the Duke of Newcastle, 
6 December 1861, 32. 
52 Ibid., 32. 
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reserves, the individualization of Native title, and the issue of crown grants to Natives.”53 
Legislative councilors wanted a solution that was financially and politically viable. Francis 
Dillon Bell, a fluent speaker of Māori and a veteran of many land deals, expressed that the 
representative government still held it “to be at once the interest and the duty of the colonists to 
preserve and civilize the Native people” and that the General Assembly should take all possible 
measures to speedily bring Māori “under British institutions.”54 A recurring conversation about 
the concentration of power in the hands of the colonial executive reveals that though the local 
legislature was divided about the form humanitarian governance would take at least some 
maintained a commitment to the continued presence and assimilation of the colony’s indigenous 
peoples. 
Grey received a reply to his letter from the Duke of Newcastle, Britain’s Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, on August 5th 1862.55 In his evaluation of native affairs in New Zealand, 
Newcastle observed that while he believed Grey to be personally aware and interested in the 
welfare of Māori, the efforts of the British government to keep control of native affairs had 
failed. In conceding the inability of the Colonial Office to protect the indigenous peoples of New 
Zealand, Newcastle thought it best to place the management of native affairs entirely in the 
hands of the colonial legislature rather than “retain a shadow of responsibility when the 
beneficial exercise of power ha[d] become impossible.”56 Contested claims to land, overlapping 
spheres of indigenous and European influence, loggerheads between the governor and the 
53 New Zealand. Legislative Council. 1862. Parliamentary Debates. 14 July 1862, 391. Governor’s Speech to the 
Legislative Council. 
54 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1862. Parliamentary Debates. 6 August 1862, 498. Francis Dillon Bell, 
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55 GBPP 1863 (467) Correspondence Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Government of New 
Zealand, Governor George Grey to the Duke of Newcastle, 9 August 1862, 27. 
56 GBPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Duke of Newcastle to Governor George Grey, 26 
May 1862, 80. 
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representative General Assembly had made intercessions by the British government on behalf of 
Māori mostly rhetorical. During a period when the colony was threatened by armed conflict, the 
Colonial Office thought it best for New Zealand to be fully responsible for its own actions. A 
hybrid exercise of government authority harmed rather than it helped. The transfer of authority 
from the British Colonial Office to the colonial General Assembly marked the end of an 
experiment in humanitarian governance from afar as a failure. 
The abdication of veto power, Newcastle concluded, was a “concession” and that the 
home government wanted to support “the important and hopeful attempt … to introduce such 
civilizing institutions among the native tribes” that would relieve New Zealand from the miseries 
of what he characterized as a civil war.57 Newcastle made clear, however, that New Zealand 
colonists were not putting in an “immediate, general, and lasting sacrifice.”58  Settlers relied 
instead on an annual expenditure of a half-million pounds charged against the home government. 
The admission of the British government’s failure to regulate and protect native interests in New 
Zealand was linked to an effort to instead provide financial support for humanitarian programs 
benefitting Māori. Since the establishment of British sovereignty in 1840 the geographic distance 
between the United Kingdom and New Zealand had made administering New Zealand during a 
time crisis a difficult proposition. Newcastle may well have apprehended the devolution of 
power would not be an unalloyed good for indigenous New Zealanders even if the oversight of 
Māori welfare created a burden the British government was no longer willing to bear. 
Considering rife unrest in New Zealand and the colony’s precarious financial position, 
Newcastle authorized New Zealand’s government to reclassify as “military contributions” all 
expenditure on “native purposes” that exceeded the existing £26,000 annual appropriation for 
57 Ibid., 81. 
58 Ibid., 79. 
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native purposes.59 This slight of actuarial hand allowed money spent on native affairs to count 
toward what the colony owed the British government as payment for the stationing of imperial 
troops in New Zealand. Newcastle’s offer provided a temporary three-year bridge allowing the 
finances of the colony to recover, provide funds for Grey’s proposals, incentivize expenditure on 
native affairs, and hold the local government more responsible for its financial outlays. Governor 
Grey, confident in his knowledge of his government and the native and European residents of 
New Zealand, moved quickly to implement his proposals.60 
One of the interventions Grey wanted to make in the administration of humanitarian 
governance concerned native reserves. In September 1862, the governor approved an act vesting 
the powers of the Commissioners of Native Reserves, then held by local officials as part of their 
other portfolios, to the governor.61 With the passage of a Native Reserves Amendment Act the 
governor could issue “grants, leases, licenses, and other instruments of disposition of land” in a 
way that he saw fit. This legislation allowed the governor to issue land directly to Māori as a 
reserve rather than relying on the representative General Assembly to do so.62 The text of the 
Native Reserves Amendment Act had been introduced only the previous month and occasioned 
little debate from either the House of Representatives or the Legislative Council, and went from 
proposal to law in less than two weeks.63 Though not accompanied by lengthy prescriptions 
about how reserves created by gubernatorial fiat should be used, the lack of debate suggests that 
both chambers of the settler legislature were comfortable with locating this aspect of 
59 BPP 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Duke of Newcastle to Governor George Grey, 26 
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humanitarian governance in the hands of the executive. A streamlined and efficient system for 
administering reserves posed little threat of disruption to the status quo while promising support 
for the governor’s anticipated runangas. Late 1862 was also a moment between the stalemate of 
Waitara and before the outbreak of violence in Waikato, so it was possible to conceptualize plans 
during an uneasy peace. 
In the last week of its 1862 session, the House of Representatives was still uneasy about 
the Duke of Newcastle’s instruction that the local government would take full responsibility for 
governing New Zealand’s indigenous peoples.64 Expressing concern at the additional expense 
governance entailed, in a petition to Queen Victoria the House of Representatives also claimed 
the British government’s vacillation had been the root cause of much turmoil. Native policy, the 
petition went on to argue, was also a matter for an imperial audience. The “duty of educating, 
civilising, and governing” Māori was a burden to be carried by the whole empire rather than “be 
wholly charged upon the European inhabitants” of New Zealand.65 The petition asserted that 
native affairs had been under the control of the governor and the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies since 1840. Consequently, this state of affairs meant the “settlers, as a body, seem to 
have been viewed as objects of suspicion and distrust, to preserve the natives from whom, it was 
necessary to pass peculiar enactments, and to establish especial protectorates.”66 In categorizing 
the current warfare in New Zealand as a question for a wider imperial world, rather than as a 
purely local concern, the House of Representatives opined that without support from Britain 
conflict could lead to the abandonment of those districts that that could not be controlled. A lack 
64 New Zealand. House of Representatives. 1862. Parliamentary Debates. 13 September 1862, 723.  Address to Her 
Majesty. 
65 GBPP 1864 (177) Correspondence Relating to the Abandonment of Imperial Control, Memorial from the House 
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of control meant Māori would be left to their own devices or the country would instead descend 
into a “guerilla war and become a life and death struggle of races.”67 Invoking financial 
arguments, the legacy of humanitarian governance, and a fear of racial violence, the petition 
pursued a broad range of strategies arguing for Britain’s continued support. 
The House of Representative’s petition also noted Governor Grey did not obtain the 
consent of the General Assembly when he accepted an increased level of responsibility on the 
colony’s behalf. Furthermore, political conditions prevailing in New Zealand precluded the local 
government from being able to fulfil its obligations to both Māori and European. Given what 
they saw as an impossible task the settler legislators thought the “honour of your Majesty’s 
throne, and the interests of humanity” alike precluded them from accepting the imposed task. 
Even during a period of armed conflict, humanitarian language remained present in arguments 
made by both settler legislators and colonial governors. Humanitarianism became about 
protecting Māori (and settlers) from abandonment or becoming decimated through violence 
rather than inspiring a progressive trajectory. War, and the threat of systemic warfare, reframed 
the terms on which humanitarianism could proceed.68 
The Legislative Council joined the lower House in petitioning Queen Victoria. While 
they concurred that the previous system of government vis-à-vis the native peoples had been a 
failure, the upper chamber identified the cause of the failures as stemming from the local 
government’s lack of control. As an example they pointed to the imperial government’s 
disallowing the Native Territorial Rights Act (discussed in the previous chapter).69 The 
67 Ibid., 4. 
68 Ibid., 4. 
69 GBPP 1864 (177) Correspondence Relating to the Abandonment of Imperial Control, Memorial from the House 
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councilors house thought the devolution of administrative responsibility would be more 
appropriate once the colony was at peace. During wartime, the capacity for a young colony to 
educate, govern, and “civilize” the natives was limited. Thus, it would be both “unfair” to the 
Colonists and “productive of ruinous consequences to the Maories [sic]” for the colonial 
government to assume that responsibility.70 Warfare and political instability could be used 
flexibly by settler representatives as both a reason for informed and responsive local control 
during a period of crisis but requiring the financial and military support from the United 
Kingdom. Settler representatives wanted both local autonomy and the financial and martial 
guarantee provided by a global empire. 
 The Duke of Newcastle received these petitions in January and the following month 
penned his reply. Referring to the “two great questions at issue between the Home and Colonial 
Governments – who shall govern the natives, and who shall pay the expense of governing them,” 
the Duke discussed the relative burden of wars waged largely for the advantage of local settlers 
but paid for by the imperial government. 71 Since Britain was shouldering the full cost of the 
military stationed in New Zealand, Newcastle wrote that the imperial government should be 
allowed “paramount control over the causes of which these wars were always liable to arise – 
that is, over Native Affairs.”72 The duke’s reply also took time to observe that settler accusations 
of imperial abandonment were hard to sustain in light of the sustained British military presence 
in New Zealand and the hundreds of thousands of pounds expended on the colony’s behalf. 
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Furthermore, the legacy of humanitarian governance had been a successful one. 
Successive governors and officers of the Native Department had helped create a system whereby 
“the Maories have made advances in intelligence and civilisation unparalleled in the history of 
uncivilized tribes.”73 Newcastle gave much credit to ministers and teachers, but thought that 
some of the success was a “system of Imperial trusteeship, which before the year [of the New 
Zealand Constitution being passed in] 1856, was real and effective” and that the duty of 
subjecting Māori to foreign law lay with those who had moved there and not with the country 
from which they emigrated. Newcastle suggested it might not be prudent to abandon efforts to 
impose European authority in native districts and that the decision to fully abandon imperial 
government still stood.74 On the topic of New Zealand’s wars, disagreement about the purpose of 
empire and the responsibilities of imperial rule invoked both financial and moral questions with 
the final decision reflecting a sense that the colonists had to make the best of the situation they 
had created. 
The humanitarian legacy of New Zealand’s annexation was a strong enough reason to 
maintain a robust British presence in the colony despite devolving self-governance to settlers. 
London was willing to support a large degree of expenditure in New Zealand based on the 
premise that by annexing New Zealand the British Empire had 
become bound to secure to the utmost of its power that the rights thus obtained [through 
responsible government] should not be used (as they have been elsewhere) to the injury 
of the natives. The Home Government has therefore been anxious to preserve an 
effectual authority in the management of native affairs, either until the amalgamation 
of races had proceeded so far as to break down the sharp division of colour which at 
present exists, or until a system of government had taken root in the Colony which, by 
assigning to the Maories some recognized constitutional position, would furnish some 
73 Ibid., 15. 
74 Ibid., 15. 
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guarantees against oppressive treatment of the less educated race, and would thus at 
once satisfy and protect them.75 
The influence of the humanitarian vision that had inspired New Zealand’s colonization continued 
as a motivating force for treating the colony with largess. Newcastle’s focus on protection and 
the prevention of injury restates the enduring perception of indigenous communities as in need of 
protection from settler populations empowered with responsible government. While Britain 
maintained a supervisory role, the duty to “civilize and control” was the responsibility of the 
colonists who were interested in promoting order and prosperity. The colonists’ duty, in the eyes 
of the British government, was to use their power to further institutions that would achieve 
amalgamation or prevent oppressive treatment through legislation and taxation. 
Newcastle characterized the existing system as a “failure” and placed blame squarely on 
the shoulders of the colonists themselves – stemming “from the inadequacy of those powers 
[exercised by the home government], and the refusal of the colonial community to confer, or 
submit to them” even though the Duke admitted the local government’s refusal to do more for 
Maori was perfectly constitutional.76 Newcastle also noted that the insistent pressure from the 
responsible government and the policies pursued especially at Waitara was “adopted at the 
advice not of the Native Department, but of the Executive Council.” 77 Responsibility for the 
decision to pursue an armed response and the choice to begin martial law, therefore, was 
promulgated by the settler government and not Governor Browne. The use of force, Newcastle 
wrote, was “in a direction opposite to that which a purely Imperial policy would have 
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dictated.”78 New Zealand’s responsible government pursued a course of action that, while legal, 
ran counter to principles of humanitarian governance as understood by the British government. 
Granting authority over native affairs to the settler legislature acknowledged the difficulties of 
administering humanitarian governance from afar. 
Growing incompatibility between the actions of the local government and the prospect of 
the British government having to foot the bill confirmed the Colonial Office’s decision to fully 
devolve responsibility in native affairs. Bureaucrats in London understood the policies of New 
Zealand’s representative government as, if not inimical to the amalgamation or constitutional 
protection of Māori, then at least not actively forwarding a vision of humanitarian protection. By 
reformulating the British government’s encouragement of humanitarian governance in New 
Zealand as a financial incentive rather than through formal political control, the Colonial Office 
hoped the power of the purse would be more effective than a veto power in realizing practices of 
humanitarian governance. The Secretary of State for the Colonies informed Grey that while he 
could now work with responsible ministers without oversight from London, he should still use 
the negative powers of his office, indeed was bound by them, to prevent any step “marked by 
evident injustice towards Her Majesty's subjects of the native race” and in decision-making could 
also work with the officer commanding British troops as a way to direct policy.79 
The British government’s devolution of authority over native affairs to New Zealand’s 
representative institutions originated from frustration with London’s ineffectual oversight of any 
substantial form of humanitarian governance. Devolution, in this case, was an admission of 
failure that sought to firmly establish responsibility for ongoing and expensive armed conflict 
78 GBPP 1864 (177) Correspondence Relating to the Abandonment of Imperial Control, Duke of Newcastle to 
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with the settler legislature. Transferring native policy out of the hands of the home government 
reflected the acknowledgement of the Britain’s failure to act as a successful interlocutor on 
behalf of indigenous Māori. Personal confidence in Governor Grey’s attitude toward Māori 
allowed the Colonial Secretary to hand off responsibility, but removing the counterweight of 
having native affairs remain the ring-fenced responsibility of the executive meant that colonial 
legislators could pursue a wider range of action. 
Grey’s efforts to devolve authority to Māori institutions sought to draw on and channel 
Māori enthusiasm into forms productive for the future success of the colonial state. Control over 
the distribution and ownership of Māori lands would not ultimately vest in a predominantly 
Māori runanga but instead became part of the Native Land Court. Like Grey’s earlier proposals 
for Native Districts as a form of tutelary humanitarianism that would enable Māori to develop 
elements of civilization so too did the runanga plan never come to fruition as New Zealand 
entered a period of sustained conflict. 
Confiscation, the Land Court, and Humanitarian Governance at War 
In the uneasy period of calm that followed the conflict at Waitara, both Māori and settler 
communities were divided about what course of action to pursue. Rewi Maniapoto, a member of 
the Kīngitanga and a Ngāti Maniapoto rangatira80 advocated confrontation. Maniapoto saw 
continued road building by Europeans and deployment of armored steamers on the crucial transit 
artery of the Waikato River as aggressive. Counselling peace, Wiremu Tamihana, a Ngāti Hauā 
rangatira, advised both Māori and European politicians that the Kīngitanga was not necessarily a 
80 Chieftan 
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threat to the colonial state and that the two communities did not need to go to war to resolve their 
disputes. 
Conflict over the government’s Waitara purchase had ended in a stalemate with little 
done to resolve underlying concerns about land alienation. Te Āti Awa accepted peace on the 
condition that the Waitara purchase would be further investigated and the Waikato iwi who had 
joined the fight against the colonial government returned northward accepting neither the 
sovereignty of the Queen nor restoring goods taken from Taranaki’s European settlers. Tensions 
about how to proceed continued unresolved as the General Assembly, governor, and Colonial 
Office debated how to adapt their policies to reflect the possibility of further violence. 
Sharpening the concern of local officials was the strengthening of Kīngitanga, Pai 
Mārire/Hauhau, and the Land League within Māori communities that featured deliverance from 
colonial rule. 
Land formed a focus point for disagreements about economic access and political 
management. Some of these disagreements, notably at Wairau in 1845, had also ended in 
violence but the mid-1860s saw an increase in the scale and intensity of warfare. Lingering 
instability after Waitara next erupted into armed conflict in the Waikato, a fertile area between 
Auckland and Taranaki, home to some of the most populous regions of Māori settlement, and 
residence of the Māori King. The Waitara (1862) and Waikato (1863-64) campaigns 
contextualized and motivated a series of legislative interventions authorizing the confiscation of 
Māori land. These acts, passed while the colony was grappling with war, established a model of 
individualized tenure as the main goal of native administration.81  
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On May 4 1863, the same week as Governor Grey agreed to give up the effort to 
purchase Waitara, a group of Ngāti Ruanui ambushed and killed eight European soldiers at 
Oakura, a settlement in Taranaki. Their deaths sparked outrage amongst the settler population 
and in July 1863 Governor Grey issued an ultimatum to the Waikato Māori requiring they swear 
allegiance to Queen Victoria. Receiving no response, Grey then ordered Lieutenant General 
Duncan Alexander Cameron to lead his soldiers into the Waikato and thereby cross an autaki 
(ceremonial border) into lands loyal to the Māori King. The invasion of the Waikato marked the 
beginning of a period of warfare that ranged widely over the North Island until May of 1872 and 
provided the most serious challenge to European colonial rule in New Zealand.82 
The local government, supported by troops from the United Kingdom who had been sent 
to support colonial forces in Waitara, worked to suppress the insurrection. Uneven terrain, the 
superior capacity of Māori to fight in forested terrain, and the advanced defensive works of 
fortified pas made military progress difficult. British and colonial soldiers experienced 
significant setbacks though Governor Grey, eager to represent a feeling of strength, wrote 
favorable reports to his superiors in London.83 
In October 1863, amidst the first year of war in the Waikato, the General Assembly took 
a significant step forward with land confiscation. Two bills, passed as the Suppression of 
Rebellion Act and the Settlements Act, authorized extraordinary powers during a time of war.84 
The Suppression of Rebellion Act gave the governor broad authority to pursue “vigorous and 
effectual measures for suppressing the said rebellion” that could not be questioned in any court.85 
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Empowering the governor with a broad swathe of responsibilities that were not subject to judicial 
review suggests that the General Assembly perceived warfare as not simply an imagined threat 
but one that posed real peril to the colonial state and required a robust response. 
Passed the same day as the Suppression of Rebellion Act, the Settlements Act created a 
mechanism for confiscating land. This act originated from an understanding that ongoing Māori 
insurrection required the government to establish “permanent protection and security,” work to 
ensure the “prevention of future insurrection,” and for the “establishment [of] … Law and Order 
throughout the Colony.”86 To realize these goals, the colonial legislature empowered the 
governor to declare areas in which he could “take any land within such district” to open for 
settlement. Seizure, rather than having to negotiate for land, both punished rebel Māori and 
provided a quick way to make more land available for settlement. The government would offer 
compensation for land taken, but no payments would be made to those who had rebelled since 
January 1, 1863 or to anybody who “aided, assisted, or comforted” any such rebel or even 
“counseled, advised, induced, enticed, persuaded, or conspired … to make or levy war.”87 
Failure to hand over weapons upon request and not showing up before a magistrate when 
summoned were also grounds for forfeiting compensation. Land taken under the auspices of the 
act could then be given to soldiers with the remaining balance of land authorized to be laid out 
into town, suburban, and rural sections and sold to willing buyers. Unlike previous government 
policies containing some measure of reserving land for Māori use, no such guidelines for making 
reserves within confiscated land appear within the Settlements Act. Rebellion made Māori 
unfitting subjects of humanitarian governance. 
86 “New Zealand Settlements Act,” 3 December 1863, 27 Vict., c8. (New Zealand). 
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When British and colonial troops crossed into Waikato in July of 1863, the majority of 
the North Island was still under Māori title. The Waikato, with its eponymous navigable river, 
rich alluvial soil, and proximity to Auckland was especially attractive as a buffer insulating the 
colony’s largest city from Māori districts. By categorizing Māori in arms against the Crown as 
“rebels” and sanctioning the seizure of their land and its redistribution, policy toward Maori 
acquired an overtly coercive aspect. Without much pretense of humanitarianism, the use of a 
combined force of British and colonial soldiers, alongside legal interventions allowed by the 
devolution of native affairs, accelerated the process of shifting customary tenure based on 
collective ownership to freehold grant governed by English common law. 
The most intense fighting in the Waikato was over by April 1864. Localized conflict, 
however, continued for the next eight years. Following the end of major hostilities, the colonial 
government faced a dilemma about how to behave in victory. A desire to preclude future 
rebellion by disrupting Māori economic and military strength had to be weighed against the risk 
of excessive penalties resulting in the alienation of all Māori from the colonial state. The divided 
loyalties of iwi during the fighting and overlapping patterns of land ownership meant that a 
simple territorial annexation of exclusively rebel land was not feasible. The government decided 
to pursue a policy of land confiscation, raupatu, with total seizures amounting to more than 3.2 
million hectares. Some confiscated land was ultimately returned to rebel Māori while other 
sections were awarded to loyal Māori or made their way into settler hands. Confiscations 
occurred in three large areas: coastal Taranaki, the Lower Waikato, the Bay of Plenty, and 
Hawke’s Bay. These locations were chosen for their fertility and suitability for settlement rather 
than a close connection with rebellious or disloyal communities. Ngāti Maniapoto, the iwi of 
Rewi Maniapoto who had supported the use of arms, lost none of their rugged hills and forested 
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lands.88 Individualizing land was intertwined with warfare and the widened scope of 
interventions allowed during a time of military crisis. Confiscated Maori land sold to settlers 
financed the wars waged against those Māori. Indigenous land paid for its own colonization and 
settlement.89 
Consolidating confiscations made during the Waikato campaign was the creation of 
Native Land Court empowered to supervise and ascertain title to land. The topic of an extensive 
historiography in its own right, the Native Land Court formed part of the legal infrastructure for 
the rapid diminution of Māori territory. The court’s remit was to determine the ownership of land 
still subject to Māori proprietorship and “to encourage the extinction of such proprietary 
customs” by converting indigenous title into Crown titles with clear mechanisms for determining 
ownership and inheritance.90 The establishment of the Native Land Court enshrined a conception 
of land ownership that was based on the individual ownership of land. The Court implemented 
an assumption that patterns of collective Māori ownership no longer had a place within New 
Zealand’s political economy. 
The Native Land Court formed the central mechanism through which large areas of 
Māori land became individualized. Constituted by appointed European judges and Māori 
assessors, any one judge and two assessors could make decisions. Any Māori could make a claim 
before the court requesting the investigation of title and the subsequent issuing of a certificate in 
their favor. Up to ten individuals could be listed on a title claim and the extent of each claim was 
limited to five-thousand acres. All claims also had to be surveyed, an expensive process, and the 
terms of any grant were subject to conditions imposed by the governor. Tribes or sections of a 
88 Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003), 216. 
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tribe could also apply to have a dividing line drawn between their claims, which the court could 
investigate if the Governor-in-Council determined that no political difficulties would arise out of 
such an investigation. The structure of the Native Land Courts and the limitations on the number 
of claimants endeavored to simplify land ownership but often overlooked or oversimplified the 
complex relationships of Māori tenure.91  
The governor could also compel the responding tribe to accept the order. Once in receipt 
of a title issued by the Native Land Court, the title-holder could receive unencumbered title to 
the land and effectively remove any legacy of indigenous claim or ownership thereof.92 Though 
the court’s focus was on individualizing title to facilitate its sale to settlers, Māori made frequent 
use of the court over the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a way to bring land up for sale and to 
prove the validity of their claims to land over rivals.93  
The 1865 Native Lands Act made no reference to reserves or any interest in having the 
land be earmarked for the support of humanitarian institutions. Clauses allowing the governor to 
put conditions on alienability, or determining how the land might be conveyed, retained a 
measure of possible protection by controlling the possibilities of fraudulent sale. A degree of 
security was also established through regulating that every conveyance or other signing away of 
property “made by a Native to a person of European race or to another native shall be interpreted 
to the conveyor … and shall be executed by him in the presence of a Judge or Justice of the 
Peace” as a provision for preventing fraud and ensuring accurate translations.94 Furthermore, to 
capture revenue, a ten-percent fee was to be paid to the local government upon the initial sale of 
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each plot of land. This fee directed a substantial revenue stream into colonial coffers. Though the 
fee was to be paid to the government, the legislation did not earmark those funds for native 
purposes. By treating land as a contractual exchange, the social purposes of reserves as a buttress 
to Māori institutions or the provision of payment as compensation for land taken by the 
government disappeared.  
The absence of setting aside a tenth of purchased land for the benefit of Māori, like the 
program implemented by the New Zealand Company, suggests that a spatial component of 
humanitarian governance was no longer prioritized as part of the colonial administration. The 
historian Alan Ward has used the term “pseudo-individualism” to describe the outcome of the 
proceedings of the 1865 Native Lands Act. He notes the court’s failure to either provide either 
genuine tribal title or secure individual land holdings complicated government efforts to locate 
Māori individual title.95  Furthermore, land confiscations often only made a pretext of punishing 
rebels with arable non-rebel areas retained by the Crown for purposes of settlement. 
Individualization was not inherently alien to Māori goals or aspirations but the 
confiscation policy and implementation of the Land Court prioritized settler concerns and 
timetables. In the early 1860s, a district magistrate in the North Island reported that he had been  
“preparing the Natives to consider the propriety of individualizing their lands; but the subject is 
so mixed up as a tribal and hapu right, that very few can be got to acknowledge that it is possible, 
though admitting its desirability.”96 At Kaiapoi, on the South Island, where individualization had 
been largely successful, Walter Buller observed in the early 1860s that Ngāi Tahu were “fully 
alive to the advantages to be secured by the individualization of their Reserves [and] they have 
already given evidence, in their increased industry and eager desire for improvement, to warrant 
95 Ward, A Show of Justice: Racial “Amalgamation” in Nineteenth Century New Zealand, 267. 
96 AJHR 1862, “Reports on the State of the Natives,” Session 1, E-07, Mongonui: W. B. White, 21 August 1861, 24. 
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the belief that their admission to individual freehold tenure will lead to a most important change 
in their social condition.”97 Directing questions to land title through the Native Land Court could 
frustrate both Māori and colonial officials. At a meeting at Kokohinau, in the Waikato, a dispute 
between the boundaries of land held by Ngāti Pukeko and Ngāti Awa was unsatisfactorily 
received by the former and resulted in a petition to Parliament rather than be mediated by the 
local resident magistrate.98 The fusion of confiscation and individualization made the latter a 
coercive undertaking while the operation of the Native Land Court precluded other possible 
arrangements for land ownership. 
Following an uneasy peace established in 1868 between rebel groups in the Waikato and 
the colonial government, a new governor, George Bowen, observed continuing divisions 
between the European and Māori populations. Like previous governors Bowen requested 
information on the state of Māori from resident magistrates and officials from across the North 
Island to help him gain a sense of the country’s political situation. The relatively calm portrayal 
they returned presented a less anxious impression of indigenous affairs on the local level than 
that presented by the colonial government to London. Their reports reflected that the violence of 
the 1860s represented a fractured and internally divided colony. In contrast to letters from the 
Wellington Premier Issac Featherston who felt that his part of the colony was on the brink of 
collapse, officials in places as far afield at the Bay of Islands and Taranaki described a largely 
war-weary population with the dangers of Hauhau on the decline and Māori ready to embrace the 
modes of the Land Court. Following almost a decade of warfare and the prospect of a wary 
97 Ibid., Canterbury: Walter Buller, 19 September 1861, 33. 
98 AJHR 1872, “Reports on Settlement of Confiscated Lands,” Session 1, C-04, J. A. Wilson to Native Minister 
Donald McLean, 29 March 1872, 5. 
270
peace, the colonial government once again turned to the question of how to administer native 
reserves. 
Heaphy’s Reports: Consolidating Reserve Administration 
Following the Native Land Court’s establishment, in the aftermath of extensive 
confiscation of Māori land across the North Island, and reflecting renewed interest in Native 
Reserves among members of the General Assembly, the end of widespread hostilities allowed 
the government to reconsider the humanitarian nature of its interactions with Māori. In October 
of 1869, Donald McLean, who as the colony’s Native Secretary was responsible for policy 
decisions relating to Māori, wrote to Major Charles Heaphy, a member of the House of 
Representatives, following up on an earlier conversation regarding the state of Māori affairs in 
New Zealand. McLean’s letter announced Heaphy’s selection as the colony’s Commissioner of 
Native Reserves.99 The years of conflict and growing power of the settler administration had 
transpired without the appointment of a commissioner or any staff dedicated to overseeing 
reserves.100 Heaphy’s appointment marked the first concentrated effort since the 1850s at 
centralizing the management of lands held in some type of trust for Māori. 
The conflicts of the 1860s, in which Heaphy had fought and received Britain’s highest 
award for military bravery, revealed in a stark fashion the lengths to which Māori and settler 
would go to retain or acquire land. In the aftermath of victory, Heaphy was attuned to the 
sensitive question of how to manage an accelerated and intensified individualization and 
alienation of indigenous land. Disruptions and displacement due to the war meant a clarified 
policy of land tenure was central to the colonial government’s efforts to bring about stability and 
99 AJHR 1870, “Papers Relating to Major Heaphy’s Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, 
D-16, Donald McLean to Charles Heaphy, 13 October 1869, 3. An 1862 act of the General Assembly had vested the
Governor with authority over the reserves.
100 “Native Reserves Act Amendment Act,” September 9 1862, 26 Vict., c.14 (New Zealand)
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make Māori land subject to European title. If military victory made such a conversion possible, 
the government nevertheless had to remain sensitive to potential Māori displeasure. 
Organizationally, the office of commissioner consolidated what had been a distributed 
model of reserves administration undertaken by resident magistrates at the provincial level. 
Heaphy, receiving a salary of 600 pounds for his efforts, was charged with classifying all the 
various reserves “with a view to the most efficient management of the estates for the future.”101 
Since 1840, the New Zealand Company, the governor, individual Māori, missionary groups, 
surveyors, and the General Assembly had all created reserved space for Māori but without, 
following much of an overall management plan. These lands fell into three broad categories 
derived from the degree of responsibility attached to the government in their operation. The first, 
and oldest, reserves were “trusts” made by a direct grant by the crown, by the governor, or 
through legislative enactment for eleemosynary institutions like hostelries, hospitals, and 
schools. Next were “reserved lands” not under any type of specialized protection other than 
general restrictions that they could not be sold, mortgaged, or transferred without permission 
from the governor. A third category of “reserves under the Native Lands Act” covered lands 
intended to be made inalienable by being conveyed to trustees.102 Heaphy’s main task for his 
first months in office was to tabulate the different types of reserves held in trust by the 
government, determine their extent and ownership, and advise the Native Secretary on the best 
means of administering the trust estate. 
 The Native Office was particularly concerned with the category of “reserves to be made 
under the Native Lands Act” as it was the newest type of reserved land. Since part of the Native 
101 AJHR 1870, “Papers Relating to Major Heaphy’s Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, 
D-16, Donald McLean to Charles Heaphy, 13 October 1869, 3. 
102 AJHR 1871, “Report from the Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, F-4, Report on the Native Reserves 
in the Province of Auckland, 19 July 1871, 3. 
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Land Court’s remit under the act was establishing reserves as part of its larger program of 
individualizing Māori land tenure, Heaphy’s instructions were to work with the court to ensure 
Māori interests were well represented. In this role, the commissioner occupied an ambiguous 
position as both an advocate for Māori reserves while aligning with the proceedings of the court 
in its task of individualization. Heaphy’s dilemma of securing the best deal for two often-
divergent interests recalled the experience of George Clarke, the Protector of Aborigines in the 
mid-1840s. Like Heaphy, Clarke was also responsible for acquiring land from Māori while 
simultaneously advocating their position with the colonial government.  
Heaphy’s letters with the Native Minister reveal his approach to reconciling this potential 
conflict of interest by working within the framework of individual title. The commissioner hoped 
that by furthering the work of the Native Land Court he might ensure Māori received legal 
possession of land with the imprimatur of colonial courts. With secure title, Māori hapu and iwi 
would have a secure economic footing. Heaphy’s vision of humanitarian governance, therefore, 
remained allied to the success of the colonial state’s tenurial and legal structures. His vision of 
humanitarian action was one which enmeshed Māori proprietorship securely within a European 
system of laws and farming practices. Heaphy’s job, as he saw it, was to ensure Māori retained 
access – even if not under their direct control – to land that would facilitate their adoption of 
European habits of “civilization.”103 Humanitarianism, therefore, was covalent with assimilation.  
 While advocating individualization, Heaphy nevertheless cautioned that the transition 
from collective to individual tenure could be a fraught one for Māori. In the case of Hawke’s 
Bay, a prosperous region on the east coast of the North Island, Native Secretary McLean had 
received troubling news that the cohesion of lands assigned jointly to several Māori parties was 
103 AJHR 1870, “Papers Relating to Major Heaphy’s Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, 
D-16, Charles Heaphy to Donald McLean, 17 December 1869, 4. 
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threatened by the sale of partial interests in the land. The Native Land Court allowed a single 
stakeholder with interest in the land to petition for sale. The danger was that introducing 
“strangers” (either European or Māori) into the ownership structure weakened the ability of what 
were often hapu-based networks to maintain control of land traditionally held through ties of 
kinship.  
Heaphy travelled to Hawke’s Bay in May of 1870 where he began a series of reports 
about the state of reserves in the various provinces of New Zealand. Over the next year, as he 
travelled around the North and South Islands, his efforts to identify and classify Native Reserves 
was the first colony-wide effort to tabulate reserves in at least fifteen years. Heaphy focused his 
energies on conveying land individualized by the Native Land Court into trust arrangements. The 
structure of a trust prevented the “easy acquisition of the means of living by the rental of land” 
that could lead to “habits of extravagance and debt” with financiers all-to-keen to loan money 
with land as collateral.104 Inalienability would preclude Māori from being reduced to penury, 
which could occur if Māori too quickly sold off their land. Since receiving Crown title to their 
lands, Hawke’s Bay Māori had taken out £31,826 in mortgages or sales against the property.105 
To preclude dispossession, Heaphy thought the trust arrangement could have positive social and 
economic outcomes for Māori by preventing sale or unwise mortgage and thereby preclude both 
the excesses of plenty from a windfall sale and the dangers of penury. Trusts would protect 
Māori both from the acquisitive banker and the temptation of immediate wealth.  
  In Hawke’s Bay, Heaphy accomplished much of his agenda and succeeded in transferring 
thirteen reserves comprising 36,000 acres into trusts administered by the Native Reserve Office. 
104 AJHR 1870, “Papers Relating to Major Heaphy’s Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, 
D-16, Report on the Native Reserves in the Province of Hawke’s Bay, May 1870, 12. 
105 Ibid., 12. 
274
He was especially happy with Karaitiana Takamoana, a leader of the Ngāti Kahungunu who 
occupied the seat in the House of Representatives for Eastern Maori from 1871 to 1879, who was 
encumbered by large debts partly incurred through his assisting government forces against rebel 
Māori. Takamoana conveyed 834 acres surrounding the village of Pakowhai into a trust.106 The 
rich soil in an area between European settlements at Gisborne and Hastings held great potential 
for promoting Māori farming. Heaphy hoped he would conduce Māori to adopt an agricultural 
livelihood by working on the land to improve it. Though skeptical of indigenous patterns of land 
economy, thinking that the process of exhausting soil and moving onto new territory was 
wasteful, Heaphy recognized that in places reserves were not efficiently surveyed with long-
narrow lots being inefficient to fence and farm and difficult to let to Europeans.107 
Over the twenty months following his appointment, Heaphy visited each of New 
Zealand’s ten districts and provinces. Reports from these visits served as both a data gathering 
exercise and as an opportunity to comment about the economic and political circumstances he 
found in each part of New Zealand. In each place, he classified holdings of land set aside for 
Māori according to the conditions of its creation and the nature of the government’s 
responsibility regarding the lands. He also noted the state of the reserve finances, and 
recommended a course of action to the Native Lands Court. On a per capita basis, the amount of 
reserve land varied widely from 87 acres per capita in Hawke’s Bay to 24 acres per capita in 
Canterbury.108 These figures are comparable to the amount of land allotted to European settlers. 
106 Angela Ballara. 'Takamoana, Karaitiana', Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, first published in 1990. Te Ara - 
the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, https://teara.govt.nz/en/biographies/1t5/takamoana-karaitiana (accessed 16 
February 2018). 
107 AJHR 1870, “Papers Relating to Major Heaphy’s Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, 
D-16, Report on the Native Reserves in the Province of Otago, May 1870, 24.
108 AJHR 1871, “Report from the Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, F-4. The estimated Māori
population and the reserves associated with Māori in that province ranged widely. North Island - Auckland: (The
1874 census was the first to include Māori and listed 43,538 in the North Island on 1,307,973); Wellington: 35.5
(5322 inhabitants and 174,366 acres); Hawke’s Bay: 87 (1897 inhabitants on 165,105 acres). South Island -
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In the case of the Auckland Province it amounted to 40 acres for each adult immigrant and 20 for 
each child. Military settlers received a grant of 50 acres. This amount of land, Heaphy thought, 
was sufficient for independent cultivators but the variable quality of the land for agricultural 
production makes any direct comparison between Māori lands and settler allotments difficult.109  
The visible work of tabulating reserves and organizing land that had been individualized 
into enduring trusts, Heaphy hoped, would reassure both loyal Māori and those who had rebelled 
that the government was not following a program of total alienation. Codifying reserves signaled 
action by the government to Māori who might have become “disaffect[ed]” had they continued 
to lose land in an unabated fashion.110 The South Island province of Marlborough had a 
relatively small Māori population of the 369 “Ngatiawa [sic],” Ngāi Tahu, Ngāti Kuia, and 
Rangitāne.111 Heaphy hoped establishing reserves for Marlborough Māori, who could have been 
easily conquered by the colonial state, would instill confidence among numerically more 
numerous Māori on North Island that the government was not pursuing universal dispossession. 
Marking out reserves and establishing trusts for individualized land was both a means to further 
the goals of the Native Lands Act and while also functioning as a post-war strategy of engaging 
Māori support and confidence in the government. 
With most South Island land largely in settler hands by the 1850s and an overall higher 
ratio of land on a per capita basis, South Island reserves were more established and enmeshed 
within the bureaucracy than those on the North Island. Like their North Island counterparts, 
Canterbury: 24.75 acres (406 on 10076 acres); Southland: 32.33 (248 on 11069 acres); Westland: 81.11 (73 on 
5930); Nelson: 120 [29.75] (483 [plus North Island Māori] on 58365 [14365]); Marlborough: 58 (369 on 21,404 
acres). 
109 AJHR 1871, “Report from the Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, F-4, Report on the Native 
Reserves, 31 July 1871, 61. 
110 AJHR 1870, “Papers Relating to Major Heaphy’s Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, 
D-16, Report on the Native Reserves in the Province of Hawke’s Bay, May 1870, 13.
111 Ibid., Report on the Native Reserves in the Province of Marlborough, August 1870, 43.
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however, reserves served multiple purposes – as sources of revenue derived from rental income, 
as space for Māori to inhabit, and in some cases maintaining access to fishing grounds, forest 
resources, or in the case of Stewart Island access to mutton bird and whaling sites.112 Ensuring 
access to these resources was calculated to “prevent the possibility of destitution to the local 
Natives, even in a season of scanty or failing crops.”113 Heaphy characterized land set aside in 
the province of Canterbury formed “a magnificent estate for the existing remnant of the people 
that formerly owned the land” who farmed and raised cattle.114 Heaphy’s invocation of 
Canterbury Māori as a lingering “remnant” suggests that at least on the South Island the local 
Ngāi Tahu were no longer a threat to the government. Instead they could be treated as a 
conquered people who would maintain access to resources. Land held in trust would then protect 
them from the impact of larger economic forces. 
In Nelson, income from reserves let to tenants was used to purchase agricultural 
equipment, provide fittings like doors, windows, and chimney bricks for building European-style 
houses, and also through small interest-free loans to “the most deserving." 115 The fund also paid 
for medical attendance and food for the sick and otherwise indigent. Nelson’s history as an early 
settlement of the New Zealand Company meant its reserves dated from the early 1840s though 
years of neglect meant that “some reserves had been lost sight of, [and] many unutilized.”116 
Reserves continued to be a source of provisions and rental income to support Māori but Heaphy 
largely saw their resources as a safety net preventing destitution rather than as Māori land 
supporting an autonomous Māori people  
112 Ibid., Report on the Native Reserves in the Province of Southland, May 1870, 30. The tītī, or mutton bird is a 
species of petrel hharvested for its oil, meat, and fat by South Island Māori 
113 AJHR 1870, “Papers Relating to Major Heaphy’s Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, 
D-16, Report on the Native Reserves in the Province of Southland, May 1870, 30.
114 Ibid., Report on the Native Reserves in the Province of Canterbury, 23 June 1870, 18.
115 Ibid., Report on the Native Reserves of the Province of Nelson - Memorandum by A. Mackay, July 1870, 38.
116 Ibid., Report on the Native Reserves of the Province of Nelson, July 1870, 39.
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 Reports from other provinces reveal non-standardized administrative practices. If, on the 
North Island, Heaphy’s concerns focused on the process of the Native Land Court issuing title 
and then his securing those titles within a trust, in Westland, on the South Island, reserves were 
already well established. The government had purchased the district, a thin, auriferous strip of 
coast between the Tasman Sea and the Southern Alps, from Ngāi Tahu in 1860. Following the 
discovery of gold in 1865 local Ngāi Tahu had placed their reserves under the control of the 
government.117 By 1870, these reserves generated an annual revenue of about £4,000 which 
supported building houses for local Ngāi Tahu, making payments to those with a beneficiary 
interest, remunerating the salaries of the local commissioner of native reserves and an interpreter, 
undertaking flood mitigation, and developing paving works on reserved land.  
In contrast to what Heaphy had observed of the isolated and subsistence state of Westland 
Ngāi Tahu during his earlier travels in the 1840s, the commissioner’s 1870 report noted a 
significant positive change in their material condition. He thought it worth noting that while “it 
has been so often written in England that the Māori suffers materially and socially by contact 
with the settler” in Westland, “in the midst of a  gold digging community—proverbially rough, 
and not disposed to regard a dark skin  with much sentiment—the Māori has improved in social 
condition, and is well cared for.”118 A sensitivity to New Zealand’s place in the British 
imagination suggests that Heaphy was attuned to the colony’s reputation abroad and the ways in 
which government programs might attest to the colony’s beneficial treatment of its indigenous 
peoples.  
117 AJHR 1870, “Papers Relating to Major Heaphy’s Appointment as Commissioner of Native Reserves,” Session 1, 
D-16, Report on the Native Reserves in the County of Westland, July 1870, 33.  
118 Ibid., 36. Thirty-four reserves comprising 5,920 acres, most (28) of the reserves were set aside in 1860 for 
Ngaitahu with the remaining six created by resident Māori ceding the land to the governor under the auspices of the 
1856 Native Reserves Act. 
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A system of rental income and payments to beneficiaries in Nelson and the Westland - 
supervised by Alexander Mackay who would later go on to become Native Reserves 
Commissioner in 1882 - contrasted markedly with the neighboring province of Marlborough 
which had over twenty-thousand acres of reserves on the books but only three of the forty-four 
designated reserves had been granted. Generally, however, the South Island provinces indicate a 
heightened intensity of trusteeship over reserves by virtue of local officials maintaining separate 
bank accounts for the reserves and looking to exchange, survey, and develop reserved lands for 
what the state saw as the best interest of Māori.119 The lower densities of Māori on the South 
Island and a reprieve from the disruptions of the New Zealand Wars, focused on the North 
Island, meant that aspects of humanitarian governance did not have to address the same intensity 
of violence, displacement, and confiscation. Social stability and the loyalty of South Island iwi 
and hapu meant reserve administration did not have to consider Māori as a threat to the survival 
of the settler colonial state. 
Heaphy continued his survey of remaining reserves into the 1870s. In Taranaki, where 
the violence at Waitara had sparked the beginning of years of warfare in 1860, the Native 
Minister wrote to the province’s civil commissioner, underscoring his desire to “settle” the land 
question in a way that would “enable the Government to locate in it a numerous body of 
Europeans [and it] would be advantageous to have all Native reserves within natural boundaries, 
wherever practicable.”120 This effort to “settle” questions of land ownership through 
confiscation, the Native Land Court, and reserves marked a return to the structures of earlier 
119 The provincial boundaries that had been established by the colonial government cut across Māori social 
groupings with Ngāi Tahu on the West Coast contributing to a lawsuit about control of a valuable harborside reserve 
in Dunedin that was being contested between the provincial council and the native reserves. 
120 AJHR 1872, “Reports on Settlement of Confiscated Lands,” Session 1, C-4, Donald McLean to R. Parris, 20 May 
1872, 28. 
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form of humanitarian governance that demarcated lines of what would be European and what 
would be Māori. The un-tenability of those lines, heavily blurred in the later 1840s and 1850s 
precluded any meaningful survey and consistent pattern of establishing reserves on a sustainable 
footing.  
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of military conflict and the establishment of the Native Land Court, 
Māori communities on the North Island endured both the confiscation of land and intensified 
legal processes targeting communal landholding. Acquiring and subdividing land was 
inextricably linked with settlement and control. This process was especially clear in proposals to 
establish townships of veterans on confiscated land in the Waikato.121 Unless local hapu had 
strong cohesion, there were few options to gain value from land other than submitting a claim to 
the Native Land Court to gain legal title over it. Paternalism as a form of trusteeship could be 
used to justify land alienation but it bore little of the spirit of the law that recognized indigenous 
title to the land. Government policy, therefore, sanctioned land grabs of a significant scale. 
Through military force and legal facility, the policy of the colonial state from 1860 to the end of 
the New Zealand Wars in 1872 exhibited little of the concern expressed during an earlier era. 
Rebellion had obviated responsibility for the colonial state – itself short on resources – to devote 
to Māori purposes. 
Reforming the office of the Commissioner of Native Reserves suggests an interest in 
reviving the humanitarian governance of an earlier era that sought the efficient administration of 
reserves through a committee of trustees. By 1872 and the conclusion of hostilities, however, 
New Zealand’s demographic and political contexts were radically different than those of the 
121 Boast and Hill, Raupatu: The Confiscation of Māori Land, 6. 
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1830s when the New Zealand Company had proposed its colonization scheme. The function and 
mission of those native reserves Heaphy codified in the early 1870s reflected a changed 
demographic reality. Between 1858 and 1874 the European share of New Zealand’s population 
grew from 50 percent to 85 percent. An increased demand for agricultural land had also 
pressured the government to pursue increasingly forceful means to acquire land.  
With millions of acres transferred from Māori to European control through confiscation, 
the reserve system Heaphy administered was not a mechanism for preserving Māori autonomy 
and cultivating an indigenous elite who would constitute a means of encouraging Māori 
assimilation and economic improvement. The adoption of a trusteeship model where 
individualized land conveyed into a trust removed Māori from the administration of the reserves 
and participation in decision making. By shifting authority from Māori to European trustees, the 
humanitarian element of native reserves in the late 1860s became more paternalist and subject to 
being run for the economic and political benefit of Europeans. 
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Conclusion 
In the 1830s, British proponents of humanitarian intervention in New Zealand identified 
the corrupting forces of visiting Europeans as the main obstacle to Māori progress. Forty years 
later, at the end of the New Zealand Wars, colonial officials saw the failure of many Māori to 
readily assimilate into Pākehā society as a problem internal to indigenous communities. No 
longer a significant military threat to the colony’s rapidly growing settler population, in the eyes 
of the colonial state Māori financial and cultural precarity now formed a social problem to be 
managed rather than an humanitarian emergency requiring intervention. Consequently, the 
government’s practices of humanitarian governance shifted from engaging and enticing Māori 
participation through interventions in health, education and legal assimilation to policies that 
prioritizing the state’s role as a trustee acting on behalf of Māori.  
The “shadow of responsibility” alluded to by the Duke of Newcastle in 1862 aptly 
describes the transformation of indigenous protection during the mid-nineteenth century as it 
recognizes that the quality of humanitarian governance changed even as the state continuously 
pursued a duty of care toward Māori.1 It is easy to dismiss the plans of the New Zealand 
Company and other proponents of humanitarian colonization in New Zealand as either naïve 
dreamers or Machiavellian schemers. Plans to ameliorate the negative impacts of settlement 
deserve to be taken seriously as an earnest experiment in imperial rule. Even if the realized 
infrastructure of humanitarian governance bore only passing resemblance to the ideas from 
1 Parliamentary Papers of Great Britain 1862 (3049) Papers Relative to Affairs of New Zealand, Duke of Newcastle 
to Governor George Grey, 26 May 1862, 80. 
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which they sprung, New Zealand was an experiment in social organization. What is equally 
important to remember, however, is that empire, even when undertaken as a humanitarian 
intervention, creates and consolidates inequality. Descriptions of Māori prevalent in the 1830s as 
victimized by wicked Europeans positioned British missionaries, colonial theorists, and jurists as 
a superior, guiding force capable of rescuing indigenous New Zealanders from savagery. Though 
the subsequent humanitarian intervention did not rely on coercion, British interlocutors had a 
clear path in mind for how Māori society would change to become like their own. Despite 
recognizing and validating indigenous autonomy, humanitarianism nevertheless structured the 
choices available to Māori. By the 1870s, with the settler state in firm political control, colonial 
administrators largely excluded Māori from participation in the management of their own 
welfare. Like earlier iterations of humanitarian governance, European officials were confident 
they knew right path for Māori. Colonial legislation in the early 1870s failed to include Māori 
representation in the management of indigenous lands. 
Charles Heaphy’s encouragement of Māori to place their land into trusts overseen by 
Europeans formed the “shadow” of earlier confidence that Māori could, through the operation of 
humanitarian governance, achieve social and economic parity with settler communities. The 
consequence of a turn toward a paternalist implication of humanitarian governance was that it 
established a trajectory of dependence by making Māori reliant upon disbursements of funds 
from a trust, rather than as active agents involved in decision making. It is in the loss of Māori 
autonomy and independence – to choose the degree and nature of their engagement with the 
colonial state – that the most drastic reorientation of humanitarian governance was located. 
Initially, reserves of land for benefit of Māori constituted a central feature of indigenous 
protection in New Zealand. Instead of forming a spatial and economic buttress protecting Māori 
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against dispossession, reserves instead formed a vector for spreading British legal, culture, and 
economic frameworks among Māori communities. Politicians and lobbyists portrayed reserves as 
emblematic of the government’s commitment to the humane treatment of Māori even as de jure 
policy and de facto governance increasingly curtailed indigenous autonomy. As the literal 
ground on which British settlers, colonial administrators, and Māori contested the latter’s 
inclusion or exclusion, native reserves exemplified the ways in which colonists expressed 
humanitarian aspirations even as their practices subverted those same ideals and, by 1872, 
excluded Māori from the management of reserves altogether. 
A map from 1869, an image of which is on the following page, shows New Zealand’s 
North Island as envisioned by the colony’s Defence Office. Portraying “Native Tribal 
Boundaries, Topographical features, and Confiscated Lands” the map presents a reoriented 
understanding of the role, and possible future, of Māori and Māori land in the colonial state. 
Alongside swathes of green denoting forests and large patches of yellow marking the 3,884,437 
acres confiscated from Māori as a result of the New Zealand Wars, there are also smaller areas of 
brown intermixed with a few yellow dots. Per the map’s legend, these brown areas represent 
“areas where rocks are found at the surface in which gold veins could alone be expected” and the 
dots indicate “where gold has actually been found.” The inclusion of Māori tribal boundaries, 
areas of confiscated land, and zones of potential gold fields presents Māori and Māori land as 
part of the same desired resource base for the settler-colonial state. Gold and Māori land, in this 
case, were part of the colonial state’s aspirations for New Zealand’s future. 
284
 
Figure 1: TNA, Sketch Map of the North Island of New Zealand 1869, CO 700/New Zealand 44. 
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Humanitarianism as a modality of imperial rule was predicated on ameliorating the 
impact of British settlement in a colonial space while nevertheless transforming indigenous 
bodies, landscapes, and legal frameworks to fit British notions of progress. As an implementation 
of a British impulse toward reform that was ascendant in the mid-nineteenth century, 
humanitarian governance shaped colonial futures in places as far afield as British Columbia, 
Australia, and Sierra Leone. Policies officials and advocates classified as humane frequently 
sought to weaken indigenous social and economic relationships based on existing communal 
patterns. 
Though drawing inspiration from a humanitarian program, government action 
nevertheless curtailed the autonomy of those deemed in need of protection. In New Zealand, the 
onset of a decade of intermittent warfare in the 1860s, and the impact of a hardening of racial 
attitudes toward indigenous peoples throughout the British Empire, reframed the nature of the 
relationship between the colonial state and Māori. Continued references to colonial 
administration as humanitarian masked a change in the quality of government policy. If in the 
1840s humanitarian governance sought out and relied upon Māori consent and participation, by 
the 1870s policies prioritized the settler-colonial state as a paternal custodian of indigenous 
interests. 
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